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Microcredit in Sub-Saharan
Africa
A Symposium

Terry F. Buss
The stark reality is that most poor people in the world still lack access to sustainable
financial services, whether it is savings, credit, or insurance. The great challenge
before us is to address the constraints that exclude people from full participation
in the financial sector. The International Year of Microcredit offers a pivotal
opportunity for the international community to engage in a shared commitment
to meet this challenge. Together, we can and must build inclusive financial sectors
that help people improve their lives.
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan,
Announcing 2005 as the International Year for Microcredit

M

icrocredit programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, for the most
part, face the same set of problems and opportunities—
everything from debt repayment to outreach—as do
comparable programs in other regions across the globe. There is little
that is especially unique, to speak of, in the way programs in SubSaharan Africa are developed or implemented or in the clients in
need and the services consumed. There are five or six issues, though,
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that appear to apply more to Africa than might generally be true elsewhere. Why have nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Africa
lagged behind other regions in transforming from subsidized agents
to private, albeit nonprofit, regulated financial institutions? How has
microcredit as a development approach been brought to bear on the
issue of HIV/AIDs currently plaguing Africa? Is microcredit a viable
development strategy in postconflict countries? Why do microcredit
programs in Africa differ so widely by region and country? How can
formal and informal financial markets be better integrated? Although
not unique to Africa, what are the positive and negative impacts of
microcredit on entrepreneurs and on their businesses, families, and
communities, especially social capital? How can outcome assessments
be used to improve microfinance program management? And how
might microcredit programs be made more sustainable? Below I raise
issues that ought to be high on a research agenda for Sub-Saharan
Africa and discuss six papers by prominent microfinance researchers
who address some of these areas in this Symposium.

Financial Institutions and Markets
Microcredit organizations in developing countries were launched
either as NGOs, components of development projects, government
agencies, or savings and credit associations or cooperatives and selfhelp groups (International Labor Organization, 1996; IFAD, 2001).1
Expectations, at least among market economists, were that, with the
exception of group schemes, these highly subsidized operations
would eventually become regulated financial institutions, able to
sustain themselves in financial markets in competition with other
private sector banks (Robinson, 2001). Since 1992, when the NGO
Fundación para la Promoción y el Desarrollo de la Microempresa
was transformed into BancoSol in Bolivia (Glosser, 2004), 39 other
NGOs have converted. Of the NGO transformations, only one—
Kenya’s Rural Enterprise Program (K-Rep)—in all of Sub-Saharan
Africa has converted (Rosengard, 2000; Fernando, 2004).2 Why
Terry F. Buss is Director of International Studies at the National Academy of Public
Administration in Washington, DC. Email address: tbuss@napawash.org
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have NGOs in Africa lagged behind other regions? Or, stated more
positively, why have African NGOs chosen not to transform?
The Asian Development Bank (Charitonenko & Rahman, 2002,
pp. x–xi) recently cataloged challenges facing the “commercialization”
of NGO microcredit programs, including “widespread negative
perceptions of commercialization, weak institutional capacity, lack of
vision in the microfinance industry, plethora of poorly-performing
government microcredit programs, inadequate secured transactions
framework, absence of credit information bureaus, lack of legal and
regulatory supportive frameworks and prevalence of grants and soft
loan funds (see also, UNCDF, 1999; Campion, 2002).” What remains
to be seen across Africa is which of these factors account more or
less for the lack of “commercialization” of NGOs and what policymakers might do about it.
Ernest Aryeetey, in this Symposium, looks at financial markets
with an eye toward integrating the informal and formal components
into a more efficient and effective financial system that will serve
microentrepreneurs and small- to medium-size enterprises (SMEs).
He offers a framework for achieving financial market integration.3

HIV/AIDs and Microcredit
Sub-Saharan Africa boasts only 10% of the world’s population but
accounts for 60% of all people living with HIV/AIDS. This translates
into an estimated 25.4 million people who are HIV-positive. As many
as 3 million new HIV cases are added each year, while about 2 million die annually from the disease (Stanecki, 2004; USAIDS/WHO,
2004; Ntinga, 2004; Dunford, 2001). Effects of the pandemic
threaten to stall or even reverse economic progress in the region (Patel
& Buss, 2003; Buss & Patel, 2005). Workers are lost and not
replaced. Families loose breadwinners. Children are orphaned.
Some microcredit programs in Sub-Saharan Africa are beginning
to target those impacted by HIV/AIDS, particularly women clientele,
as a way to empower them to participate in economic prosperity
where they had been excluded in the past. “Most African microfinance schemes could potentially expand their outreach and become
self-sustaining. They are an effective anti-poverty tool—‘When the
Volume 7 Number 1
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poorest especially women receive credit, they become economic
actors with power; power to improve not only their lives but . . . the
lives of their families, their communities and communities of
nations’” (UNDP, 1999). But HIV/AIDS may unravel women’s
progress, not to mention the progress of men and families, as they
struggle to become economically independent. Microcredit programs
are now associated with health care, preventive education, life and
disability insurance, orphan care, and other social services not previously associated with microcredit (e.g., Microcredit Summit, 2000).
Taking on HIV/AIDS in the context of microentrepreneurship poses
special challenges: many traditional African societies ostracize people
with AIDS, making it difficult for them to participate in group lending schemes, for example. It is unclear whether the melding of microcredit with HIV/AIDS prevention and mediation will be successful
over the longer term as an approach to the economic empowerment
of women. But prospects might be promising.
Carolyn Barnes, in this Symposium, seeks to better understand
how chronic illness and death, possibly associated with HIV/AIDS,
negatively affect households and the impact of microcredit in helping
affected households access capital and services from the Zambuko
Trust in Zimbabwe. The study looks at the vetting of members by
loan guarantee groups and the ways these groups deal with individuals affected by illness and death. Because loan group members serve
as gatekeepers for loans, internal dynamics of these groups, as well as
the policies and loan terms and conditions, are important to understanding any push factors that might exclude HIV/AIDS infected
and affected individuals. Barnes suggests ways that might assist
microfinance institutions and their clients to address negative effects
of HIV/AIDS.

Microcredit in Postconflict Countries
Civil war and outsider aggression have plagued many countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa, with many conflicts attracting global attention—
in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Congo, to name a few. Many
wonder whether microcredit programs might help stimulate recovery
in these war-torn places (Tucker, Nourse, Gailey, Park, & Bauman,
4

Volume 7 Number 1

Microcredit in Sub-Saharan Africa

2004; World Bank, n.d.). The UN Capital Development Fund
(UNCDF) is experimenting with such investments. From their website:
Sierra Leone: Very few in this country have access to microfinance following a decade of conflict. But with the aim of inspiring economic growth and durable reconstruction, UNCDF has
mobilized donors to work with the government in a five-year
program to build an inclusive national financial sector that fully
integrates microfinance—with $3.3 million from Kreditanstalt
für Wiederaufbau (KfW, Germany’s development bank),
$3 million from UNCDF and $2.5 million from UNDP. The
goal is a competitive microfinance industry by 2009 that provides
sustainable financial services to at least 80,000 active clients.
(UNCDF, 2004)
Is microcredit a viable development approach for recovering
war-torn countries or regions? More research in Africa is needed to
answer this question.

Variability in Microcredit Programs
Microcredit program developers—mostly NGOs, development
projects, and APEX4 organizations—in Sub-Saharan Africa and
other regions have been just as entrepreneurial in designing programs as entrepreneurs have been in launching new businesses.5 A
lot of knowledge exists about how to attain different program goals
through organizational structure, product design, funding innovation,
and service delivery. This being the case, one would expect that there
would be wide variability in program offerings across Sub-Saharan
Africa. In fact, though, regions and individual countries tend to
employ similar programs that vary from other regions (see Aryeetey
in this Symposium). Are the needs of microenterprises for capital
and services different across regions, necessitating different microcredit programs? Or are there either barriers or opportunities that
shape program possibilities? Identifying reasons why programs differ
across Africa might be an interesting line of inquiry. The range of
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programs covered by our six articles in this Symposium provides an
overview of the possibilities.

Impact Evaluations
Even though there are now perhaps thousands of microfinance programs serving millions of people, impact evaluations are not as common as they ought to be.6 As a field, we still lack continuing hard
information about what works well and what does not, and what
impacts microfinance has on microentrepreneurs in Africa.7 Gayle
Morris and Carolyn Barnes, in this Symposium, report findings from
an impact study of three microfinance programs in Uganda—
FINCA,8 FOCCAS, and PRIDE. The study found numerous positive impacts on program clients: the addition of new products and
services, an improvement or expansion of enterprise sites and markets, a reduction in the costs of inventory purchases, and an increase
in sales volume. Household-level impacts included new enterprises
begun, increased amounts spent on durable assets and agricultural
inputs, increased amounts of cultivated agricultural land, and
increased amounts of household income from crops. Microfinance
programs help client households reduce financial vulnerability
through the diversification of income sources and the accumulation
of assets. Donor organizations should consider investing more
resources in evaluation studies of microcredit in developing countries. In addition to producing knowledge, evaluations can be used to
financially support universities and think tanks that might receive
contracts to conduct the work.

Linking Outcome Research to
Management Decision-Making
Commercial financial institutions have always invested heavily in
the production of information that can be used by management to
improve productivity, and hence profitability. In the world of microfinance, though, much of the knowledge production, especially in
the early days of these programs, concerned mostly assessments by
donors to see whether their expectations were being fulfilled, and to
some extent to identify problems, barriers, and opportunities that
6
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might improve the design and operation of programs in the field. As
microcredit program managers have become more sophisticated,
and as methodologies for producing information have been increasingly refined, information is now being used by program managers
to guide operations, just as it is in the commercial world. Practitionerfocused assessment and its cousin, client-focused assessment, are
becoming increasingly common, improving the field in the process.
Doocy, Norell, Teffera, and Burnham conducted an outcome
assessment of microfinance programs in southern Ethiopia, looking
at the impact of program participation on socioeconomic status and
food security. They show how management used study findings to
improve client retention, increase client savings, and expand participation for women.

Microcredit Program Sustainability
Program sustainability is a huge issue in the microcredit field. It
means something different in the context of program type—self-help
groups, NGOs, government-sponsored programs, or commercial
ventures (Buss, 1999). Organizations depending on donor agency
subsidies are not (but could be) commercially viable, but depend on
their ability to meet donor expectations while behaving effectively
and efficiently within this context. Government-sponsored programs
tend to function similarly to NGOs. Commercial programs are sustainable to the extent that they survive and thrive in the competitive
market, while meeting the needs of investors or owners. Of course,
self-help groups are sustainable to the extent that they serve the credit
needs of members and continue to replenish capital. Regardless of
microcredit organizational type, sustainability probably is achievable
for all at least in part if the following principles are adhered to:
understanding the market for microcredit, adhering to proven best
practices in the field, decentralizing decision-making, building and
maintaining capacity, focusing on the mission, being accountable
and transparent, and striving for efficiency and effectiveness.
Baumann, in this Symposium, looks at the sustainability of
NGO-managed microfinance institutions in South Africa where the
society has extreme income disparities. NGOs must recover operating
Volume 7 Number 1
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costs—especially salaries—equivalent to those in First World countries. Yet microfinance institution clients in South Africa are among
the poorest in their ability to repay loans, as is common in Third
World countries. Therefore, Baumann argues for alternatives to the
NGO-based microcredit model.

Microcredit and Social Capital Formation
Social capital refers to the notion that networks of people working
together produce benefits for themselves and the community to a
much greater extent than does isolated, individual action (de Souza
Briggs, 1997). Poor people who are not connected are disadvantaged
in any effort to reduce their poverty. Social capital formation has
come to undergird many poverty reduction strategies: the World
Bank and the United Nations Development Program both heavily
promote this approach, as do other donor countries and international
organizations. Microcredit programs are in themselves one form of
social capital in that they bring together lenders and borrowers for
the purpose of starting and developing microenterprises and, in
many cases, consuming social services. This connectivity benefits
business, community, and individuals as they attempt to fight their
way out of poverty.
Kah, Olds, and Kah look at the role of microcredit in social
capital formation in Senegal from both a rational choice and a Marxist
perspective. The study goes beyond an assessment of the impact of programs on participants to an assessment of the impact on communities.
* * * * *
The Symposium (contained in this issue of the Journal of
Microfinance) begins with Aryeetey’s paper laying out microcredit in
Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by a discussion of formal and informal
financial market integration. Next, Morris and Barnes report results
from their impact assessment of microfinance in Uganda. Barnes
reports on her work in Zimbabwe in the context of HIV/AIDs.
Doocy, Norell, Teffera, and Burnham show how program outcome
assessments can be linked to program management decision-making

8
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in Ethiopia. Baumann tackles microcredit program sustainability in
South Africa. And, finally, Kah, Olds, and Kah show how microcredit programs engender social capital formation in Senegal.

Notes
This symposium is a project of the Africa Working Group of the National
Academy of Public Administration (Academy) in Washington, DC. The views expressed
in the Symposium are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Academy as an institution.
1. There are, of course, examples of commercial lenders with programs serving poor
people. The Century Rural Development Bank of Uganda is one example (Seibel, 2002).
2. K-Rep, founded in 1984, transformed into K-Rep Bank Ltd., a commercial
bank, in September 1999. K-Rep originally was a financial intermediary providing capital to NGOs and to work on the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Private
Enterprise Development Project. See http://www.k-rep.co.ke
3. See also, Aryeetey (2001).
4. APEX organizations are intermediaries between funders and microcredit programs.
Their track record has been called into question (see, for example, Pennell, 1999).
5. See, for example, Chao-Beroff (2000).
6. The Africa Microfinance Network, for example, includes 365 member institutions, serving 2 million poor people in 13 African countries. The Micro-Credit Summit
hopes to serve 54 million clients by end of 2005. See http://www.microcreditsummit.org
7. Some illustrative examples from the field include: MkNelly and Lippold (2001),
Brown (2002), Freedom From Hunger (1998), Rosenberg (1998), Hospies, Musinga
and Ong’ayo (2002), Lafontaine (2001), and Afrane (2002). The best catalogs of studies, including evaluations and impact assessments, are found at: Microfinance Gateway
(http://www.microfinancegateway.org), UNCDF (http://www.uncdf.org), Consultative
Group to Assist the Poorest (http://cgap.org), and Global Development Research
Center (http://www.gdrc.org).
8. See FINCA website at http://www.villagebanking.org/
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Informal Finance for Private
Sector Development in
Sub-Saharan Africa

Ernest Aryeetey
Abstract: What can be done to make informal finance and microfinance suitable
for financing growing small to medium size enterprises (SMEs) in Sub-Saharan
Africa? First, I present the characteristics of informal finance, focusing on size,
structure, and scope of activities. Informal finance has not been very attractive for
the private sector. Indeed, the informal sector has considerable experience and
knowledge about dealing with small borrowers, but there are significant limitations
to what it can lend to growing microbusinesses. Second, I discuss some recent
trends in microfinance. While externally driven microfinance projects have surfaced in Africa, their performance relative to small business finance has not been as
positive as in Asia and Latin America. Third, I introduce some possible steps
toward a new reform agenda that will make informal and microfinance relevant to
private sector development, including focusing on links among formal, semi-formal and informal finance and how these links can be developed.

I

n this section I explore the characteristics of informal finance
that make it difficult for it to be accessed by Sub-Saharan
African enterprises. “Informal finance” might be defined as
embracing all financial transactions taking place beyond various
countries’ regulations on banking and other financial sectors. This
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definition includes a wide range of financial activity whose operational scope differs across countries. Indeed, there is a wide variety
of informal savings and lending in the region.
The definition of informal finance includes such schemes as the
operations of Savings and Credit Associations (SCA), known all over
Africa; professional moneylenders; part-time moneylenders (estate
owners, traders, grain millers, smallholder farmers, employers, relations and friends); mobile bankers, known as susu or esusu collectors in
West Africa; credit unions; and cooperative societies. These exist in
both urban and rural areas. While savings collectors fall under the first
category of deposit mobilizers, moneylenders—including relations
and friends—do not generally accept deposits and may be assigned to
a second category. SCAs (credit unions and credit cooperatives) take in
deposits and also lend in varied forms. Most informal units deal with
specific groups of people, ensuring that only those satisfy distinct selection criteria are able to either deposit with them or borrow from them.

Who Can Borrow from Whom?
There is extreme segmentation in Sub-Saharan financial markets,
“fragmented” because the various segments serve distinct groups of
clients with similar characteristics and needs, and there is hardly any
interaction among different institutions. The negative effects of weak
linkages among segments far outweigh benefits of any specialization
they could make available through the existence of segments.
Fragmentation is indicated by wide differences in interest rates, as
well as insignificant flows of funds between segments, limiting
access to funds by potential clients. Because funds of different
lenders can hardly be substituted for one another, fragmented markets
have difficulty intermediating between savers and investors. In not
being able to allocate financial resources, they cannot always transform
and distribute risks and maturities efficiently. As a consequence,
deposits mobilized, as well as credit facilities, differ in structure, associating demand and usage with distinct socioeconomic groups.
Professor Ernest Aryeetey is Director of the Institute of Statistical, Social, and Economic
Research (ISSER) at the University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana. Email address:
isser@ug.edu.gh
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Credit from moneylenders is often the most expensive credit
available, hence demand comes from persons with no other options.
Such credit remains, nevertheless, the only source of informal credit
that does not require borrowers to satisfy specific membership
obligations. Despite the relatively high probability of loan requests
being granted, short maturity periods and high interest rates do not
make this credit attractive for those seeking working capital and
fixed investment loans. In most of rural West Africa, for instance,
clientele is wide ranging—farmers, market women, other traders,
nonfarm entrepreneurs, and other self-employed craftsmen. Farmers
sometimes borrow money from moneylenders during the planting
season to maintain their households until the next harvest. They
may also borrow for funerals and other social events. While rural
households usually borrow from their own communities, they
sometimes travel far to borrow from a moneylender.
SCAs’ credit facilities are used mainly for consumption, even
though they sometimes provide working capital. In Malawi, however,
the use of cooperative loans for financing farm working capital
outweighs use for consumption, as these are mainly for fertilizer
purchase and payment for farm labor (Chipeta & Mkandawire,
1991). A small loan for a short period has to be used for an activity
that has a quick turnover, such as cereal production. Group membership is an essential tool for screening loan applications and for
ensuring that contracts can be enforced. For many associations,
limitations to growth in size are imposed by expected increased risk
and increased probability of losing homogeneity as the group
expands. Homogeneity provides them with a sense of familiarity,
engendering mutual trust. Some rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) intentionally do not put together people with too
different backgrounds and interests. Size limitation restricts capital
to those borrowers whose demand for loans is not regular—e.g.,
those requiring loans to purchase a relatively expensive consumption
item.
Savings (susu) collectors grant “advances” to some trusted clients.
Other loan recipients might be traders at local markets in need of
short-term credit. When collectors lend to non-deposit clients, terms
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are often different from those of their deposit clients; they tend to
behave as moneylenders.

How Does Informal Sector Lending
to the Private Sector Work?
A number of recent studies reveal adequately that there has been
substantial growth in the activities of the informal financial sector
since reforms began in many Sub-Saharan African countries (e.g.,
Steel, Aryeetey, Hettige, & Nissanke, 1996; World Bank, 1994).1
Unfortunately, while the informal sector has grown and is willing to
increase lending, its products are not necessarily what the growing
small private sector demands.
There appears to be greater diversification in activity among
some informal institutions in attempts to reach out to more borrowers than is observed among formal institutions even after reforms.
Lending by SCAs has become part of a wide and growing range of
informal financial activities that are increasing clientele, as well as
growth in institutional goals and scope, including a diversification of
clientele. Even though SCA activities have broadened, socioeconomic principles underlying their operations have not. Change in
the scope of SCA activities, as with other informal financial units,
has been induced by changing socioeconomic circumstances of
clientele or membership, and also by changes in national economies.
Significant growth in lending by SCAs and rural cooperatives has been observed in a number of countries. But the growth
of lending by commercial moneylenders has been slower than
that of the SCAs and cooperatives in West Africa. Loan applications to moneylenders in Ghana and Nigeria rose significantly in
the 1990s but rural moneylenders received more applications in
a year than did urban lenders. They granted loans to over 80%
of their loan applicants in the period. Similar experiences have
been reported in Malawi.
Urban informal commercial loan sizes in Sub-Saharan Africa
generally lie between $50 and $1000, with a median value of about
$250, and have only grown marginally in many cases. In general,
loans from moneylenders tend to be the largest in the informal sector.
16
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Urban loans are also significantly larger than rural loans. Loan sizes
for moneylenders tend to be similar across countries.
Interest rates and maturities of informal lenders often make
their loans unattractive for business. Interest rates vary widely, from
zero to more than 100% per annum, even though they often have
similarly short maturities, seldom going beyond six months. Also,
rates do not seem to change significantly with time for a large
number of informal lenders. Interest rates of Malawian
moneylenders (Katapila), for example, appear to be much higher
than in most parts of Africa. They sometimes go as high as 100%
per month. This rate has been applied for many years in Malawi. In
all countries, moneylenders have the highest lending rates.
Interest rates of moneylenders in some countries have come
down, since financial sector and economy-wide reforms in the 1990s
began in Africa. It is not obvious if this is a result of competition with
other existing lenders, leading to declining demand, or of a change in
their own supply. This has more to do with general economy-wide
alterations in economic structures. Moneylenders are changing the
scope of lending in response to the changes in the financing needs
of traditional clientele. There is increasing pressure on lenders to
provide more credit for working capital for longer periods than they
have done in the past. While this change has been observed, moneylenders’ rates remain far above other segments.
When other group-based schemes lend to nonmembers, their
rates are often comparable to those of moneylenders. This holds for
both savings collectors and SCAs in many countries. Their rates
remain far less when dealing with their members or traditional clients.
In general, loans with the above characteristics are not attractive for
growing small borrowers, leading to the development of a gap in the
credit market as discussed below.

What Credit Gap Exists in African Financial Markets?
As a result of fragmentation, and because each lending unit cannot
alter the structure of its operations and products in the short to
medium term without additional flows of resources, there are few
lenders in Sub-Saharan Africa that meet the needs of borrowers
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interested in credit with the following characteristics: small loan
amounts up to $1,000, interest rates far below 30% per annum, and
a maturity of up to 18 months. That is what many small businesses,
often in countries with inflation rates well over 20%, ask for. The
most affected are microenterprises wanting to expand in small towns.
Credit gaps in various countries capture borrowers who cannot
access informal lenders, because they do not find the packages or
contracts of those lenders attractive for their purposes, and yet cannot gain access to the formal circles, because they are considered
ineligible. This does not mean small borrowers who want loans that
informal lenders provide are adequately taken care of. But if they
have not received credit, it is mainly because the nearest informal
lenders—for whom they are eligible—do not have enough resources
to provide them with loans. Their inability to obtain credit is seldom
because informal lenders do not want to lend to them. For the others,
no one can meet their demand cost effectively without significant
revision of institutional structures.

How Do Informal Operators Select Clients?
A characteristic of African financial markets is the weakness of modern contract enforcement mechanisms. Lenders lend small amounts
and have maturity periods that minimize costs, often in a way that
make their loans less attractive to businesses. In the absence of sound
formal contract enforcement, both formal and informal lending
institutions face the problem of managing risk with loan administration practices that suggest greater emphasis on loan screening than
on monitoring the use of loans and contract enforcement. Their
approaches might suggest a greater concern, the fear of selecting
noncreditworthy clients (adverse selection), even though clients’
changing their minds about loan use later (moral hazard) remains a
problem in the information asymmetry that lenders confront
(Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1996).
Screening in the informal sector relies extensively on personal
knowledge about borrowers. The development of personal ties and
the use of borrower proximity in decision-making are mechanisms
for countering adverse selection and moral hazard. The more rural
18
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the environment, the greater the need to personalize ties in confronting information asymmetry. Familiarity with borrowers often
reduces the significance of repeat borrowing. This explains why, in
such places as northern Nigeria, agricultural lending among relatives,
acquaintances, and neighbors is the norm. Susu collectors in Ghana
can take a decision on a loan request within one minute simply by
looking on the card on which deposits are entered to ensure that
borrower is a regular depositor. For a moneylender, new borrowers
are often introduced by persons a lender knows quite well and who
are prepared to guarantee payment with their word. This confines
their locus of operation to small areas.
In SCAs, as in cooperatives, loan screening is done at the time of
admission to membership. It assumes that a person requesting to join
the group is interested in a loan and will be admitted to the group if
he or she has characteristics similar to those of the other members,
including occupation and ethnicity in many cases. In screening applicants therefore, emphasis is not necessarily on whether members can
pay back loans they have taken, but on the commitment of members
to the group’s goals. Because group members invariably have similar
incomes and similar credit requirements, knowing the individual’s
character and how reliable they are is important.
The suggestion often made that informal lenders have a better
record on repayments than the formal sector mainly because of
constant monitoring of the uses to which loans are put does not
appear substantiated from a number of African studies (Nissanke &
Aryeetey, 1996). The form of monitoring often considered is regular
visits to project sites, but there is relatively little monitoring by informal lenders after loans have been given out. Moneylenders and other
informal groups seldom visit the project sites of their borrowers.
Obviously, when lending is localized, the need for project visits is
reduced. For moneylenders who are more likely to have borrowers in
other localities, monitoring is minimized because they always know
very well the persons who introduced borrowers to them.
Loan repayment rates generally tend to be much higher for
informal lenders than they are for formal lenders. Higher repayment
rates for informal lenders are not necessarily the result of more
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“aggressive” contract enforcement procedures. There is indeed little
evidence of litigation in courts. Collateral confiscation, in the absence
of proper ownership documentation and malfunctioning legal systems, is very difficult. Informal lenders go to clients’ homes to deliver
verbal warnings and threats. In membership arrangements, dismissal
of borrowers from groups is the most significant sanction.
The higher repayment rates of informal lenders are simply a
consequence of more efficient procedures for the retrieval of loans
and the borrowers’ knowledge that the informal lender has a higher
capability of actualizing threats to foreclose on collateral. For
example, when farmland is used as collateral, a bank is less likely to
foreclose on this without extra costs than a moneylender would. The
borrower knows that the moneylender can always find a relation to
farm on the land until a loan is repaid in full—an action that a bank
cannot take without incurring additional costs. Hence, for borrowers facing the two lenders, collateral has different meanings which
condition their attitudes towards repayment. They would not treat
the threat of collateral confiscation by an informal lender lightly. This
gives reason for risky SMEs to be cautious about dealing with the
informal financial sector.

What Are Direct and Indirect Linkages between
Formal and Informal Segments?
It is obvious that informal lenders could boost their business considerably if they could expand their lending base with resources from
the formal sector, and increasing loan sizes would be attractive for
SMEs. Direct or institutional linkages are expected to be shown in
actual flows of funds between segments. By indirect or market linkages, it is anticipated that activities in various segments will be
affected by activities in other segments through the influence of
financial markets. Both links are actually weak in most countries.
Thus, there is little evidence of informal lenders obtaining bank
loans for their lending businesses (Popiel, 1994; Nissanke &
Aryeetey, 1996; Bell, 1990).
With respect to indirect interaction between formal and informal
lenders, this remains less important. Expected competition between an
20
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institutional lender and an informal lender presents possibilities for
price interaction to occur, but this is based on the assumption of an
availability of “low-cost institutional credit” to informal lenders.
This seldom holds for Sub-Saharan African financial markets. In
view of deep market segmentation, informal lenders are hardly ever
persuaded by changes in formal sector loan interest rates to alter
their own rates. The fact that many informal rates have not been
altered in the face of significant increases in formal interest rates,
since financial sector reforms in the 1990s began in many countries,
indicates how “unrelated” pricing in the two sectors might be.

Recent Developments with Microfinance in
Sub-Saharan Africa
To counter credit market failures that result in the fragmentation
and exclusion of many potential borrowers from markets, a variety
of credit schemes have been introduced into many Sub-Saharan
African countries. But innovative credit schemes and microfinance
activities are far better known and more successful in Asia and Latin
America than in Sub-Saharan Africa. Apart from fewer programs,
their occurrence among countries varies considerably also. There
are countries with a good number of microfinance programs,
including Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, and Guinea
Bissau, and others with very few, including Sao Tome, Chad,
Mauritania, and Sierra Leone. K-REP in Kenya is probably the best
known microfinance scheme in Africa (Rosengard, 2000; SODECON, 1990).

Objectives and Strategies of
Innovative Schemes
Innovative credit-retailing schemes are usually community-managed
credit and savings schemes established to improve members’ access
to financial services, build a community self-help group, and help
members accumulate savings. Microfinance programs, generally
derived from innovative schemes, are more likely to be born out of
donor projects, and are not necessarily community-based. Indeed,
over 80% of enterprise development programs sponsored by donors
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have a microfinance component. More than half of such projects
focus solely on microcredit. For many innovative schemes, however,
credit provision may not be the only operational objective. Even for
those that perceive credit provision as the ultimate assignment, the
extent to which a direct supply of credit is present in their programs
depends on whether they adopt “minimalist” or “integrated”
approaches.2
Most of the acclaimed innovative schemes have been based on
the minimalist procedures. A recent trend emphasizes market principles. Through donor participation, many microfinance arrangements
have benefited from the best practices developed in other developing
regions. They have drawn some ideas from more successful projects
elsewhere, including the following: (1) issuing short-term loans;
(2) starting with small initial loans; (3) concentrating on providing
small working capital to firms with proven track records; (4) providing specialized services without targeting; (5) simplifying services; (6) providing localized services; (7) shortening turn-around
time for loan applications; (8) motivating repayment through group
solidarity or joint liability; (9) mobilizing savings from the poor; and
(10) charging full-cost interest rates.
Village banks, for example, emphasize making loans to finance
income-generating activities and savings. In establishing mechanisms
to lend to joint liability groups, these banks expect group members
to overcome collateral requirements. They lend on unsecured bases,
using five-person group guarantees whereby each individual is
responsible for the others and future access to credit is determined
by all members repaying loans. This is a principle borrowed from the
Grameen Bank.3 There are a number of microfinance projects in
Africa, however, that provide credit to individuals and projects.
K-REP has both group lending (through Watanos) and individual
arrangements with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that onlend K-REP loans. A number of the schemes in Francophone African
countries have a mixture of group and individual arrangements.
The loan characteristics of microfinance schemes indicate that
their loans are comparable to those of most existing informal
arrangements. Loan maturities are generally short. Groups that borrow
22
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on-lending are expected to repay within a year. Members of the
small groups must repay their first loans within a few weeks, with
assurance that they can take a further loan from the revolving fund
established by the group. While interest rates are higher than most
formal lending rates in Africa, they tend to be lower than the rates of
moneylenders. Rates seem comparable to those of some of the best
known schemes in Asia and Latin America. Characteristics of these
loans suggest that a large part of Africa’s private sector cannot use such
facilities to finance investments. They are useful for the very poor
microbusinesses, similar to those financed by the informal sector.

Performance of Microfinance Programs
The assessments of the achievements of credit programs are centered
on repayment rates, loan sizes, savings levels, program costs, and
income from interest. Evaluations of repayment in Village Banking
programs have been high, averaging 90% in many places (Holt,
1991). Projects with high repayment rates often include the following
characteristics:
• training programs for participants
• interest rates not subsidized
• integrated formal written membership requirements and screening measures in their bylaws to ensure discipline among members
• a savings program accompanies lending
• an appropriate sociocultural environment, e.g., population not
transient, which helps to reduce default as social sanctions are
strongest in a stable population.
A number of recent evaluations of microfinance projects have
examined the extent of their outreach activities and their drive
towards self-sustainability (Christen, Rhyne, & Vogel, 1994).
Financial self-sustainability is achieved when the return on equity, net
of any subsidy received, equals or exceeds the opportunity costs.
Outreach is measured on the basis of the types of clientele served
and the variety of financial services offered, including the value and
number of loans extended, value and number of savings accounts,
type of financial services offered, number of branches and village
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subbranches, percentage of the total rural population served, real
annual growth of the institution’s assets over recent years, and participation of women as clients. Many such evaluations have questioned
the sustainability of projects, as well as their outreach (e.g., Webster
& Fidler, 1995; Kiiru, Pederson, & Nzioka, 1995).
It is important not to compare the achievements of African
microfinance programs only to those of other regions. It is possible to
explain further the backgrounds of these programs and to compare
their achievements with other institutional arrangements within the
region. Comparing innovative schemes and ascertaining their compatibility with known practices and attitudes in African countries,
reflected in informal systems, introduces a better understanding of
their difficulties. Various evaluations suggest that while innovative,
other microfinance projects are performing in making credit available,
local environments often constrain their ability to bring costs down
much lower than they presently are. They cannot go where the
informal sector can with their present set-up, hence providing a
justification for a link between them. Evidently both microfinance
and informal finance try to reach the same target group, but with
different structures. The African Development Bank (AfDB) has
developed a program in microfinance (see Appendix). But it is
important that care is taken to ensure a complementarity in the services provided by informal finance with a view to reaching those
that are currently not reached by either.

Increased Informal Finance and Microfinance for
Private Sector Development
The central problem for financial development in most SubSaharan African countries remains how to ensure that institutional
development and innovation leads to filling of the “credit gap” facing
SMEs. While they lack access to bank credit, their requirements
exceed limits of informal agents, as well as of many microfinance programs. There is currently limited scope for enhancing the allocation
of credit equitably and efficiently outside of a closer relationship
between the formal and informal sectors. As seen earlier, financial
system fragmentation can be wasteful. Closer linkages between dif24
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ferent segments can improve system efficiency by enabling different
agents to specialize for different market niches and by facilitating
flow of savings and credit up and down the system. Filling the credit
gap may require incentives to the formal financial sector to establish
conditions and support for informal and semiformal institutions to
move up to this market following an integration of the financial markets. The approach to a greater role for informal finance and microfinance focuses on the achievement of integrated financial markets:
how such integration might come about, and operational approaches
for bringing microfinance closer to small African entrepreneurs.
The proposal for integrated financial markets is based on a number of recent studies applying concepts from the “new” institutional
economics, stressing information asymmetry, transaction costs, and
risks. These studies have provided useful analytical tools to understand constraints that explain the persistence of fragmentation in
Sub-Saharan African financial markets, even when financially
repressive policies have been reformed (Chipeta & Mkandawire,
1996; Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1996; Popiel, 1994). In an integrated
financial market, direct and indirect linkages between the formal
and informal sectors are evident and significant. The flow of funds
among them is dictated by awareness of their respective specializations, allowing each segment to utilize information and the structural
advantages of others to enhance their own activities. The flow of
information is a major component of market integration.
There is an obvious need for national policy frameworks that
have appropriate levels of incentive and regulatory policies as a
context for achieving integrated financial development. In addition
to using such frameworks to provide a developmental platform for
financial institutions by helping them reduce and share risk with an
acceptable incentive structure, the framework should draw in
broader economic relationships by ensuring that the approach is
truly demand-driven by the real sector. Hence, while avoiding a
crowding-out of the private sector, maintaining steady growth of the
real economy is essential. A strong revival of informal finance in a
number of countries after reforms provides a good testimony to the
influence of a vibrant real sector on financial sector developments.
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Forging Links in Deposit Mobilization
Banks should be encouraged—and given incentives—to enter into
closer relationships with such informal agents as SCAs and NGOs.
These agents have the potential of becoming effective mechanisms
to mobilize deposits from and deliver credit to the household and
microbusiness sector. They can bulk up small savings at relatively
low cost and can retail more credit to the informal sector if backed
up by access to bank credit.
Indeed, taking a cue from what susu collectors in Ghana have
demanded of Ghanaian banks, banks in Sub-Saharan Africa could be
encouraged to offer informal deposit mobilizers preferential deposit
rates—higher than the rates of return on their other opportunity
sets—that encourage them not only to use the facility more and more
in view of financial gain, but also to discern recognition of their role
in savings mobilization by banks. In many West African cities where
transactions at bank branches take unusually long periods, “special”
clerks or tellers could be assigned to such frequent depositors as savings collectors at large branches they patronize in order to reduce the
length of time they spend at bank counters. Waivers of charges and
fees on demand deposits of informal deposit mobilizers by banks
would be seen as encouraging an institutional link between the two.
While direct contact between banks and informal deposit mobilizers will be very useful, semiformal institutions—savings and loan
companies—well-functioning finance houses, and credit unions also
hold considerable potential as shown by the review of the role of such
semiformal institutions. When markets are fragmented, it is best to
develop new institutions to integrate markets, and only then to
regulate. In a satisfactorily operating market-based economy, the
development of such new institutions is likely to take place if
demand for additional financial services exists. Governments only
need to be supportive.

Forging Links in Credit Allocation
The optimal way for banks and informal lenders to link up for purposes of credit allocation is to develop an agency relationship in which
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bank-loanable funds are channeled through semiformal (microfinance) lenders and informal lenders for on-lending to small borrowers.
Here also, operations of susu collectors4 in West Africa provide some
valuable insight into how such an arrangement could be pursued.
The realization of the full potential of informal finance units
lies in the identification of similar strong links between formal and
informal units. This relation should be oriented toward a two-way
flow of deposits and credits to enhance financial intermediation in
the region. While potential is much stronger in some countries than
in others, it must be developed wherever possible to ensure that the
benefits arising are for mutual growth. In eastern and southern African
countries as well as francophone countries—where cooperatives are
relatively well-developed—they could be the informal institutions for
developing such linkages.
Special incentives could be particularly useful in encouraging
banks to develop twinning arrangements with semiformal or nonbank
financial institutions, to provide these institutions with management
support as well as funds. For example, funds on-lent to microfinance intermediaries could be rediscounted at a concessional rate to
increase profitability to banks, or tax incentives could be provided
to compensate for the costs and risks of developing small borrower
portfolios. This would lead to the layering of credit supply through
different intermediary steps that involve a number of “shock
absorbers.” This is a principle well-known in informal finance in
those arrangements involving links with traders.
While the principle of channeling credit through informal
sources is acceptable, there is a need for caution with regard to which
informal agents can serve as good conduits for such lending. It is
important to rely more on well-established agents operating from
within recognizable bodies—associations, cooperatives, companies,
unions, etc. These have greater credibility than individuals. In a
number of countries, also, individual moneylenders with good longstanding relationships with banks could be useful. Channeling formal
credit to informal lenders can be defended on the grounds of efficiency
and increased financial integration, especially among small farmers.
Informal lenders can build a personal relationship with their borrowers
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that can ensure an extremely low loan default rate. The encouragement
of more subcontracting in the real sector would also generate more
financial linkages in parallel. For example, if leasing companies
could pass on tax benefits to banks to obtain better credit terms,
they could in turn pass on more financial services to their clients.

Government Policies for Enhancing Linkage Development
If banks have not linked up with informal finance and microfinance
institutions already, it is because of considerable distrust, inadequate
knowledge about the latter, and prejudice in some cases, all of which
create a risky environment for banks. Policy should be designed to
overcome this. There should be an approach to developing financial
systems that focuses on building institutions that serve identified
segments. There are two possible ways for policy to be used to
enhance the development of linkages between the various segments,
including the informal sector and such semiformal lenders as
NGOs—that is, the use of the fiscal system and of regulatory and
supervisory systems to provide incentives for formal institutions to
provide wholesale credit through informal agents.
Tax relief on profits granted to banks that allocate credit through
informal and semiformal agents could be recovered by imposing
higher taxes on banks that do not channel credit through the informal sector. Some banks—such as merchant banks—will have no
need to use informal agents for allocating credit and, therefore, will
be the actual financiers of the subsidy. Because the higher tax is on
bank profits, it should not be transferred to the users of those banks.
Regulatory and supervisory systems could be of considerable
importance in providing incentives to banks. If banks perceived that
risk was considerably reduced by dealing with credible semiformal
and informal agents, they would be encouraged to use them.
Effective regulation and supervision of semiformal and informal
institutions might tend to be problematic, in some cases, however.
Governments would require a proactive approach. This would
embrace a legal, regulatory, and prudential framework that fosters,
and when possible, accelerates financial market development. This
framework supports the setting up of mechanisms, institutions, and
28
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instruments that promote and facilitate this development as the
economy grows and as market functions expand. Regulation should
steer away from restrictive laws and focus on removing the obstacles
to financial market development. Restrictions on what assets banks
may hold could be modified to encourage them to invest in semiformal financial institutions. This requires diversification of formal
sector instruments. Commercial bills and bankers’ acceptances based
on cooperative or “mutualistic” guarantees should be developed to
establish a link between semiformal and formal financial institutions.
In sum, the development of a three-tier approach for lending to
marginal borrowers, mainly SMEs, would be very useful because it
provides an appropriate framework for regulation and supervision.
Banks would lend in the first instance to credible semiformal
agents5 who would then link with such informal lenders as susu collectors, cooperatives, and SCAs. Rural borrowers would receive
loans directly from informal agents. Where banks have good relations
with easily identifiable informal agents—e.g., the Association of Susu
Collectors in Ghana—there is no reason why the chain cannot be
shortened by directly dealing with that informal institution.
Semiformal institutions would in general be agencies for regulating
smaller informal units as they can identify operators much better
than any other external body.

Reducing Lender Risk for Microfinance Projects in Africa
Principles for reducing lender risk in integrated financial systems will
necessarily involve restructuring internal management leading to
improved appraisal of risk, the development of other tools for containing risk, and some risk-sharing procedures. Formal and informal
lenders and deposit-takers will have to learn to share risks with each
other while developing better techniques for dealing with borrowers
at the margin for whichever market niche they have adopted.
Techniques for lending to small borrowers minimize risk, and these
have seen significant improvement in the last decade throughout the
world. It is possible to reach small borrowers cost-effectively, taking
into account existing risk profiles of such borrowers.
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At the margin, financial institutions want to know whether it is
cost-effective to take deposits from and lend to small businesses.
Internally, they will have to adjust the credit-delivery methodology,
focusing on the way in which borrowers are identified, approved, and
supervised. Financial institutions that have been more successful in
extending and recovering credits to small enterprises have often based
their lending operations on an in-depth market assessment at the
design stage, allowing them to determine actual patterns of demand
and to identify and address the relative levels of risk involved.
Financial institutions lending to small borrowers must be profitable. They must earn enough to cover the cost of funds and recurrent
operational and administrative costs. This requires the use of interest
rates freely to assure profits, considering the negative impact too
high rates will have by way of incentive effects and the effects of
adverse selection. They must therefore strike a proper balance
between risk management and low transaction costs as a percentage
of average earning assets.
There are a number of innovative financial institutions that
have been successful in maintaining this balance. They have
employed a variety of measures to effectively reduce SME lending
risk, basing their risk reduction strategies on the fundamental
principles of:
• minimizing poor judgments on character and capability,
through careful credit analysis
• using intensified follow-up methods to track projects and loan
repayments
• applying “get tough” policies on repayment
It is interesting that many institutions are increasingly emphasizing nontangible aspects of creditworthiness—character, repayment
history, motivation to succeed—to reduce the likelihood of poor
credit judgment and the resulting need for intensive collection
efforts. One of the more successful microfinance institutions in
Africa has been the Senegalese Private Enterprise Credit Agency
(PECA) (USAID, 1989). It addresses the intangibles by carrying out
rigorous risk analysis of the potential borrower and business operation,
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including on-site observation of the business operation and interviews
with employees and key informants in the community about the
business operator’s character and debt repayment records. Personal
knowledge of the borrower or the person introducing the borrower
is generally accepted to be a crucial first step.
Indeed the principle of knowing the borrower is highly regarded
by the Malian Bank of Africa (BOAM)—an “alternative” commercial
bank—which bases risk management largely on “character lending.”
They require that each borrower be known by and receive the moral
guarantee of a member of the loan committee or a shareholder. In
Kenya, the project “Promotion of Rural Initiatives and Development
Enterprises” (PRIDE) also requires that all potential borrowers be
vetted by the executive committee governing their community level
market enterprise committee, and their immediate enterprise group
must agree to cross-guarantee the loan given. (See also, Morris &
Barnes, herein.)
Some institutions approach project-related risk with rigorous
analysis of project viability on the business site. If well done, with
the appropriate methodology, significant gains in risk reduction
could be achieved. PECA has tried this approach quite successfully.
PECA field officers develop business plans with enterprise owners
and conduct careful analysis of all risk factors—market, market
share, cost, and pricing structure—followed by similar independent
evaluations of the proposed projects by PECA management.
Also, the principle of lending to borrowers with a record of good
payments is generally applied by a number of successful institutions
lending to borrowers at the margin. Most of the loans undertaken
by PRIDE and PECA are made out to existing businesses with an
established business history and reputation. Initial loan sizes are limited and maturities are short-term. These conditions remain until the
borrower establishes creditworthiness. PECA negotiates subsequent
loans according to business needs. PRIDE provides loans in steps,
building up loan size to prepare good repayers to graduate into the
banking system. PECA tailors the loan size and repayment schedules
to cash flow.
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PRIDE uses a computerized accounting system to track savings
and loan performance. It has developed a credit reference system for
borrowers to be used as a centralized credit reference bureau with
banks and NGOs as partners. BOAM has introduced mobile field
officers to track SME loans in areas without branches.
In view of the high dependence of a large number of economic
activities in Africa on the agricultural sector—itself highly dependent
on uncertain weather conditions—it is advisable for entrepreneurs to
seek ways of reducing dependence. As entrepreneurs move away
from strong dependence on one sector, it becomes important for the
financial system to complement that move with its own diversification. Where feasible, financial institutions need to diversify their
loan portfolios to reduce their dependence on high-risk activities.
While this could be done through loan pricing arrangements, there
is often no guarantee that the desired results will be achieved in
poorly functioning market systems. PECA has taken direct actions
to diversify their portfolios as a risk reduction measure, to avoid sectoral concentration or overemphasis on lending in areas vulnerable to
natural calamities or external shocks.
An approach that seems to be catching on with some successful
financial institutions and which has been used quite effectively by a
few informal lenders when necessary has been the adoption of a tough
stance on contract enforcement. It has been shown that while collateral confiscation in the informal sector does not happen everyday,
knowledge that the lender could actually do it has often put some
fear into borrowers and encouraged them to make repayments on
time. Some nonbank financial intermediaries have begun a “gettough” policy on repayment. PECA ensures that any client not paying
within 10 days of the scheduled payment date is visited by a legal
officer. If loans are nonperforming for more than 60 days, action is
initiated to seize security.

Appendix: African Development Bank Microfinance
Initiative for Africa (AMINA): A Case Study
Microfinance institutions, which often represent the only access to
some form of financial services for microentrepreneurs and other
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disadvantaged groups, often lack professionalism and institution
capabilities. In an attempt to encourage and strengthen these institutions, the primary objective of ADB Microfinance Initiative for
Africa (AMINA) is to increase the access of the poor to financial services through capacity-building of microfinance institutions. The
economic and institutional viability of microfinance institutions is
key to their long-term sustainability. By developing permanent institutional capacity to serve microentrepreneurs, both outreach and sustainability are fostered, which is more effective over time than simply
giving grants, disbursing loans, or providing one-time training to
microentrepreneurs.
The weaknesses of microfinance institutions include the lack of
suitably trained and qualified personnel, appropriate operational
policies and procedures, and management information systems.
AMINA shall focus on long term capacity-building of these microfinance institutions through a coordinated program of technical assistance, creating linkages between microfinance institutions an
commercial banks and strengthening information dissemination
among microfinance networks.
AMINA will seek to assist microentrepreneurs, women, and
other disadvantaged groups in their development of productive
activities. The proposed model for the initial implementation of the
AMINA program has at its core technical and other assistance
designed to increase the professional capacity of microfinance institutions to respond to the financial service needs of the target groups.
AMINA will also attempt to establish and enhance linkages between
microfinance institutions and formal financial sectors, primarily
commercial banks. Finally, AMINA will coordinate its activities
closely with existing and programmed ADB activities and with the
activities of other donors, especially those that pertain to the financial
and private sectors. AMINA will serve as a mechanism to increase
horizontal linkages between microfinance practitioners and to engage
governments, regulatory agencies, and donors in a policy dialogue on
issues of concern to microfinance institutions.
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AMINA Program Objectives
The overall objectives of AMINA include:
• Providing technical and other assistance to nontraditional financial intermediaries, such as nongovernment organizations
(NGOs) and others who provide financial services to the poorest
sections of the population in low-income African countries.
This capacity-building sponsored by AMINA will strengthen
the ability of microfinance institutions to reach large numbers
of the target groups on a sustainable basis.
• Encouraging commercial banks and other formal financial sector actors to play a more active role in providing financial
resources for the target populations. AMINA will seek to create
linkages and greater intermediation between the formal financial
sector as wholesale providers of funds for distribution on a local
or retail level by microfinance institutions. It will also encourage
microfinance institutions to place savings deposits gathered from
the target populations with the formal banking sector.
Enhancing these linkages between the formal financial sector
and retail microfinance institutions will result in increased
monetization and financial deepening of the economy as a whole.
• Facilitating cooperation and coordination among aid donors,
private sector actors, and others involved in providing financial
services to target groups. AMINA will play an important role in
encouraging and facilitating information dissemination among
microfinance practitioners themselves. AMINA will also serve
to facilitate policy dialogue among donors, relevant government
agencies, and other interested parties on subjects relevant to the
provision of microfinance services, such as interest rate policies,
reserve requirements, and the like.
AMINA-sponsored activities seek to contribute to the economic and
social welfare of the program’s target populations through improved
access to appropriate financial services.
• Microenterprise development: employment opportunities are
created and incomes are increased among the rural and urban
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poor through improved access to a range of financial services,
including the provision of credit and savings mechanisms. This
leads to the economic empowerment of the marginalized and
disadvantaged members of society.
• Increased economic output, employment, and incomes: The
increase of economic opportunities among the poor and other
disadvantaged groups such as women yields more balanced economic growth for the economy as a whole, and more equitable
distribution of its rewards.
• A growing and dynamic private sector: microfinance expands the
ranks of new stakeholders in the economy through the empowerment of previously disadvantaged groups—women, landless
rural poor, and urban unemployed—by providing them a means
of attaining economic advancement. In addition to jobs and
income created, more broadly-based economic empowerment
advances the development of a more pluralistic society.
• Transformation of the private sector: as microentrepreneurs are
assisted by microfinance institutions and there is an increased
level of economic empowerment among previously disenfranchised societal groups, the private sector is transformed from
being reactive and poorly organized into a more cohesive and
effective force for political stability. A more broadly-based private sector in turn leads to a more accountable and transparent
economic, regulatory, and political system.

AMINA Program Components
In order to attain these program goals, objectives, and anticipated
outcomes, AMINA will engage in a coordinated range of activities.
These include technical assistance for microfinance institutions, the
issuance of financial guarantees to commercial banks who establish
refinancing facilities for microfinance institutions, and service as a
forum for policy dialogue and an information dissemination mechanism. An important undertaking of the AMINA program will be to
sensitize ADB professional staff to microfinance issues and techniques
through training sessions and participation in technical assistance
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activities for microfinance institutions. Their participation will likewise develop a heightened appreciation for the role of the private
sector and women in the overall economic development process.
AMINA will also support existing and planned ADB activities in
countries selected for implementation of the pilot phase of the program. Finally, AMINA will closely coordinate its technical assistance
and policy dialogue activities with other donors and initiatives active
in the pilot program countries. (Source: African Development Bank,
retrieved from http://www.afdb.org/about_adb/AMINA.htm)

Notes
1. See, for example, http://www.microcreditsummit.org/pubs/reports/socr/2004/
SOCR04.pdf
2. With the “minimalist approach,” the organization concentrates only on lending.
All activities that it engages in are designed to facilitate lending. These include the training of staff and also beneficiaries to the extent that they can comprehend how the loan
program works. Under the “integrated approach,” training and other forms of technical assistance are regarded as integral components of a whole scheme for assistance.
3. See website at http://www.gfusa.org
4. Susu collectors (usually male) visit shops, workplaces, market stalls, and homes
at agreed times on each day and collect funds towards a savings plan. Following this
plan, a saver agrees to deposit a specific amount determined by himself or herself in consultation with the collector for an agreed period of time—usually a month—after which
period, his or her deposits are returned less a day’s deposit.
5. These agents would include the numerous modern nonbank financial institutions (savings and loan companies, finance houses, credit unions, etc.) that are currently
observed in a number of countries.
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An Assessment of the Impact
of Microfinance
A Case Study from Uganda

Gayle Morris and Carolyn Barnes
Abstract: This paper reports the results of an impact study of three microfinance
programs in Uganda—FINCA, FOCCAS, and PRIDE. Program clients and
nonclient groups in three places—rural Mbole district, Kampala, and Masaha
town—were studied in an initial survey and a follow-up two years later. The study
found numerous positive impacts on program clients: addition of new products
and services, improved or expanded enterprise sites and markets, reduced costs of
inventory purchases, and increases in sales volume. Household-level impacts
included new enterprises begun, increased amount spent on durable assets and
agricultural inputs, increased amount of cultivated agricultural land, and increased
amount of household income from crops. Microfinance programs help client
households reduce financial vulnerability through diversification of income
sources and accumulation of assets.

T

his article assesses the impact of microfinance programs in
Uganda on clients, their households, and their enterprises.1
It also examines whether participation in a microfinance
program leads to improvements in the economic welfare of households and enterprise growth and stability.2

Journal of Microfinance

The assessment employs surveys with clients from three U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID)–financed microfinance programs in Uganda: the Foundation for International
Community Assistance (FINCA), located in the capital city of
Kampala; the Foundation for Credit and Community Assistance
(FOCCAS), located in the rural Mbale district; and the Promotion
of Rural Initiatives and Development Enterprises (PRIDE), located
in the town and surrounding area of Masaka. A central group of
nonclients, located in the same geographic area as the programs,
were surveyed for comparison. FINCA and FOCCAS loan only to
women, and PRIDE loans to both men and women. Interviews were
conducted with a randomly selected sample of microfinance program
client entrepreneurs and nonclient entrepreneurs. The survey was
first conducted in November and December 1997 to obtain baseline
information, then repeated in November and December 1999 to assess
the impact. The data were recently reanalyzed for this symposium.

Uganda Context
Economy
Uganda is a landlocked country located in the heart of the great
African high plateau in the Great Lakes region. From 1997 to 1999—
the study period—GDP growth rates were 5% and 8%, respectively.
Uganda’s estimated per capita income in 1999 was US$320, with a
per capita purchasing power parity of US$1,136. Inflation rates were
less than 10% during this period (World Bank, 2000).
Agriculture contributed nearly one-half of GDP. Nine of ten
Ugandans depend on subsistence and cash crop production and small
agro-based industries to survive. The major cash crops are coffee, tea,
and tobacco, in addition to a wide variety of food crops. Four fifths
of smallholders farm fewer than 5 hectares of land. The average
agricultural holding is estimated to be 1.6 hectares.
Gayle Morris is an agricultural economist on the faculty of Edinboro University of
Pennsylvania. Email address: gmorris@edinboro.edu
Carolyn Barnes, with 20 years of Africa experience, currently works as an international
consultant with Management Systems International. Email address: c_barnes31@
hotmail.com
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Population
Uganda’s population is approximately 21.5 million, growing annually
at 3%. During the 1990s life expectancy had been declining in
Uganda due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In 1999 the average life
expectancy was 42 years. Household-level impacts of the pandemic
include loss of members or loss of income sources, increased financial
expenditures on health and funerals, assisting other households in
coping with illness and death, and the absorption of children who
have lost one or both parents. The Uganda AIDS Commission estimates that the population of orphaned children is approximately 1.5
million. The macro-level impacts include a relatively high death rate
among the educated elite, the loss of productive labor activity, a
shortage of drugs and hospital beds, and the allocation of scarce government revenue for HIV/AIDS related programs. But the Ugandan
government aggressively reduced the prevalence of HIV/AIDS so
that it now boasts the lowest rates (5%) of any sub-Saharan African
country.
Microentrepreneurs are a vibrant part of the Ugandan economy:
about one fifth of all households are engaged in some kind of business
activity, and a third of the working-age population are employed in
micro and small enterprises (Impact Associates, 1995).

Microfinance Programs Studied
The three microfinance institutions (MFIs) included in this study
(FINCA, FOCCAS, PRIDE) differ in ways that may influence the
profile of clients who join them (Barnes, Morris, & Gaile, 1998;
Barnes, Gaile, & Kibombo, 2001). FINCA operates on a village
banking model, lending money to and accepting savings from lowincome women organized in groups, each of whom operates a
microenterprise. In 1997, FINCA had operations in nine districts
servicing 9,000 individual clients; by 1999 it had approximately
20,800 clients. We surveyed FINCA clients from Kampala and
Masaka town and its periphery. FOCCAS provides women in
income-generating microenterprises with credit and savings services.
It also provides education on health, nutrition, family planning,
HIV/AIDS prevention, and better business management. We surveyed
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only FOCCAS clients from rural Mbale. The FOCCAS program also
expanded between 1997 and 1999, from 3,297 to 6,671 clients.
PRIDE provides financial services to female and male microentrepreneurs operating businesses in urban areas. PRIDE integrates the
individual borrower or saver into the formal financial system by requiring clients to have a savings account with a commercial bank. PRIDE
has also increased its base from 3,700 in 1997 to 16,500 by 1999.
Common strategies among MFIs are:
• Formation of credit group consisting of individual members,
each of whom owns and operates a business that produces a
weekly cash flow.
• Group guarantee of loans to individual members, with the
group responsible for repayment if an individual defaults.
• Use of interest rate that supports the administrative MFI costs.
• Mandatory savings requirement.
• Mandatory weekly group meeting for loan repayment.

Methodology
The sampling frame required surveys of clients of FINCA, FOCCAS,
and PRIDE and of three comparison groups of nonclients. The
frame included three different geographic areas of Uganda (Mbale,
Masaka, and Kampala). Sampling methodologies varied by area and
client status; however, in all cases a form of random sampling was
undertaken. For clients, random samples were taken from client
records of the microfinance institutions.
Two selection methods were utilized to identify the nonclient
sample. In both Kampala and Masaka, a “random walking method”
which utilizes spatial matching with randomized components was
used to draw the nonclient sample. In rural Mbale, a clustered, stratified, systematic, unaligned random sample of rural households was
utilized. Three key factors were used to ensure similarity between
clients and nonclients: sex, ownership of a microenterprise which
generates a weekly or biweekly flow of revenue, and an enterprise in
operation over the past two months.
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Because the assessment utilized a baseline survey in 1997 and a
follow-up survey in 1999 of the same microentrepreneurs, it was
essential to relocate baseline respondents in 1999. A sample size of
1,332 respondents was interviewed in 1997. A computer list of all
the 1997 respondents was generated and divided among the three
study sites to relocate the baseline respondents in 1999. Interview
field teams utilized identifiable street addresses, local administrators,
and other knowledgeable key informants to locate individuals on the
list for Mbale and Masaka respondents. Due to increased difficulty
of relocating Kampala respondents, the field team tried various other
strategies, including visiting FINCA group meetings, examining
parish voters’ registers, and attempting to identify female respondents
by the names of their spouses, children, or other relatives that they
had provided on the 1997 questionnaire. All of these relocation
strategies resulted in relocating and interviewing 965 of the original
1,332 respondents (72%) from 1997 (see Table 1).
Table 1 provides information by MFI program of the numbers
of clients successfully reinterviewed (576 clients or 79% of all 1997
clients), and the reasons why clients and nonclients were not reinterviewed (154 clients or 21%). The majority of respondents not
reinterviewed are nonclients (213 nonclients or 35% of all 1997
nonclients), and the most common reason is nonrecognition of their
names by community members.3

Table 1. Summary of Relocation and Data Collection
Efforts (Using 1997 Baseline Study Status)
Number of clients
FINCA PRIDE FOCCAS
Successful
interviews
Unsuccessful
interviews
Dead/
seriously ill
Shifted
Unknown
Other reasons
Total

Number of
nonclients

Total

Percentage

283

143

150

389

965

72

17
40
10
9

9
19
3
6

8
9
16
8

21
63
117
12

55
131
146
35

4
10
11
3

359

180

191

602

1332

100
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In some cases a gain score test was performed.4 This analysis was
performed because the respondents had not been randomly assigned
to the client and nonclient groups and then sampled. To determine
the effect of MFI program participation, the gain score analysis took
into account the effect of initial differences between clients and nonclients.
When distinctions between districts were analyzed, a simple
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was used. This ANOVA
was the analogy of a t-test when three districts (Kampala, Masaka,
and Mbale) versus two client categories (client and nonclient) are
used. For categorical (nominal) data, chi-square analyses are used,
but disaggregated so that location effects are kept separate from
client or nonclient effects.5 The design of the baseline questionnaire
involved a series of steps. First, an initial set of hypotheses, variables,
and measures was drawn based on the results of previous assessments
of microfinance program impacts (Sebstad & Chen, 1996).
Exploratory interviews were then conducted with microentrepreneurs
in Masaka, Mbale, and Kampala and with the leaders of two loan
groups in Kampala. Key informant discussions were held with
microfinance program officers and staff, and program strategies were
analyzed. For the 1999 follow-up survey, the original questionnaire
was modified by eliminating unreliable questions, rewording questions, and adding questions on household changes and MFI program
participation.

Findings
Respondents and Households Characteristics
The 1997 baseline indicates that client respondents were 36 years of
age and nonclients were 33 years. Respondents averaged one year of
secondary school. Two thirds were married. Client households averaged 6.6 members, 2 of whom were economically active. Nonclient
households averaged 5.5 members. Average households had three
rooms. Residency arrangements varied by district, with Mbale
respondents living on agricultural land, Kampala respondents renting their residences in an urban area, and the majority of Masaka
respondents owning their own homes. Because two of the three
44

Volume 7 Number 1

An Assessment of the Impact of Microfinance

MFI programs only lent funds to women, women represent 93% of
the sample.

Stability of 1997 Enterprises
Three fourths of microenterprises in 1997 that regularly generated
cash were in operation in 1999—417 of 571 client enterprises and
Table 2. Changes in Enterprise One Firms Operational
between 1997 and 1999
Changes
Added new products
or services in last
2 years (N=722)
Improved or expanded
premises (N=717)
Moved to new premises
or sold in new market
locations in last 2 years
(N=710)
Reduced costs by buying
inputs in greater volume
or at wholesale prices
(N=718)

Size of stock larger now
than 2 years ago
Size of stock about
the same (N=715)
Sales volume larger now
than 2 years ago
Sales volume about
the same (N=715)
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Clients

Nonclients

Statistical significance

144
30%

53
21%

p=0.01 between clients
and nonclients
p=0.03 among districts

114
25%

37
15%

p=0.01 between clients
and nonclients
p=0.01 among districts

71
16%

24
15%

p=0.03 between clients
and nonclients
p=0.01 among districts

166
36%

61
24%

p=0.01 between clients
and nonclients
p=0.03 among districts

198
43%

87
34%

p=0.01 between clients
and nonclients
p=0.03 among districts

128
28%

98
39%

211
46%

90
36%

136
29%

100
40%

p=0.01 between clients
and nonclients
p=0.01 among districts
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246 of 322 nonclient enterprises. The most common reason for
closure was unprofitability (46%), followed by theft (30%). When
considering both the 1997 Enterprise One—defined as a household’s
most important source of cash income—and the substitute
Enterprise One, 89% of enterprises were at least two years old.
Changes between 1997 and 1999 reflected the efforts of
microentrepreneurs to consolidate, stabilize, or increase their profits.
Clients were significantly more likely than nonclients to have
(1) added new products or services, (2) moved to new premises or sold
in a new market location, (3) reduced costs through buying in bulk, or
(4) increased the size of their stock over the last two years (see Table 2).
Geographical location was statistically significant in explaining
the changes occurring in Enterprise Ones. The local economy and
business environments in Mbale, Masaka, and Kampala affect
microentrepreneur options and risk taking. Urban microentrepreneurs in Masaka and Kampala districts were more likely to experience
increased competition, pushing them toward changes in their enterprises. In contrast, entrepreneurs in rural Mbale had more limited
options and less incentive to change.
Clients were in a better position than nonclients to take advantage of opportunities, because participation in an MFI program
empowers clients to make changes in the management of their
Enterprise Ones. Ownership of a second enterprise in 1999 was more
common among clients (48%) than nonclients (25%). More clients
(31%) than nonclients (21%) had started a new enterprise between
1997 and 1999, suggesting that microfinance programs helped
clients diversify their economic activities.

Use of Enterprise Revenue
In 1997, 92% of respondents listed Enterprise One as the main
recipient of firm revenue. Food for household members was the second largest expenditure for clients (48%) and nonclients (56%).
Debt payment was the third for clients (45%). Though firm revenue
was most often spent on Enterprise One by two thirds of those surveyed in 1999, 21% reported expenditures on household basic needs
(e.g., food, education, medical expenses) as the primary use of rev46
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enue from Enterprise One. Clients in 1999 were more likely than
nonclients to report paying debts among their top two expenditure
categories—22% and 1% respectively. Similarly, clients (10%) were
more likely than nonclients (8%) to report savings among their top
two expenditure categories.

Microentrepreneur Problems
Respondents were asked to identify the single most important problem they faced in running their Enterprise One. In 1999, clients and
nonclients mentioned irregular capital flows (27%) and marketing
(24%). Kampala residents were more likely than microentrpeneurs
in Masaka and Mbale to mention capital flows as a primary problem. Microentrepreneurs experienced intense competition, which in
turn affected the demand for their products or services and the profit
margins. As more clients (43%) than nonclients (31%) had
increased their profits in their Enterprise One, participation in a
microenterprise credit program appeared to have helped clients fend
off the pressures toward lower profit levels.
Sources of Household Income
In 1997, respondent households averaged 2.92 sources of income
with client households averaging 3.23 sources. Between 1997 and
1999, client and nonclient households tended to have one more
additional source of income. Clients were more likely than nonclients
to have income from a source other than microenterprises in the 12
months prior to the 1999 interview (71% and 59%, respectively).
Crops and livestock were the most common sources of nonenterprise
income. Households tended to diversify income sources since 1997.
MFI programs provided clients with the opportunity to establish new
enterprises, even though program loans used an existing enterprise as
collateral.
Loan Funds Usage
Three fourths of clients used at least part of their loan funds on
Enterprise One. Additional uses of loan funds included other enterprises, savings, loan repayment, school expenditures, and other serVolume 7 Number 1
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vices. Loan repayment capability was important, since there was no
grace period and repayment began the week following receipt of the
loan.
The expenditure of loan funds on Enterprise One was usually
directed toward building up stock and supplies (see Table 3).6 Clients
were significantly more likely than nonclients to have (1) added new
products or services, (2) moved to new premises or sold in a new market location, (3) reduced costs by buying in bulk, or (4) increased the
size of their stock over the last two years. Also clients were more likely
to have increased sales volume in the past two years. There was a
strong association between participation in a MFI program and
changes in Enterprise One: clients appeared be more flexible and to
make changes within their enterprise with the use of their loan funds
or increased sales revenue.7
Microentrepreneurs in Masaka were more likely than those in
Kampala and Mbale to have added new products or services, moved
to new premises or sold in a new market location, reduced costs by
buying in bulk, or increased the size of their stock.

Ownership of Durable Assets
Increase in value of durable assets purchased—mattress, radio, stove,
beds—was regarded as a strong indicator of MFI impact on their
clients, serving as a proxy measure of household wealth. The increase
between 1997 and 1999 in the average value of asset purchases by
clients was more than twice that of nonclients.8 The difference
between clients and nonclients was most notable in Kampala.
Overall in every asset category studied, client households were more
likely to have acquired the specific consumer durable good than
nonclient households (see Table 4). Overall differences between client
and nonclient in each district were not statistically significant. The
exception was for Kampala, where a significantly higher percentage of
clients than nonclients acquired a television. Participation in the MFI
programs was strongly associated with increased expenditures by
clients solely or jointly with other household members on durable
household assets.
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1997
96%
5%
2%
10%
5%
6%
9%
1%
6%

1999
89%
20%
13%
16%
7%
10%
13%
2%
5%

Kampala (N=128)
1997
100%
15%
16%
9%
2%
17%
11%
1%
12%

Clients
39%
26%
6%
23%
7%
14%

Nonclients
35%
20%
12%
26%
3%
15%

Masaka

*Indicates a statistically significant difference at the 0.05 level

Mattress
Radio
TV
Stove
Refrigerator
Beds

Household assets
Nonclients
24%
21%
3%
21%
7%
7%

Kampala
Clients
26%
17%
*12%
24%
10%
11%

Clients
38%
24%
2%
13%
7%
18%

Nonclients
34%
21%
2%
10%
10%
9%

Mbale

1999
93%
44%
11%
12%
12%
4%
10%
5%
8%

Mbale (N=141)

Table 4. Households Acquiring Major Durable Assets, 1997 to 1999

Note: Multiple responses possible.

1999
71%
32%
8%
20%
5%
8%
11%
5%
21%

Masaka (N=284).

1997
Enterprise One
98%
Other enterprise
10%
Food for household
2%
School expenditures
5%
Medical care
3%
Savings
15%
Debt/loan repayment
8%
Obligations to non-household member 1%
Other (bought land, building, etc.)
6%

MFI Loan Expenditure

Table 3. Client Expenditure Patterns on Most Recent MFI Loan

Clients
36%
24%
6%
21%
5%
14%

1997
98%
10%
6%
7%
3%
14%
9%
1%
8%

Nonclients
32%
21%
5%
18%
3%
11%

Total

1999
81%
33%
10%
17%
7%
7%
11%
4%
14%

Total (N=553)
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Agriculture Sector Activities
As previously mentioned, Uganda had an agriculture-based economy.
Due to land inheritance patterns and strong extended family ties,
persons living in urban areas may also cultivate land. In 1997, clients
(54%) in all three districts had a larger proportion of households
earning income from crops and livestock than nonclients (40%).
Below we look at changes in land cultivation, income from crops,
crop diversification, and respondent spending on agricultural inputs.
Changes in Land Cultivation and Income from Crops. The
majority of respondents’ households had access to agricultural land
either through individual ownership, family ownership, or rental
arrangement. In 1997 the amount of land accessible to the household was significantly higher (statistically significant at the 0.05
level) among clients (see Table 5). Client households were more
likely than nonclient households to have increased the amount of
land they cultivated. The net difference between those who
increased and those who decreased the amount of cultivated land
was +25% among client households compared with +19% among
nonclient households.
The expansion in land cultivated had a direct relationship to an
increase in income from crop production. Client households were
more likely than nonclients to report an increase in income earned
from crops 12 months prior to the 1999 interview, indicating a
strong association with participation in MFIs.
Table 5. Change in Amount of Land Cultivated
between 1997 and 1999 (Household Data, 1999)
Change in land cultivated
over the last two years

Client

Nonclient

Total

Increased

154
32%

56
23%

210
29%

Decreased

34
7%

10
4%

44
6%

Did not change

293
61%

174
73%

467
65%

Total

481
100%

240
100%

721
100%

Note: Statistically significant at the 0.01 level
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Table 6. Gain Score in Amount of Money Spent on
Agriculture Inputs by Client Status and District
(Uganda shillings, N=887)
District

Clients

Nonclients

Masaka

3578

-1572

Kampala

4667

889

Mbale

-998

-289

Total

2653

-474

Note: Statistically significant at the 0.05 level for clients compared to
nonclients overall and in Masaka and Kampala.

Changes in Crop Diversification. In 1997, clients averaged 4.7
crops and nonclients 4.6 crops. By 1999, clients had increased the
number of crops grown more than had nonclients.
Investment in Agricultural Inputs. On average clients spent
slightly more on agricultural inputs than nonclients in the three
months prior to the 1999 interview. Changes in the amount of
money spent on inputs in 1999 compared to 1997 were higher for
clients than nonclients (see Table 6). Masaka and Kampala clients
and nonclients differed as well. Increased expenditure on agricultural
inputs, expanded land cultivation, and crop diversification by clients
were positively related to MFI program participation. Additionally,
MFI program participation suggested clients were empowered to take
advantage of new or expanded income-earning activities to increase
their income.

Coping with Financial Shocks
Nearly 80% of households experienced unanticipated, financially
demanding events between 1997 and 1999, the two most common
being medical expenses and death of a household member (see
Table 7). In 1999 more than 80% reported medical expenses and 40%
reported a death, likely associated with HIV/AIDS. The differences
between clients and nonclients in 1997 and 1999 were significant.
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Table 7. Types of Financial Shocks Affecting Households
in 1997 and 1999 (N=714)
Event

1997
Clients

Medical expenses,
household members
Deaths,
household members
Business losses
Obligations to
non–household
members
Drought related
Need to repay debts
Loss of a job
New individual
joined household

1999

Nonclients

Clients

Nonclients

294
66%

182
71%

337
63%

203
82%

115
26%
87
19%

76
30%
38
15%

183
30%
93
20%

101
40%
43
17%

62
14%
42
9%
15
3%
21
5%

25
10%
26
10%
10
4%
7
3%

29
6%
26
6%
36
8%
33
7%

10
4%
12
5%
10
4%
11
4%

14
3%

4
2%

4
2%

0
0.0%

Note: Multiple responses possible. The percentages are based on the total number of
households in each category reporting at least one financial shock.
Note: The chi-square tests show that the difference between clients and nonclients
over both time periods are significant at the 0.05 level.

Microfinance Program Implications
Findings from the analysis have programmatic implications. The
reasons for exiting the program given by those who had dropped out
of their MFI program tended to emphasize elements associated with
the lending strategy. Data suggested that microfinance organizations
should consider the feasibility of providing individual loan products
to participants who were diligent in repaying their group loans.
These individuals want to “graduate” to larger loans than the groups
provide, and they had some collateral to secure the loans. This
process could prepare them for participation in the parallel commercial banking system in the future.

52

Volume 7 Number 1

An Assessment of the Impact of Microfinance

The 1997 baseline study and the 1999 follow-up study suggested the importance of using a comparative nonclient group to be
able to associate changes with program participation. The value of
the two-year interval, in spite of difficulties in relocating respondents,
was that the 24-month timeframe permitted identification of impacts
and trends over this period.

Notes
1. The authors would like to acknowledge the statistical work of Dr. Gary Gaile
(consultant to Management Systems International) and the data coordination (including interviews with clients and nonclients) of Richard Kibombo and his colleagues at
Makerere Institute for Social Research, Makerere University, Uganda. Mr. Kibombo
coordinated and supervised the data entry work and provided data analysis. This article
is based on research funded by USAID/Uganda. Both Morris and Barnes worked for
Management Systems International, which was contracted by USAID/Uganda through
the Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Services Project. The article is based on the
research findings of two earlier reports: (1) Barnes, Morris, & Gaile (1998); and
(2) Barnes, Gaile, & Kibombo (2001).
2. While the focus of the research reported in this article is the impact of MFIs, a
recent book edited by Manfred Zeller and Richard Meyer additionally examines MFI
financial sustainability and outreach as part of the “triangle of microfinance” (Zeller &
Meyer, 2002). In the MFI literature impact studies are labeled as investment led. A brief
survey of the results of similar investment-led studies in developing countries is found
in Sharma and Buchenrieder (2002).
3. Additional information on the sampling plan and the questionnaire is in volume
2 of the baseline report by Barnes, Morris, & Gaile (1998).
4. When a statistical test gives a .05 or below response, it indicates that the
observed case is not just a chance coincidence and indicates that the dependent variable
(client/nonclient status or district status) is positively correlated with the independent
variable (e.g., amount spent on assets). The test means that there is only a 5 in 100
probability that the apparent difference would have occurred due to chance. A result
between .06 and .10 indicates that results are marginally significant. Statistically significant results are indicated in the article.
5. Chi-square tests are appropriate for analyzing either a client or nonclient variable
or a district variable against another variable for which only a frequency (versus an interval statistic such as a mean) is provided.
6. In 1997 and 1999 less than 5% of respondents reported having bought one or
more fixed assets (e.g., buildings or equipment) directly with their loan funds. The low
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proportion of clients using their loans to purchase a fixed asset is probably related to the
short length of the loan cycle and the relatively small loan amount.
7. MFI loans are typically used by microentrepreneurs to increase the scale of
existing activities or to diversify into related fields. Additional research on the use of
MFI loans in microenterprise development is summarized in Dawson (1997).
8. The data are distributed with a highly negative skew and with large standard
deviations. Therefore they are not analyzed as raw data with tests assuming a normal
distribution. They are log-transformed so their distributions are suitable for statistical
testing. The actual (nontransformed) gain score differences are available from the
authors.
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Microcredit and Households
Coping with HIV/AIDS
A Case Study from Zimbabwe

Carolyn Barnes
Abstract: This study seeks to better understand the ways chronic illness and death,
possibly associated with HIV/AIDS, negatively affect households and the impact
microcredit has had in helping affected households. This is achieved through analyzing data from clients of Zambuko Trust and from nonclient microentrepreneurs,
using proxy indicators of HIV/AIDS affected households. It also investigates the
vetting of members by loan guarantee groups and the ways these groups deal
with individuals affected by illness and death. Since members of loan groups
serve as gatekeepers to loans, the internal dynamics of these groups as well as the
MFI’s policies and loan terms and conditions are important to understanding any
push factors that might exclude HIV/AIDS-infected and -affected individuals.
Suggestions are provided from clients and other key stakeholders about changes
that might assist microfinance institutions and their clients address the negative
effects of HIV/AIDS.

I

n Africa, HIV/AIDS affects millions of households. More than
20 million Africans have died, 12 million have been orphaned,
and 29.4 million are living with the virus. The infection and
death of a household member creates economic stresses at the household and community levels (UNAIDS/WHO, 2004; Stanecki,
2004; Over, 1998; Dayton & Ainsworth, 2002).

Journal of Microfinance

Outside the health sector, the microfinance community has
been in the forefront in addressing HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and
mitigation (Donahue & Sussman, 1999; Parker, Singh, & Hattel,
2000; McDonagh, 2001). Preventive education for microcredit clients
is now common. Furthermore, microcredit has been promoted for its
potentially positive impact on those faced with the risk of becoming
HIV infected or affected, and those already affected. Solid evidence,
based on qualitative methods, has been provided of the ways microcredit clients in Kenya and Uganda cope with the effects of
HIV/AIDS (Donahue, Kabbucho, & Osinde, 2001). New financial
products—emergency loans and health and life insurance—have
emerged (Balasubramanyam, 2001; McDonagh, 2001; McCord,
2000).
Underlying the attention to the potential of microcredit and
other financial products to address HIV/AIDS is the premise that
microfinance institutions (MFIs) are or can become financially selfsustainable. Nevertheless, HIV/AIDS can have a negative financial
impact on MFIs (Manje, 2000; Evans & Radu, 2002).
This study, conducted in Zimbabwe, seeks to better understand
the ways that chronic illness and death, possibly associated with
HIV/AIDS, negatively affect households and the impact microcredit
has had in helping affected households. Special attention is given to
the dynamics within loan co-guarantee groups to determine if the
groups explicitly exclude individuals infected and affected by
HIV/AIDS. Since members of loan groups serve as gatekeepers to
loans, the internal dynamics of these groups as well as the MFI’s
policies and loan terms and conditions are important to understanding any push factors that might exclude HIV/AIDS infected
and affected individuals. Recommendations from clients and other
key stakeholders are provided on changes that might assist microfinance institutions and their clients in addressing the negative effects
of HIV/AIDS.1
Carolyn Barnes, with 20 years of Africa experience, currently works as an international
consultant. Formerly, she was a senior technical staff member of Management Systems
International. Email address: c_barnes31@hotmail.com
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Study Methodology
Zambuko Trust’s microcredit program was chosen as the focal point
for this study because Zambuko has more clients than any other
organization in Zimbabwe providing credit to microentrepreneurs.
The study involved reanalysis of data from longitudinal surveys of
Zambuko clients and nonclient microentrepreneurs conducted in
1997 and 1999,2 as well as focus group sessions, individual interviews, and a forum with key stakeholders.
Because HIV infection was hidden under a veil of silence in
Zimbabwe, proxy indicators were used to identify survey households
that were possibly affected by HIV/AIDS. The initial step in reanalysis
involved classification of the client and nonclient respondents’ households as possibly affected by HIV/AIDS during the 1997–1999 period
if they met one of the following criteria: (a) a member was chronically
ill and unable to work in the six months prior to the 1999 interview,
(b) the household absorbed one or more of the following since the
1997 interview and the person remained for more than six months: a
sick person, an adult due to death in a prior household, or a child due
to one or both parents having been sick or died, (c) the respondent,
spouse, or household member 20 years old or older was seriously ill,
which caused a financial crisis since the 1997 interview, or (d) the
spouse or household member 20 years old or older died, which caused
a financial crisis since the 1997 interview. These households are referred
to as possibly HIV-affected households or as affected households.
This classification system facilitated analysis of the effects of
chronic illness and death on households and the ways that microcredit
impacted affected client households.3 The survey data were analyzed
using an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) approach that took into
account differences between the comparison groups in 1997 on values
for specific, moderating variables: poverty level of the household,
household economic dependency ratio, whether or not the household was affected by illness or death between 1995 and 1997, and
the 1997 value for the variable analyzed. The ANCOVA procedure
statistically “matches” individuals in the comparison groups (e.g.,
affected clients and affected nonclients) on their 1997 measures on the
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variable analyzed (e.g., household income level) and on the moderating variables. It then uses the average difference between the matched
groups on their 1999 measure of the variable analyzed to estimate
impact.
The classification of the survey respondents as clients and nonclients is based on their status in 1997.4 The reader should note that
between the two surveys approximately half of the 1997 clients did
not take another loan from Zambuko; hence, in 1999 half of those
classified as clients were former clients. The analysis is based on a
database of 579 respondents: 338 clients and 241 nonclients from
Harare, Chitungwiza, Bulawayo, and Mutare.
To better understand dynamics within loan guarantee groups, in
late 2000 and early 2001 focus groups were held in the same geographic areas covered by the survey. A randomly selected sample of
current clients and of clients who had already participated in the survey were invited to participate. In total, 140 microentrepreneurs participated in the sessions. Also, 33 loan officers and branch managers
from the regions surveyed participated in focus group discussions,
and 7 senior managers of Zambuko were interviewed. In addition, 32
persons from microfinance institutions, HIV/AIDS support organizations, and donor agencies participated in a one-day forum in
Harare on September 13, 2001. After the study’s findings were presented, the participants met in small groups to discussed the implications of the findings in relation to what is currently being done and
what else might be done.
Most of the survey respondents were women (85%). In 1997
the respondents averaged 39 years old, with 8 years of education.
The majority were married and 10% were widowed. Seventy-five
percent of the respondents’ households were poor and one third were
extremely poor, measured by global standards for determining per
capita, per day income and taking into account purchase power
parity.5 Their households averaged five to six members.
By applying the proxy indicators, the findings indicate that 40%
of both the clients and the nonclients were from households that
were possibly HIV-affected in 1999. Illness of spouse, self, or another
household member 20 years old or older was the most common
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indicator. Clearly 34% of the affected client households and 24% of
the affected nonclient households had experienced the death of an
adult member in the past two years. One fifth of the affected households reported a chronically ill member and slightly more than one
quarter had absorbed a person into their household that was ill or as
a result of illness or death in that person’s previous household.6
In 1997, 60% of the client respondents were on their first loan.
After the completion of their 1997 loan, half of the 1997 clients took
an additional loan. The impact analysis below includes both those
who took an additional loan and those who left the program. The
average sum of all loans taken by HIV-affected clients was Z$5,821
compared to Z$6,435 for the other clients, but the results are not
statistically significant.

Country Context
The HIV infection is widespread in Zimbabwe, with an infected
population estimated to be between 9 to 11.9 million persons in
mid-1999. While life expectancy prior to the AIDS epidemic was 65
years, it was projected to decrease to approximately 39 years by 2005.
In 1999 an estimated 25% of the adults aged 15 through 49 were
HIV/AIDS infected. Overall, an estimated 1.5 million adults and
children were infected by the end of 1999. Deaths due to AIDS were
estimated to be 130,000 in 1997 and 160,000 in 1999. Some
624,000 children under age 15 are estimated to have lost their
mother or both parents by the end of 1999 (UNAIDS & WHO,
2000). Ten out of every 100 children die before they reach age 5
(Central Statistical Office, 2000).
The high incidence of HIV/AIDS and its negative impact on
households has been exacerbated by the negative impact of the
political and economic environment. Since the mid-1990s, weak
economic policies, governance problems, unsustainable levels of
public spending, and high levels of domestic debt have negatively
affected the Zimbabwean economy. Examples include government
intervention in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo from August 1998 onwards, political tensions, and disrup-
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tions associated with the direction of land reform and resettlement
(IMF, 2001).
Inflation has soared. The cost of living, as measured by the
Consumer Price Index (CPI), in the 12 months after the launching of
the survey in September 1997 increased 32%. From September 1998
through August 1999 the annual increase in the CPI rose to 70% and
in the next 12 months the annual increase in the CPI was 62%
(Central Statistical Office, 2000; Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 2000).

Zambuko Trust
Zambuko Trust, which began operations in 1992, had branch
offices in all of the major urban centers and key secondary towns
and had five regional offices by late 2000.7 Initially Zambuko provided loans to individuals backed by a guarantor, but in 1995 it started
providing group-guaranteed loans (Figure 1). After participating in a
group scheme, a client might be approved for an individual loan.
However, resistance to group-guaranteed loans outside of Harare and
Chitungwiza led Zambuko to continue to issue loans to individuals
who would pledge a nonessential asset and who had a co-guarantor.

Figure 1. Zambuko Loan Products
Group-based Loan. Given to individuals in a self-selected group of 5-10
who co-guarantee the loans to its members. Each member pledges a nonessential movable asset against his or her loan. Prior to formal loan application, individuals must
attend a half-day training session that covers basic business management. Loans are usually for 9 to 12 months, repaid on a monthly basis. The groups are not required to hold
meetings on a regular basis. Loan officers informally provide business management advice.
Individual Loan. Individuals must have a personal guarantor and pledge a movable asset against the loan. Loans tend to be from 9 to 12 months, with monthly loan
installments. Prior to formal loan application, the person is required to attend a halfday training session that covers basic business management. Informal business management advice from loan officers is provided.
Trust Bank Loan. Self-selected groups of 10 or more individuals that co-guarantee
loans to its members; these loans are targeted to the poor. A potential borrower must
attend a one-hour training session for eight weeks prior to receipt of the loan, and
biweekly meetings during the loan cycle. Loan size is smaller than other products, and
loans are for six months, with monthly installments.
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Both individual and group members are required to attend an initial
half-day orientation session prior to receipt of the loan, whereas the
Trust Bank program involves more intensive training on good
management practices.
In 1997, the average Zambuko loan was Z$2,537 (equivalent to
US$213) and carried a 32% per annum interest rate. In 2000, the
average loan size was Z$10,162 (equivalent to only US$185, due to
a decline in the value of the Zimbabwe dollar). By late 2000, the
interest rates had increased to as high as 52%, depending on the loan
cycle and repayment record, as an attempt to keep up with the high
rate of inflation.
Approximately 45% of Zambuko’s clients were traders and 40%
were engaged in manufacturing, such as knitting sweaters and
sewing. The others were engaged in services, agriculture (livestock
rearing and market gardens), and food preparation. Approximately
80% of Zambuko’s clients were women.
An effort was made to ascertain the effect of HIV/AIDS on
Zambuko’s financial performance. At the end of 2000, less than onehalf of 1% (0.32%) of Zambuko’s outstanding loans were written off
because of the death of clients. Beyond these data, the institution
does not have a basis for estimating the impact of HIV/AIDS on its
program and among its borrowers. Yet responses from clients and
loan officers participating in the focus group sessions document that
the effect goes beyond the death of clients to difficulties with loan
repayment and to leaving the program.

Findings
Economic Effect of HIV/AIDS on Households
HIV-affectedness appears to be negatively associated with the proportion of the household’s members who were economically active, the
role of enterprise income in the household’s economic portfolio, and
the ability to seek medical treatment (see Table 1). These results are
based on an analysis of changes between 1997 and 1999.
Moreover, when controlled for specific differences between
respondents in 1997, the ANCOVA results point to specific, negative
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Table 1. Key Differences between HIV-affected Households
and Other Households (percentage distribution)
HIV-affected

Other

Economic dependency ratio
1997
1999
Gain score change

N=228
31
40
8.6

N=351
29
32
2.8

Ratio of enterprise income to
total household income
1997
1999
Gain score change

N=221
75
55
-20

N=282
66
57
-9

Did not seek medical treatment
when needed in past 6 months
due to lack of funds (1999)
Yes, unable to seek treatment

N=228
18

N=351
9

Statistical
significance

<.01
<.01

<.01
<.01

<.01

economic impacts on households. The monthly household income
level for affected households was estimated to be Z$525 less than for
other households (<.15). Also, the monthly net revenue for the
household’s enterprises was Z$521 less a month for the affected
households compared to other households (<.05). The findings
suggest that illness and death influence the amount of income the
household earns from its enterprises, which in turn affects their
overall monthly income level.
On a number of other economic indicators, the ANCOVA results
suggest that the affected households were similar to other households.
For example, no statistically significant differences were found
between affected households and other households on the following:
per capita monthly income; the frequency of the consumption of
specific, nutritious food items; the proportion of the household’s
girls and boys aged 6 to 16 who were enrolled in school; and the
number of person-hours worked in household enterprises.

Impact of Microfinance on Affected Clients
This section presents data on selected changes between 1997 and
1999, as well as the results of the ANCOVA tests that signaled the
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Volume 7 Number 1

HIV/AIDS and Microcredit

impact of microcredit (see Table 2). The average total net revenue
from household enterprises declined between 1997 and 1999 for
both the affected client and affected nonclient households, when
measured by the revenue earned the month prior to the interview
and controlling for inflation. In 1997 the household enterprise revenue averaged Z$2,672 for affected clients compared to Z$1,822 for
affected nonclients (P<.05). When measured in 1997 constant values, the amount in 1999 was Z$456 less for client households and
Z$192 less for nonclient households.8 Although the drop was
greater for the affected clients, they still had a significantly higher
average in 1999 than did the affected nonclients (P<.10).
In 1999 the affected clients averaged 37 hours of work in their
household enterprises during the week prior to the interview, which
was nine hours less than in 1997. In comparison, the affected nonclients averaged 46 hours of work, which was two hours more than
in 1997. When controlling for initial differences, the affected client
respondents had worked significantly fewer hours in their household

Table 2. Impacts of Microfinance on Affected Clients
Suggested by the ANCOVA Analyses of the Survey Data
Findings (1999 compared to 1997)1
At the household level, HIV-affected clients compared to
HIV-affected nonclients had:
• greater number of household income sources (.23)
• greater proportion of the household’s boys
aged 6–16 in school (5%)
At the enterprise level, HIV-affected clients compared to
HIV-affected nonclients had:
• worked fewer hours the previous week in household
enterprises (8 hours)
• greater proportion that insist on a deposit when
extending credit to customers (13%)
At the individual level, HIV-affected clients compared to
HIV-affected nonclients had:
• saved in more ways (.43)
• greater proportion with an individual savings account
with a formal institution (16%)

Statistical significance

<.01
<.10

<.05
<.10

<.01
<.01

1 The

analysis took into account specific initial differences in 1997, including household
poverty level, household economic dependency ratio, and whether the household had
a crisis due to illness or death of a member between 1995 and 1997.
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enterprises in 1999 than had affected nonclients. Nevertheless, the
ANCOVA results did not suggest a negative relationship between
microcredit and the total amount of net revenue from microenterprises, and the average net revenue from enterprises in affected client
households was significantly higher than the net revenue earned by
the comparison group. Because the findings on total hours of work
in the enterprises do not suggest substitutes for the labor of the
clients, the results imply that the affected client households managed
their enterprises more efficiently.
When all sources of household income were considered, the
affected clients averaged 2.5 sources in 1997, and this average increased
to 2.8 by 1999. In comparison, the affected nonclients averaged 2.1
sources in 1997, and this average rose to 2.3 by 1999. The ANCOVA
results suggest that affected client households had more sources of
income in 1999 than the affected nonclient households, indicating
that microcredit had enabled these client households to follow an
income smoothing strategy.
Also, the ANCOVA results point to microcredit having a positive impact on affected client households sending their boys aged 6
to 16 to school, indicating investment in the human resources of its
members. The proportion of affected client households with boys
aged 6–16 in school had increased from 91% in 1997 to 99% two
years later. In contrast, the affected nonclient households had gone
from 93% to 95% of their boys in this age range enrolled in school.
Zambuko’s program also appears to have had an impact on the
way that affected clients manage their finances (see Figure 2). In 1999,
13% more of the affected clients than the affected nonclients insisted
on a deposit when they extended credit to their matched enterprise
customers. Also, 16% more affected clients than affected nonclients
had an individual savings account with a formal institution. In addition, the average number of ways the respondents saved was higher
for the affected clients than affected nonclients. These differences
imply that Zambuko’s microcredit program had a positive impact on
the way affected clients manage their money.
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Vetting of Members of Loan Guarantee Groups
The focus group discussions indicate that loan groups apply basic criteria in the selection of members: the trustworthiness of the candidate,
whether the candidate is hardworking, and whether the candidate is
someone whom they know. These criteria are the ones recommended
by Zambuko. Participants explained how they define each of the criteria. Trustworthiness means a commitment to meeting obligations. It
also implies that the person will be diligent in meeting loan obligations. Hardworking relates to the effort put into the enterprise to generate revenue and savings, which would enable the borrower to repay
his or her loan. Knowing the person is also important. To many, this
means that the person is a neighbor or works near other members.
Those owning or purchasing their residence tend to be preferred,
although some groups accept renters who have resided at the same
place for a long time or who have a relative nearby who is known to
the group. Renters are considered high risk because they are difficult
to track down if they move. The ability to relate to and communicate

Figure 2. Improved Financial Management
In May 1997 when she received her first Zambuko loan, Ms. Mlanga, a 32-year-old
divorcee with a 4-year-old son, had few household assets and lived in one room that she
rented. In late 1998, Ms. Mlanga took in her chronically ill and widowed sister. The sister’s in-laws sent her away when they took over her deceased husband’s property and the
care of her children. To accommodate the sister, Ms. Mlanga moved into a two-room
rental unit without electricity. Ms. Mlanga attributes her ability to manage her meager
financial resources to the training she received from Zambuko. Using the budgeting skills
she acquired, she is able to pay her rent on time, and she buys groceries in bulk. She says
that if it were not for Zambuko, she would not have achieved what she has so far.
Mrs. Chikaro started borrowing from Zambuko in 1994. Prior to becoming a
client, she did not have any confidence in her enterprise and herself because her enterprise
was struggling to survive. Her husband, the household’s main income earner, became ill
and then died in early 1997. During his illness, her enterprise activities were disrupted,
since she devoted time to caring for him. After her husband died, she continued to borrow from Zambuko. Her savings and loans enabled her to buy a knitting machine and
build a rental unit adjacent to her house. She has managed to support herself and her four
children. She reports, “someone coming into my house would not know that there is no
man,” since she is doing well meeting all of the household expenses by herself.
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with members was also often mentioned as important. Groups did
not want a member who would cause problems.
Other criteria may also be applied. In one instance, the health
status of the individual was explicitly stated as a criterion. A member
of a Harare loan co-guarantee group, formed in 1999, stated that
they look for “one who is not constantly ill because it would give us
repayment problems.” Later participants were asked: “If Zambuko
had a policy of writing off the loans of deceased clients, would your
group allow sick persons to join?” The answer was “no,” because the
sick people would probably be unable to work enough in their enterprises to enable them to meet monthly loan installments. This was
considered important because Zambuko requires group loans to be
paid in full or else each member is assessed a late fee. The response
also indicates a recognition that HIV-infected individuals experience
a number of health problems as the infection progresses. The focus
group findings mirrored Zambuko’s policy against loaning to persons who are ill, because of the risk associated with the ability of the
individual to repay their loans.
Nevertheless, there were notable exceptions to exclusion of the
chronically ill. An example was given in Mutare of a group with a sick
person who had “worked hard to the end and would struggle and still
managed to pay her installments.” This loan group incorporated the
23-year-old daughter of the deceased member because her mother
was such a hardworking and trustworthy person. In another case, a
borrower confided to her loan officer that she was HIV-positive. At
her request, he talked with her group members and they consented
to allow her to remain in the group for the next loan cycle.

Loan Repayments and Illness and Death
Loan co-guarantee groups have responsibilities for the debts of their
members. Since mid-2000, Zambuko has enforced the group guarantee loan condition: each group’s installment must be paid in full,
otherwise each member is charged a late fee. Also, for loans extended
prior to January 2001, the loan group was responsible for paying the
outstanding loan of deceased members (see Figure 3). Group
responsibility meant that if the group did not collect the money from
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Figure 3. Examples of Loan Co-Guarantee Groups Dealing
with Death of a Member
A Mutare group member had left instructions that her children should pay off her
loan using the money generated from renting one of the rooms in her house. She had
the written instruction “stamped” (notarized) at the police station. When she died, her
instructions were implemented without difficulty. This group makes a practice of discussing with members what should be done to recover the loan money if they die.
Instructions are written in their savings passbook, and the members are expected to
inform their spouse or another family member about these instructions.
A Highfield group member died only three days after receipt of her loan, so the
funds were still in her bank account. Neighbors informed the husband, and upon their
advice he withdrew the money and would not honor the wife’s debt. In spite of appeals
to the husband and mother-in-law, the group members ended up repaying her loan.
Two Trust Bank groups reported paying the loans of deceased members because the
deceased had paid their installments on time prior to their death. Another group paid off
half of the deceased member’s loan and then Zambuko wrote off the remaining balance.

the deceased person’s family, group members had to pay. As a participant explained, “Initially Zambuko wrote off loans of people who
had died, but they stopped after realizing that some people would go
to the officers and lie that some had died when she/he was alive.”
Group members normally assist members who have difficulty
meeting their loan installments because they are ill or coping with illness or the death of a family member. The group, however, normally
expects to be reimbursed. Some groups have established special group
savings accounts to enable them to provide short-term assistance.
Group members may also lend support to members in other ways,
although this does not appear to be a normal practice. It depends on
the situation, personal ties, and the ability of the members to assist.
Clients in the focus groups reported that loans help microentrepreneurs to improve their ability to cope with future illness and
death. However, borrowers with individual loans and many group
members consider loans a burden if serious illness or death occur
when the microentrepreneur has a loan outstanding. Their view is
also held by Zambuko officers. Both Zambuko officers and clients
tend to agree that loans should be for the economically active.
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Illness and Death Affecting Continuation in the Program
Focus group findings indicate that the loan product influenced the
way groups treat members who are ill or have experienced difficulties
due to illness or death in their household or among extended family
members. For the non–Trust Bank groups, as long as the individual
had been a good member and met loan installments in a timely
manner before experiencing problems due to illness or death, the
person is normally allowed to remain in the group during the next
loan cycle. As the Chitungwiza participants remarked, “We must do
this because it might be one of us the next time.” A woman from
Bulawayo who had told about her group helping a member whose
husband was ill and then died explained that “the group said that she
should feel free to continue as a group member since her repayment
problems were not of her own making.”
The amount of the subsequent loan, however, might be more
modest. The Mbare participants advise members who have had
repayment difficulties due to illness or death to take a smaller-sized
loan, but they do not drop them. In another session, a group member recounted how one of their members wanted a larger loan but the
others appealed to the loan officer to recommend a smaller amount,
because the individual was likely to die. The loan officer agreed. The
group members were correct and the member died that year.
The Trust Bank participants expressed a different approach,
possibly because they have shorter loan cycles and the burden falls on
a larger number of people due to the larger sized co-guarantee groups.
Trust Bank groups gave examples of advising members who had
experienced difficulties making repayments to “rest” from the program during the next loan cycle. One Trust Bank group, however,
had problems because a member insisted on getting another loan
after failing to repay the previous loan. The loan officer was unaware
of the problems the woman had caused the group, because there was
no record of them having paid for her. In this case, the participant
telling the story dropped out of the loan group because she did not
want to be in a group with such a person.
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Figure 4. Leaving the Program to Care for the Sick
An elderly former Bulawayo client made dresses and knitted sweaters. She traveled
to rural areas where she sold them for cash or bartered for maize that she would then
bring into town to sell. Then her unmarried son fell ill with tuberculosis (probably associated with HIV infection), and she had to relocate to the rural areas to take care of him.
Then her son-in law also fell ill with tuberculosis. When her son died, she moved to
Masvingo to assist her daughter in caring for the son-in-law (who also had signs of
being HIV infected). This meant that her business activities were disrupted because she
had to spend a lot of time caring for the sick, so she was unable to continue in
Zambuko’s program. She intends to borrow again once her caretaking responsibilities
are completed.

Some persons self-select to rest between loans or drop out of the
program. For instance, two of a group’s five members did not want
to take another loan due to illness in their households, so the other
members decided to stop borrowing until they were all ready to seek
another loan. The remaining members made this decision rather
than to add new members to their group that they did not trust as
much to repay their loans on time.
Program departure in 1999, voluntarily or involuntarily, was
associated with having a chronically ill household member or recent
widowhood. Thirteen percent of departing clients compared to 5%
of continuing clients had a chronically ill household member
(P<.05) at the time of the 1999 interview (see Figure 4). These data
mirror focus group findings that clients and loan officers have found
that loans are burdens on those in the midst of a crisis. Also, among
those who had become widowed after 1997 and had not remarried,
the continuation rate was only 38%, compared to 49% of those who
were not widowed in 1997 nor in 1999. These findings suggest that
certain types of affectedness influence program departure.
The focus group sessions also revealed instances in which members of the group left the program because of the burden of paying for
other members. The Trust Bank participants in particular talked about
the burden and problems associated with the group co-guarantee.
They felt that smaller, more cohesive groups would be better than
what they have (10 to 28 members in their loan co-guarantee groups).
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Knowledge of HIV/AIDS Support Organizations
Focus group participants were asked if they knew of any organizations that assist people caring for those affected by AIDS. In the
Highfield’s session, 9 out of the 10 participants stated that they were
looking after orphans whose parents, they believe, died as a result of
AIDS. One woman reported that she used to go to the Highfields (a
section of Harare) social welfare office but it no longer assists them.
Another said that her church tries to help such individuals. One person explained that her brother died of AIDS and left orphans, but to
get help is difficult because on the death certificates they write reasons
other than AIDS. Other participants in the Highfield session did not
know of any organization.
In the sessions in Bulawayo, most participants did not know of
any HIV/AIDS support organizations. A few had heard about the
New Start Center on the radio and on television, and one person had
heard of the Matebeleland AIDS Council; however, none of the
Mutare participants knew of any HIV/AIDS support organizations.
One participant remarked that during the year 2000 people came and
asked them to register children that had lost both parents. Those who
registered had to pay a Z$20 registration fee. “Up to now we have not
heard anything from these people and nothing has happened.”

Recommendations
Suggestions by Microentrepreneurs
The last part of each focus group session elicited participants’ suggestions on services aimed at helping those who take care of or support
people with long-term illnesses and those who lost members of their
family. The suggestions given all focus on Zambuko. Although the
participants were encouraged to think beyond Zambuko, they gave
suggestions focused on the organization that they know and in which
they have confidence.
The provision of a grace period and deferring a loan installment
payment were mentioned in most groups as ways to help those affected
by HIV/AIDS. The responses were associated with suggestions that
Zambuko accept partial payment of group loan installments, especially
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if only one person had not paid. Participants in nearly all sessions also
suggested that Zambuko institute an insurance policy that would
write off the loans of deceased clients.9 They thought that Zambuko
should ask for proof of death, such as a death certificate. Only the
Highfield participants did not like the idea of paying another fee,
even if it were to pay off the loan of a deceased client.
Participants in Bulawayo expressed interest in workshops on how
to care for HIV-infected people because they are afraid that if they
have physical contact with an infected person they will get the disease.
Also, Bulawayo participants suggested it would be good if informational workshops were held for Zambuko clients so they would know
where to go for assistance related to HIV/AIDS. Their request mirrors
the type of sessions Zambuko’s Trust Bank officers had organized for
members who meet on a scheduled basis to learn about HIV/AIDS
prevention from a Ministry of Health HIV/AIDS specialist.
A couple of sessions in Harare and Chitungwiza with group
members ended with participants stating that they had learned a lot
from the experiences shared by others. They felt that it would be
good for group members to come together more often to share their
experiences in dealing with difficult situations.
An interesting observation from the focus groups with clients
was that the Mbare female and male participants were more businesslike in their attitudes, approaches, and opinions than those in the
other groups. Mbare clients work in one of the most vibrant microenterprise market areas in Zimbabwe. Mbare participants seemed to
regard Zambuko as a banking, not a social, institution and weighed
suggestions against this standard (see Figure 5). The reason is probably associated with their having no other options for credit.

Figure 5. Zambuko Viewed as a Financial Institution
A suggestion in Mbare that Zambuko assist if a member dies, such as buying a
coffin, was met with an immediate “no” from the others. “I think you are asking for
the impossible. Let us say that you have an account with Standard Bank, would you ever
go to Standard Bank to say bury me?” The participants indicated that it would be bringing shame to them if they expect Zambuko to carry their personal problems as if “it is
a crime to make us their members.”
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Suggestions by Other Stakeholders
The above findings stimulated discussion and elicited suggestions by
key stakeholders participating in a forum in Harare. No attempt was
made to reach a consensus or to prioritize the suggestions. Nevertheless,
microfinance participants tended to regard these as good suggestions.
Overwhelmingly the participants felt that there was greater need for
communication and networking between the microfinance institutions. Those institutions already doing something related to
HIV/AIDS should be given a platform to share their experiences so
that the sector can advance on the learning curve. Also MFIs should
develop a common policy and an appropriate culture and be proactive in establishing ways of addressing the impact of HIV/AIDS on
their programs and clients.
These participants also suggested that MFI managers discuss
HIV/AIDS as both a client issue and a management issue. More
attention should be focused on delinquency management and how
to manage risks. For example, managers should consider the household, not just individual microentrepreneurs, when giving loans.
They should permit one loan to fund start-up activities and different
economic activities by household members. Upon the death of a
client, another person from the household should be eligible to fill
that person’s place in a loan group or with the loan institution,
although the person should receive the loan amount for first-time
borrowers. Microfinance institutions might consider providing loans
to households rather than individuals.
Another suggestion was that microfinance boards of directors
and donors should reconsider their policy on the time frame for
financial sustainability, profitability, and productivity. They need to
be realistic about the impact of HIVs on microentrepreneurs and in
turn upon their microcredit programs. Tools are needed to enable
them to track the changing impact of HIV/AIDS on clients and
their institutions. Client-focused tools would permit MFIs to better
understand their outreach and impact on those most vulnerable to
HIV infection and those already affected by the virus.
Loan officers often encounter situations related to HIV/AIDS.
They ought to be trained on how to communicate in these situations
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and on the importance of verbal and nonverbal behaviors. They
might also be provided with basic counseling skills and be updated
on a regular basis on HIV/AIDS-related services so that they may
inform their clients and others in need.10
The forum participants agreed with the following suggestion
made by Zambuko loan officers: MFIs should encourage borrowers
to train one of their teenage children to operate the enterprise. The
objective would be twofold. First, if successful it would provide a
fallback position if the client has to take time away from the business due to illness or death. Second, it would help to teach business
knowledge and skills that could assist the child in future years, especially if economic hardships befall the household due to the death
of the adult income earners.
Participants felt that under certain conditions, there may be scope
for a special loan product for microentrepreneurs who are caring for
orphans and helping those affected by HIV/AIDS. For example,
loans might be extended to persons who are committed to caring for
the abandoned terminally ill in their rural community. (However, in
an unstable economic environment, this type of loan ought to be
for enterprises that involve products or services that have a relatively
stable market.)

Conclusions
Findings based on proxy indicators of HIV/AIDS reveal that
between 1997 and 1999, 40% of the survey client and nonclient
households were possibly affected by HIV/AIDS. These households
appear to be in a worse economic situation than those not affected.
They had a higher economic dependency ratio and were less likely to
seek medical treatment when needed due to a lack of funds.
When controlling for selected initial differences, the study
found that microcredit from Zambuko enabled affected client
households to smooth their income flows through the diversification
of their income sources and to invest in the education of their boys
aged 6 to 16. Moreover, it had an impact on the way affected clients
manage their finances. There also appears to be a relationship
between participation in Zambuko’s credit program and a decrease
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in the number of hours worked in household enterprises, but not a
negative impact on the net revenue from these enterprises.
Loan groups normally assist members having difficulty making
their loan installment, but they expect to be repaid. Persons who had
difficulties making their loan payments due to illness or death in the
household are normally permitted to remain in the group for the next
loan cycle, although Trust Bank members may be asked to wait a while.
Until recently, the groups have borne the responsibility of paying the
outstanding loans of deceased members. Both loan officers and most
clients tend to believe that a loan is a burden when the clients are in
the midst of a crisis.
A number of modifications to existing credit products and procedures were suggested that are worthy of exploration to determine their
financial viability. For example, there appears to be merit in testing a
new approach to loaning for microenterprise activities. Currently
organizations tend to loan to an individual for a specific, existing
enterprise rather than for a set of household enterprises. MFIs might
pilot test loans that would cover existing and new enterprises and
assess applicants on the ability of the household to repay the loan,
possibly with the contract cosigned by two adult household members.
This approach could be combined with encouraging young adults in
the household to learn skills in managing and operating an enterprise.
Zambuko reaches poor households and households that are or
become affected by HIV/AIDS. However, just because a program
operates in a country with a high HIV prevalence rate does not automatically mean that the program reaches and benefits HIV/AIDSaffected households. The loan products, terms, and selection criteria
are likely to influence the extent to which microentrepreneurs from
these households participate in a microcredit program. The case
study from Zimbabwe indicates that credit products and terms could
be modified to be more appropriate to the constraints faced by
microentrepreneurs in countries with high HIV prevalence rates.
By joining associations or formal networks, institutions providing
microcredit can work together to advance their understanding of
appropriate terms and conditions for microcredit products in countries where HIV is widespread. These industry-wide groups might
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also work to curb approaches and activities that would undermine
their microcredit programs. A potential threat comes from programs
providing grants to HIV/AIDS affected individuals, when these programs call them loans. The microcredit industry in Africa has made
great strides in establishing a culture of discipline in the repayment of
debts. Greater attention needs to be given to demarcate the appropriate role of grants and credit in efforts to mitigate the negative impacts
of HIV/AIDS on individuals and households.

Notes
Acknowledgements: The research was jointly funded by the U.S. Agency for
International Development’s Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Services Project
and Horizons Project (see http://www.usaidmicro.org/pdfs/aims/MF_and_Mitigation_
of_Impacts_of_HIV_AIDS.pdf and http://www.popcouncil.org/pdfs/horizons/micro
finzimbfnl.pdf ). The work was carried out in asociation with Erica Keogh, Nontokozo
Nemarundwe, Loveness Nyikahodzoi, and Ellen Weiss. A high level of cooperation was
given to the Management Systems International research team by the officers and staff
of Zambuko Trust as well as its clients. The contents and views expressed in this article
do not represent the official position of USAID nor Zambuko Trust.
1. Suggested new products are found in Barnes (2002).
2. See Barnes (2001) for the results of the longitudinal assessment carried out for
USAID’s Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Services (AIMS) Project.
3. The analysis also included the other clients and other nonclients, but only the
results for the two affected groups are discussed.
4. The nonclients were randomly selected from those who met Zambuko’s basic
loan criteria, had not received credit from a formal institution for their enterprise, and
were matched by gender and enterprise sector with a client in their community.
Nonclients who had become Zambuko clients since the 1997 interview were excluded
from the database.
5. In 1997 two thirds of the client households were below the $2 a day per person
poverty line, and one third of the client respondents were from extremely poor households (below the $1 a day per person poverty line).
6. The cases of chronically ill persons are also captured in the more general question on serious illnesses. These cases suggest an advanced stage of HIV infection.
7. Registered under Zimbabwe’s Money Lenders Act, Zambuko is not permitted to
accept voluntary deposits.
8. One U.S. dollar was equal to Z$11.9 in September 1997 and to Z$38.1 in
September 1999.
9. Since Zambuko had just initiated its loan insurance scheme on new loans, the
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participants were unaware of the most recent policy change.
10. See Dunford (2001) for a discussion of options for educating clients on
HIV/AIDS.
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Outcomes of an Ethiopian
Microfinance Program and
Management Actions to
Improve Services
Shannon Doocy, Dan Norell,
Shimeles Teffera, and Gilbert Burnham
Abstract: Management decision making in MFIs is becoming increasingly tied to
collecting information about social performance. This paper examines the impact
of participation in an Ethiopian microfinance program on indicators of socioeconomic status including wealth, income, and home or land ownership. A survey
assessing these outcomes was conducted in May 2003 in two predominantly rural
sites in Southern Ethiopia and included 819 households. The article discusses
management decisions made as the result of survey findings about socioeconomic
status and food security to increase retention rates and to facilitate client savings.
Additionally, the management was prompted to increase the number of female
clients and raise the proportion of female loan officers. This paper illustrates how
data from routine monitoring and evaluation can be linked to MFI management
decision making, which ultimately results in providing better microfinance services.

M

icrofinance programs focus on expanding local economic
activities and improving the standard of living of their
clients by providing financial services needed to establish
small businesses. Microfinance can be defined as “the provision of
banking services such as savings, credit and money transfer to poorer
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people who cannot access ordinary mainstream banking services”
(Wilson, 2003). While the primary goal of most microfinance
institutions (MFIs) is improving the economic status of poorer segments of the population, most service providers aim for a broader
impact of enhanced well-being. Because households function as
social and economic units, microenterprise programs have a unique
opportunity to impact the economic, social, and general well-being
of households.
Microfinance is typically viewed as an economic development
strategy, and it is a particularly relevant approach in countries where
disadvantaged groups tend not to benefit from involvement in the
formal economy. In most developing nations, the majority subsists
on income from microenterprise activities; the microenterprise sector
is estimated to account for 20% to 70% of all employment in many
developing countries, illustrating the importance of the informal
economy in the subsistence of impoverished populations throughout
the world (Wilson, 2001; Waters, 2001). Microfinance is a logical
approach to development because it functions at the grassroots
level, can be sustainable, is capable of involving large segments of the
population, and builds both human and productive capacity.
This paper assesses the outcomes of an Ethiopian microfinance
program in terms of household income, wealth, and food security. If
microfinance programs operating in Ethiopia and similar contexts
are successful at increasing household wealth and incomes, then it is
likely that the livelihoods of poor populations can gradually be
improved in many locations. Additionally, the paper explores data
from an impact evaluation and discusses management actions taken
by the MFI in light of the evaluation results.

Shannon Doocy is a Research Associate in the Department of International Health, Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. Email address: sdoocy@jhsph.edu
Dan Norell is a Team Leader for Microenterprise Development, World Vision US.
Email address: dnorell@worldvision.org
Shimeles Teffera is a Technical Officer for the WISDOM Microfinance Institution.
Email address: wisdom@telecom.net.et
Gilbert Burnham is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Health,
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. Email address: gburnham@jhsph.edu

80

Volume 7 Number 1

Outcomes of an Ethiopian Microfinance Program

WISDOM Microfinance Institution and Survey Sites
The World Vision microfinance affiliate in Ethiopia, known as
WISDOM, was established in 1999. The institution is headquartered
in Addis Ababa and currently operates 15 branch offices throughout
the country. In the 2003 fiscal year, WISDOM had US$2,055,873
in disbursed loans and 12,157 active clients; 25% (N=2999) of
clients were women. The average outstanding loan size during the
period was US$141. In May, 2003, an assessment of the WISDOM
lending program was conducted to examine its impact on clients in
the context of prolonged drought and food insecurity. The Adama
and Sodo branches of WISDOM were selected to participate in the
assessment because (1) they serve regions that are among the most
drought-affected in Ethiopia, and (2) the branches were relatively

Figure 1: Map of Ethiopia & Survey Sites
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mature, having been operational for more than four years, which
allowed for the inclusion of clients that have been borrowing from
the institution for longer periods of time (Figure 1).
The Sodo branch is located in Wolayita, in the State of
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region. The Sodo
branch had 2,517 clients when the survey was implemented; as a
result of differences in branch size, three quarters of the sample
(N=614) was concentrated in the Sodo survey site. The remaining
sample (N=205) was drawn from the areas served by the WISDOM
branch in Adama. The Adama branch of WISDOM is located in the
East Shewa Zone of the Oromiya Regional State, approximately
100km southeast of Addis Abba. At the time of the assessment, the
Adama branch had 745 active clients. The branch serves the Districts
of Adama and Boset and the city of Nazreth.

Methods
A survey of 819 households was conducted in May 2003 in two
predominantly rural sites in Ethiopia. The survey was primarily
intended as an assessment of microfinance program outcomes and
coping capacity, primarily in terms of measures of socioeconomic
status. This study compared two groups of clients that received
loans (incoming clients who had completed one loan cycle or less
and had been participating in the program for no more than ten
months, and established clients who had completed two or more
loan cycles) and one group of community controls who were eligible to participate in the WISDOM lending program but had not
received a loan within the past year and were not seeking a loan.
A total of 408 established clients, 205 incoming clients, and
206 community controls participated in the survey. The sample
was stratified by survey site and client sex, and participants were
systematically selected from client lists of the microfinance institution. Neighborhood residents were used as community controls;
they were matched by sex and selected by proximity of residence to
established clients participating in the study. Indicators of socioeconomic status included monthly household income, per capita
monthly household income, household asset and livestock value, and
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household asset and livestock index score. In addition, food security
was assessed by a variety of indicators including household diet, child
nutrition status, and food aid receipt.
Wealth was estimated based on currently owned household
and productive assets. Nineteen types of assets were included in the
index. Items were those commonly included in asset indices used to
estimate wealth in rural Africa and were established based on previous studies (Morris, Carletto, Hoddinott, & Christiaensen, 2000;
Schellenberg, Victora, Mushi, Savigny, Schellenberg, Mshinda, et
al., 2003) and preparatory work in the survey region that identified
locally important assets. Two measures of household wealth based
on assets were developed using a methodology developed by Morris
(2000) that combined asset ownership and data from market surveys. Asset-based indicators of wealth included the total value of
household assets and livestock and a household asset and livestock
index. The asset and livestock index was derived based on the assumption that households with greater resources will purchase and own a
greater volume of durable goods; thus asset ownership and household
wealth should be related.
Income was assessed using two indicators, monthly household
income and per capita monthly household income. Monthly household income was estimated by asking the respondent about all of the
economically active members of their household and the money or
product generating activities they are engaged in. The monetary
value of products produced for barter was used when goods produced
were traded and not sold. In the case of agricultural households where
income is largely seasonal, the total harvest income was divided by
twelve to obtain an estimate of average monthly income from seasonal sources. Per capita monthly household income was also calculated as a measure of socioeconomic status because it incorporates
household size, which is often related to socioeconomic status.
The survey used questionnaire-based interviews. The questionnaire was developed in English and was approved by WISDOM and
World Vision. The questionnaire was piloted by WISDOM staff in
the Adama branch to ensure it was culturally and linguistically
appropriate before it was finalized. The survey was translated into
Volume 7 Number 1

83

Journal of Microfinance

Amharic by a translation agency in Addis Abba that was selected by
WISDOM. Back translation was performed by the WISDOM staff.
Trained local interviewers were used to ensure knowledge of languages spoken in rural areas.
Data analysis was performed using SPSS version 10.0 and
STATA version 8.0. Income and asset values were originally reported
in Ethiopian Birr and later converted to the US dollar at a rate of 8.60
birr per US dollar (Universal Currency Converter, 2004). Regression
models were employed to determine if outcomes were a result of differences in characteristics of the comparison groups or were attributable to program participation. All significant differences between
comparison groups and location of residence (by district or survey
site) were considered in linear regression models along with other
potentially significant predictors. Variables with a p-value less than
0.05 in univariate regression were considered for best-fit multivariate
models using stepwise methods. The “best-fit” model that was selected
included predictors with p-values less than 0.05, minimized the
residual sum of squares, and maximized the F-statistic.
The study was approved by Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School
of Public Health Committee of Human Research and by local
authorities in Ethiopia.

Results
Wealth
Household asset and livestock value and index scores were used to
estimate wealth. Mean asset and livestock values were US$635 (95
CI: 579–692) in Adama and US$646 (95 CI: 615–677) in Sodo.
Incoming clients had the greatest mean asset and livestock value
(US$711), followed by established clients (US$642) and community controls (US$588). Mean asset and livestock values among the
three comparison groups were significantly different in Sodo (p=.024)
and similar in Adama. No significant differences were observed in
the mean asset and livestock index score for the three groups in Adama
or Sodo.
Change in asset value over time was compared among WISDOM
clients using current asset value and asset value at entry to the lending
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program. Unfortunately, similar data were not available for community controls. Of established and incoming clients, 69.9% reported
a positive change in asset value since enrolling in the WISDOM
lending program, 23.3% reported no change in asset value, and
6.8% reported a decrease in asset value. No significant difference in
asset change was observed between incoming and established clients.
No significant differences in frequency of productive asset sales were
found between the three participant groups in Adama or in Sodo,
with less than 2.0% of households reporting the sale of productive
assets (as a coping mechanism) in the past year. These results suggest
that negative change in asset value is likely to be similar among community controls and program participants.
Change in asset value over time was assessed to determine if
program participation resulted in a continued increase in household
wealth. Length of participation in the lending program and number of
loan cycles completed was compared with two measures of change in
asset value: (1) the change in estimated asset value since enrolling
in the lending program, and (2) the proportional change in asset value
since enrolling in the lending program (current assets/entry assets). No
significant correlations were observed between length of program
participation (time in months or loan cycles) and either measure of
change in asset value suggesting that participation in the lending
program is not associated with an increase in client wealth.

Income
No significant difference in average monthly household income was
observed between the three participant groups in Adama or Sodo;
mean monthly household income was US$32 (95 CI: 28–37) and
US$39 (95 CI: 36–42) in the two sites, respectively. Per capita
household income was also similar among the three groups in both
survey sites, with a mean value of US$9 (95 CI: 8–10). When the
established client sample was assessed, a small but statistically significant negative correlation between income and length of participation
were observed when comparing monthly household income to
length of participation in months and the number of loan cycles
completed. This is likely a result of declining income trends among
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the population as a whole during the prolonged drought and is probably not attributable to participation in the WISDOM program.
Established clients had significantly more income sources than
incoming clients and community controls. On average, established
clients had 1.4 income sources as compared to 1.2 income sources
for incoming clients and community controls (p<.001 by ANOVA).
After adjusting for the number of economically active individuals in
a household, client households still had significantly higher numbers
of income sources. These results suggest that extended participation
in the WISDOM lending program results in diversification of income,
which is most likely due to the establishment of new enterprises
that are facilitated by program participation and the resultant access
to loans. Household income increased 1.23 times or 23% for each
additional source of household income, indicating that diversification
of income sources has a positive affect on household income. These
findings suggest that participation in the WISDOM microfinance
program gave people the funds to expand existing businesses or start
other microenterprises, resulting in the diversification of income
sources and the spread of the risk of financial difficulty over an
increased number of microenterprises.
When other variables were held constant, literate respondents
had household incomes that were, on average, 1.15 times or 15%
greater than that of illiterate respondents. Household income increased
1.03 times or was 3% greater for each additional year of formal
education attained by the household head. Landowners had lower
average incomes than nonlandowners, at 0.88 times or 12% less than
nonlandowners, when adjustments were made for other covariates.
Households with primarily nonagricultural incomes had, on average,
incomes that were 1.39 times or 39% greater than households with
agricultural incomes. Residents of rural districts had smaller incomes
than those of urban districts: rural district incomes were, on average,
0.85 times or 15% less than incomes in urban districts.

Home and Land Ownership
The study found significant differences in land and home ownership
patterns among the three participant groups. Established client
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households reported the greatest levels of home ownership, at 84.5%,
as compared to 77.2% of incoming clients and 74.6% of community
controls (p<.001 by ANOVA). Land ownership was reported by
45.6% of established clients as compared to 30.5% of incoming
clients and 41.6% of community controls (p=.002 by ANOVA).
The observed relationship among the three comparison groups—
where established clients were most likely to own a home, community
controls were least likely to own homes or land and incoming clients
were intermediate—suggests that the likelihood of home or land
ownership increases with participation in the lending program.
Definitive conclusions, however, cannot be made because of the
cross-sectional survey design. Client loan use patterns may provide
some insight into the interpretation of home ownership information,
where a large portion of loan funds were reportedly used toward
purchasing or leasing land and homes. Comparison of home and
land ownership rates in clients and incoming clients suggest that
home and land ownership may be facilitated through the WISDOM
lending program.

Discussion
While the majority of WISDOM clients reported an increase in asset
value since enrolling in the lending program, differences in household
asset data between clients and community controls were statistically
insignificant. Findings from this study indicate that participation in
the WISDOM microfinance program did not result in increased
household wealth. Comparison of household asset value in Adama
revealed an interesting (though statistically insignificant) pattern
between participant groups where clients were the wealthiest,
incoming clients were intermediate, and community controls were the
least wealthy. In Sodo, this trend was not observed: incoming clients
were the wealthiest, followed by established clients and community
controls. Significant correlations between measures of asset change
and program participation were not observed, further indicating
that participation in the lending program was not related to greater
accumulation of assets or an increase in wealth.
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Efforts to increase the proportion of female clients resulted in
targeting women (mostly from urban areas). Because wealth and
incomes in urban areas were greater than in rural areas, the gradual
shift to a more urban clientele in later years resulted in increased
wealth among new clients at enrollment. Consequently, comparison
of wealth between the different groups is not possible, because of the
lack of baseline data, and only limited conclusions about changes in
wealth and microfinance participation can be made. Ideally, the correlation between income and the length of participation could be
examined based on multiple observations of each client over an
extended period; however, a longitudinal study design was not pursued because of time and resource limitations. As a result of the
cross-sectional study design, the comparison relies largely on reported
monthly incomes of clients that enrolled at different points in time.
Because of the trends in the characteristics of clients that enrolled at
different periods of time, the results of this comparison should be
interpreted with caution.
While some correlations between the measures of income and
the length of participation were statistically significant, the coefficients were small (r<.40), indicating that strong conclusions cannot
be drawn. Coefficients were negative for the comparison of income
and the length of participation in the program (by both month and
loan cycles), indicating that income may have decreased slightly per
each additional month of participation in the lending program. One
potential explanation for the weak correlation coefficients is the
ongoing drought that is thought to have resulted in a gradual decline
in household incomes over several years.
Client status was not a significant predictor of income in the
model presented, indicating that participation in the program did
not have measurable impact on monthly household income.
Significant predictors of household income in multivariate models
that are of particular interest include those that may have been influenced by development programs. While the district of residence or
agricultural versus nonagricultural income category are client characteristics that are unlikely to be changed, other traits such as literacy,
the education level of the household head, and the number of sources
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of household income are potential areas, which if targeted by development programs, could result in increases in household income.
The number of household income sources was a significant predictor of household income, indicating that having a greater number
of income sources was associated with higher levels of monthly
income. Significant differences in the number of income sources for
each client group suggest that participation in lending programs
may result in the diversification of household income. The observed
relationship between enrollment and income sources, where established clients have the greatest diversity in income, followed by
incoming clients, with community controls having the least diversity
of income sources, suggests that extended participation in the lending
program leads to diversification of income. The relationship between
the number of household income sources and monthly household
income indicates that diversification of income via lending programs
may be an effective strategy to increase household incomes.

Study Limitations
The inability to randomly assign participants to experimental and
control groups is a problem common to all microfinance evaluations,
and thus it cannot be viewed as a primary limitation of the study;
nearly all microfinance research is based on quasi-experimental
designs. The principal limitation of this study is the cross-sectional
design. An important drawback of cross-sectional studies is the
inability to control for trends or directional changes in the characteristics of the population over long periods of time. Because WISDOM
clients enrolled in the organization over an extended period of time
and no baseline data is available, it is difficult to establish whether
clients enrolling during different periods are similar; consequently,
the comparability of incoming and established client groups is drawn
into question. Study findings suggest that changes in enrollment
practices meant that incoming clients had higher socioeconomic
status than established clients. In the context of the Ethiopian
drought, declines in the income of agricultural populations are probable; the cross-sectional study design is also unable to account for
these trends. Consequently, it is not possible to determine whether
Volume 7 Number 1

89

Journal of Microfinance

declines in income over time are attributable to the prolonged
drought or how participation in the WISDOM lending program
may have modified household income.
The cross-sectional design clearly limited the ability of the study
to adequately measure changes in income, wealth, and the relationship between asset accumulation and program participation. The
inclusion of wealth and income indicators in program monitoring or
in cross-sectional surveys that are administered at multiple points in
time is a better approach for MFIs to measure client wealth and
determine if changes in wealth and income are in fact a result of
participation in a lending program.

MFI Management Actions
WISDOM and World Vision undertook the study with the aims of
(1) understanding the impact of WISDOM microfinance services
on the well-being of their clients, and (2) improving the financial
products and services that WISDOM offers its clients. This impact
survey and the desire on the part of WISDOM management to use
the impact assessment data to improve their services is part of a
growing trend in the microfinance industry. As one author maintains,
“there is a growing movement towards practitioner-focused impact
assessment and client assessment. This takes as its starting point management’s need for information to improve practice. Practitioner

Figure 2: Socioeconomic and Food Security
Indicators by Clients’ Status and Sex
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Table 1: Summary of Evaluation Findings and
Corresponding Management Implications
Findings

Management Implication

Increased income reported
by clients

Increase outreach to allow for more
beneficiaries

Greater rates of home and land ownership
among clients as compared to community
members

Improve the client retention rate and
promote savings as a means of facilitating
the purchase of homes and land

Lower prevalence of malnutrition among
children of female clients (as compared
with children of male clients)

Increase the number and proportion of
female clients and loan officers

Lower rates of food aid receipt among
female clients as compared to male clients

Increase the number and proportion of
female clients and loan officers

High proportion of clients that report
a decreasing quality of diet

Facilitate savings for all clients

impact assessments aim to gather information about clients which is
credible enough to allow for good decisions to be made”
(Simanowitz, 2004). WISDOM management took a number of
actions based on the findings of the survey. The WISDOM Market
Research and Product Development Officer met with the WISDOM
General Manager and senior staff regarding the evaluation. Table 1
outlines key survey outcomes and resulting management actions
that were intended to improve WISDOM’s products and services.
With the increase of income reported by clients (though not
confirmed by the study results), WISDOM management remained
committed to increasing outreach to more clients. WISDOM had
fallen short of its annual outreach targets but committed to increase
outreach to exceed the goal of 18,000 clients by the end of
December 2004. As of September 30, 2004, WISDOM had 17,782
active clients and was well on its way to meeting its target. With the
finding that 85% of clients own houses, WISDOM management
worked to improve retention rates. Management’s rationale was that
if WISDOM can retain clients, then clients will slowly be able to
build more assets, including houses, a key asset for wealth creation.
WISDOM’s retention rate as of September 30, 2004, was 77%.
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In the primary survey site Sodo, female clients and their families
reported better food security and nutritional status according to a
variety of measures.1 The prevalence of global acute malnutrition
was 18% among children of male clients as compared to 10%
among female clients. Female client households were also significantly less likely to have received food aid during the past year:
16.5% of female clients reported receipt of food aid as compared to
26.9% of male clients. As compared to female clients, male clients
were 2.0 times as likely to have received food aid in the past year, and
the children of male clients were 1.9 times as likely to be malnourished as the children of female clients. The lower rates of child malnutrition and food aid receipt among female clients convinced
management that it needed to increase its efforts to improve the percentage of female borrowers. As of September 30, 2004, only 41%
of active borrowers were female, as compared to a business plan target of 50% and the World Vision Microfinance Operating Standard
of 60%. While the actual percentage of female borrowers fell below
targets, it is a substantial improvement from the quarter prior to the
survey (second quarter of 2003) when females accounted for only
27% of all clients.
Two additional changes were made by WISDOM management
in response to survey findings. Survey findings indicated poor food
security in a large portion of households surveyed: 26% of households reported a decrease in dietary quality during the past year.
WISDOM management responded with a plan to increase savings
services for clients. The management’s rationale was that with
greater savings, household diets and food security would improve.
The final change initiated by WISDOM management was to
increase the number of female loan officers as a means of better
reaching out to female clients.
Changes initiated by WISDOM management as a result of the
evaluation fit into a broader effort within microfinance. For microfinance practitioners, monitoring and evaluation is increasingly tied
to the management decision making of the MFI. The SEEP (Small
Enterprise, Education, and Promotion) Network Client Assessment
Working Group is developing a Social Performance Management
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System that aims to tie monitoring and evaluation findings to management actions in an effort to strengthen MFIs. Social Performance
Management is a framework to assess social performance and use
assessment findings to make decisions regarding both financial and
social performance of MFIs (Imp-Act, 2004).

Conclusion
Household asset data indicates that participation in the WISDOM
microfinance program did not result in increased household wealth.
Significant differences in household income were not observed
between participant groups in either survey site and client status was
not a significant predictor of income in univariate or multivariate
regression models. Significant differences in the diversification of
income (according to multiple measures) were observed between
participant groups, where established clients had the most income
sources, followed by incoming clients and community controls,
respectively. Diversification of income (i.e., the number of income
sources) was significantly associated with monthly income in multivariate regression models. These findings suggest that participation
in the lending program leads to diversification of income.
WISDOM management utilized research findings to make management decisions to improve the financial services that WISDOM
offers to its clients. WISDOM management made efforts to increase
the percentage of female clients, expand savings services, improve
the retention rate, and increase outreach. Tying management decision making to the collection of social performance information is
clearly a trend in microfinance. Through this linking of data and
MFI management decision making, microfinance clients can be
better served.

Notes
1. For a detailed report of nutrition findings, see Doocy, Teffera, Norell, &
Burnham (2005) and Doocy, Norell, & Burnham (2004).
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Pro-poor Microcredit in
South Africa
Cost-efficiency and Productivity of
South African Pro-poor Microfinance
Institutions
Ted Baumann
Abstract: This article compares the performance of selected South African microcredit nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that have a poverty-alleviation
focus against various benchmarks drawn from the MicroBanking Bulletin.
Donors, governments, and many analysts regard sustainability as the benchmark
of microfinance institutions’ (MFIs) performance. However, the most relevant
question is whether microcredit NGOs are doing as well as they can in their
context. Of particular contextual importance is income inequality in a society.
South Africa has the world’s second worst income inequality, after neighbouring
Botswana. This creates a situation in which microcredit NGOs must recover
“First World” costs, particularly salaries, from revenues based on clients who can
only afford loans on a par with Third World countries. Compounding this situation
are structural obstacles to microenterprise in South Africa, as well as obstacles to
productivity in microcredit NGOs. Taken together, this creates a “salary burden”
for South African microcredit NGOs, which is the highest in the world according
to relevant benchmarks. South African MFI managers face significant obstacles to
improving productivity to compensate for the divergence between staff and client
living levels. These include an inadequate skills base, the small scale of the market,
rapid labor turnover, and limited resources for capacity development. South
African MFIs face the options of moving upmarket (which many have done),

Journal of Microfinance
adopting methodological innovation or new product development, or closing. Of
these, there is a strong argument to be made for supported savings and credit
approaches as an alternative to NGO-based microcredit. Such an approach has the
advantages of greater voluntary input and social capital formation.

T

he question of sustainability in microcredit is a subject of
ongoing debate. The dominant view is what some call the
“Ohio State” school of thought, which is advocated at the
university of the same name in the United States. Broadly, this view
espouses a market-led, full cost-recovery approach to microcredit,
with no subsidies. It holds that sustainability is essential for two
reasons. First, the goal of microcredit practice should be to extend
the reach of commercial financial markets to the poor and excluded.
This requires that microfinance institutions (MFIs) perform well
enough to be able to access commercial wholesale finance, preferably
sooner rather than later. Second, sustainability is necessary to prevent
MFIs from concealing bad practice with ongoing subsidies. (For the
purposes of this article, sustainability is defined as: Coverage of
administrative cost + Loan loss + Cost of funds + Inflation +
Capitalization for growth from operating income.)
It is certainly reasonable to ask that the social cost-benefit ratio of
resources directed to microcredit interventions should be at least as
good as if those resources were applied differently, or even given away
(Schriener & Yaron, 2001). There is little point in subsidizing MFIs if
the returns for doing so are not at least the same as for alternative
uses—over an appropriate period and including “externalities,” i.e.,
nonfinancial impacts on clients and their communities.
For such calculations, absolute sustainability can be established
empirically and easily—an MFI either is or is not sustainable. In
most cases, however, the question is relative: How sustainable is an
MFI compared with other MFIs? Is it headed towards or away from
sustainability, and why? Most importantly, for our purposes, is the
MFI doing as well as can be expected given the circumstances?
Ted Baumann is Coordinator of the Community Finance Network (CMN) and Director
of the Bay Research and Consultancy Services, Muizenberg, South Africa. Email address:
tedb@cmfnet.org.za
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This last question is rarely raised. In particular, discussions
about MFI sustainability performance often ignore national-level
specifics. Donors, governments, and analysts routinely compare
MFIs in different countries to each other, telling MFI managers
what norms they “should” be able to achieve. Yet, as not all variables
affecting sustainability are under the control of MFI managers, we
should be prepared to ask whether an MFI is doing the best it can
in its context.
Such a perspective is needed because any microcredit model
involves a number of variables, both internal and external. For
example, an MFI might vary with the size of a loan group, interest
rates, or its incentive policy (internal variables). Or, it may be constrained by national laws, economic and labor market conditions, or
political instability (external variables). Some aspects of comparative
performance against international benchmarks are under an MFI’s
control; others may be determined by external factors that are not.
There is also interplay between the two. MFI managers’ decisions
about things they can control may be shaped decisively by contextual
factors they cannot control.
In assessing MFI performance towards sustainability, it is particularly important to take into account the level of income
inequality in a society. In some contexts, it might be difficult or
impossible to deliver poverty-oriented microcredit services, because
the socially determined costs—principally personnel costs—of
running a competent MFI are excessive relative to the income levels
of client microenterprises and therefore their borrowing capacity.

Purpose of the Article
With this in mind, the article addresses the matter of context in
South Africa. It investigates three issues:
• First, it compares the efficiency indicators of four South African
microcredit nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), all of
which target poor and very poor households with solidarity
group-lending methodologies, with relevant international
benchmarks drawn from the MicroBanking Bulletin (MBB).
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(“Poor” households are defined as those living at or below the
unofficial but most commonly used South African poverty line,
which was about US$67 per person per month at the time of
the research in 2002. “Very poor” households are those that
have access to half or less than this.)
• Second, it identifies contextual factors that undermine the ability of South African MFIs to match such benchmarks.
• Third, it considers implications for South African MFIs, the
government, and donors.

Methodology
The MicroBanking Bulletin has provided useful benchmarking tables
on the global microcredit industry for some years now and is
updated biannually. The definitions underlying the MBB data have
been used to gather comparable data on South African MFIs. The
main point of comparison is with other African MFIs, particularly
those that are small scale and serve a low-income target market.
Comparisons are also made with MFIs elsewhere by size (medium to
small), methodology (solidarity group), and target market (low
income).

The South African Microcredit Context
One of the most important external variables confronting South
African MFIs is the country’s extreme income inequality. Although
South Africa’s per capita gross national income (GNI) of
US$2,820 1 puts the country in the middle-income band globally,
this conceals enormous variation in income distribution. The Gini
coefficient is currently about 0.65, which makes South Africa one
of the most unequal societies on the planet. The figure improved
somewhat after the first democratic elections of 1994. Its relapse
since then, however, is linked to a steep rise in unemployment and
poorly paid employment. This has been driven by industrial and trade
policies designed to improve global competitiveness and a macroeconomic policy emphasizing low inflation and a small government
deficit in order to attract foreign capital.
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South Africa’s Dualistic Economy
The chief cause and manifestation of South Africa’s radical income
inequality is the dualism of the economy. An economically “advanced”
and globally integrated minority, black and white, coexists with a
dependent and marginalized majority, almost entirely black. In
South Africa, these are known as the “first” and “second” economies.
While the former enjoys a human development index comparable to
that in southern Europe, the second economy lives at a level comparable to that in South Asia.
The material basis of this dualism is both historical and structural. Unlike peasantries elsewhere in Africa, South Africa’s rural
poor lack access to basic means of production, such as land, because
of unresolved issues of comprehensive settler dispossession. They live
in crowded rural villages squeezed between commercial farmland
(no longer exclusively white) and tourist-oriented game reserves. In
the urban areas, opportunities for self-employment are severely
constrained by South Africa’s manufacturing and retail sectors, the
most advanced in Africa, which relegate small-scale trading and
manufacturing to the margins.
Because of their lack of access to productive resources, South
Africa’s poor are almost totally dependent for their survival on the
output of the formal economy. The things that sustain and enhance
life are only available as commodities. The poor, however, are structurally excluded from access to the cash necessary to obtain these.
One outcome of this situation is poor households’ dependence on
state transfer payments, such as pensions, disability and childcare
grants, and inter- and intra-household transfers. This is especially
marked in rural areas. Another result is a high incidence of predatory
economic crime.
Microenterprise in South Africa
For most of South Africa’s “second economy” poor, microenterprise
means small-scale trading/hawking, personal services, and production of specialty items. However, South Africa’s efficient formal manufacturing and retail sectors severely constrain opportunities to add
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value and accumulate capital in such informal activities. Small-scale
traders capture only the tiny sliver of value arising from transport cost
differentials and convenience purchasing, because most low-income
households’ requirements can be obtained from formal shops.
Informal clothing manufacturers add value by producing items
required in small quantities, which are thus unattractive to formal
manufacturers, such as school uniforms. Some informal manufacturers in the ex-Bantustan areas take advantage of value versus volume
transportation issues to produce bulky or heavy but low-value
building materials, such as window and doorframes, or furniture,
but rapid improvement in transport infrastructure is undermining
this opportunity. Amongst the most rewarding (legal) informal
occupations in South Africa are brewing traditional beer, best produced in small batches and consumed fresh; tavern keeping; and
hairdressing.
South Africa’s informal traders, service providers, and manufacturers are also constrained by the lack of cash in their communities.
Most customers and clients of South African informal microenterprises are dependent on state transfer payments, inter-household
transfers, and informal microenterprise for their cash incomes. Cash
cycles tend to be monthly, with a fresh influx at pension/child care
grant payout time. Formally employed persons in poor communities
may spend some of their income on goods or services at microenterprises, but for everything above the most convenient or specialized
purchases, there are formal supermarkets and shops reasonably close by.
This inauspicious context is illustrated by the fact that while
nearly 40% of employment in the South African retail trade sector is
in microenterprises,2 the contribution of microenterprises to
national retail trade output is only 2.3% (SAIRR, 2001). Some 53%
of South African personal services employment is in microenterprises, but these contribute less than 10% of the sector’s output.
Only about 8% of microenterprises are involved in manufacturing.
Overall, microenterprises provide nearly 20% of South Africa’s
“jobs” but contribute only 5% to the gross domestic product (GDP).
The national microenterprise income share is divided amongst
nearly 8 million South Africans, which is 17% of the population.
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These economic factors lead to very low incomes in the
microenterprise sector (SARB, n.d.; SSA, n.d.). The average annual
income in this sector is a little over US$1,000, which is about 46%
of the most commonly used South African poverty datum line (at
US$1 = R8). Annual per capita income for persons in households
whose income derives mainly from microenterprise is about
US$250. This is well below the annual per capita poverty line of
US$400, not to mention the ubiquitous “a-dollar-a-day” regarded
by some as the benchmark of absolute poverty. This is not to imply
that microenterprise is the only source of income in such households.
Many South African households dependent on microenterprise
income also receive some form of state grant via a resident pensioner
or the childcare grant system.

MFIs in South Africa
South African MFIs straddle the country’s first and second
economies. Although their clients are drawn from the poor communities and microenterprises described above, their staffs are solidly
emplaced in a middle-class material environment little different
from developed countries. This applies to all MFI staff, regardless of
race. South African racial issues do have an effect on MFIs, however.
In a peculiar but understandable paradox, South Africa’s push for
affirmative action and rapid black advancement means that skilled
black MFI personnel are highly marketable, particularly in the
state and private sectors, putting upward pressure on their salaries
and leading to fairly rapid turnover. Yet, for reasons of equity and
historical redress, donors and the government often disfavor available
white personnel.
South African pro-poor MFIs are mainly rural, but because
South Africa has very few small-scale cash farmers, their clients are
not agricultural microenterprises. They are mainly petty traders,
dressmakers, traditional brewers, etc. in rural villages. Life and work
in remote rural areas, with client groups at great distances from one
another, means an additional premium for MFI managers wanting
to attract and retain good staff.
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South Africa’s educational system at all levels is poorly prepared
to produce the kind of skills and aptitudes needed by MFIs. Of the
country’s 30-plus technical colleges and universities, only two provide
any microcredit-related training and both programs are relatively
new. Development courses at South African universities tend to be
theoretical, general, and geared to urban issues such as trade unionism.
Because there are so few MFIs, there is no microfinance-specific
labor “market” and, consequently, most training takes place on the
job. An ever-present problem is poaching of staff by other MFIs,
NGOs, private firms, and the state.
Overall, the distance between South African MFI staff and their
clients, both economic and social, is greater than in many countries,
particularly in Asia. In India and Bangladesh, for example, it is not
uncommon to find MFI clients with a fair amount of education and
self-confidence. South Africa’s low-income communities contain few
people with ready-made skills to help manage microcredit solidarity
groups. This places a greater burden on the MFIs to provide training
and support for their clients.

The South African MFIs
Table 1 lists four South African NGOs that extend microcredit to
poor and very poor households for microenterprise purposes. All
these institutions use a group-lending methodology, although there
are significant differences between them in this regard. All claim to
be trying to reach very poor households, although only one employs
a targeting methodology.
From Table 1 it can be seen that:
• The average age of the South African group is 6 years, compared
with 5.6 for all MFIs, but 8 years for African MFIs.
• The average client base of 10,096 is comparable to the global
average of 11,698, but it is significantly lower than the African
average of 18,640.
• The average South African portfolio is US$867,348, compared
with a global MFI average of US$3,859,273 and an African
average of US$3,168,759. This puts the South African group
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Table 1: Selected South African MFIs, 2003
Name

Age Offices

Staff

Active Women Average
borrowers borrowers
first
loan

Average
Average
loan balance/GNI
balance
per capita

Beehive

8

3

54

5,892

75%

$125

$111

3.93

FINCA

3

1

50

1,386

96%

$125

$151

5.34

Marang

2

19

145

15,836

95%

$120

$76

2.69

11

11

100

17,242

98%

$67

$82

2.89

SEF

on the boundary between the MBB’s definitions of “small” and
“medium” in the African context.
• The average balance outstanding of US$105 per client is considerably lower than the global average of US$453, but closer to
the African average of US$181. The more relevant comparison,
however, is to the MBB’s “Africa small/low” peer group, with an
average of US$54.
• The average loan balance as a percentage of GNI per capita is
3.7%, compared with 15.3% for the Africa small/low group.
However, this is not so much indicative of outreach performance
as of South Africa’s high per capita GNI. Thus, a small—even
exceptionally small—microloan in the South African context is
double the size, in absolute terms, of those given by the Africa
small/low peer group.

South African MFI Benchmark Performance
The MBB’s benchmarks include: outreach, profitability and sustainability, income, expense, portfolio quality and efficiency, and
productivity measures. In this article, we are interested in outreach,
expense, efficiency, and productivity. Tables 2 to 6 compare the results
for the South African MFI group against five categories of MFIs:
1. Africa all: All African MFIs, regardless of size, target market,
methodology, region, etc.
2. Africa small/low: African MFIs with a loan portfolio of
US$800,000 or less and with an average loan balance of US$150
or less
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3. World all: All MFIs, regardless of size, target market, methodology, region, etc.
4. World solidarity: All MFIs using solidarity group-lending
methodologies.
5. World low end: All MFIs with an average loan balance of
US$150 per client.
The following is clear from Table 2:
• South African MFIs are at the bottom of the scale in terms of
average number of clients and the number of offices serving
them. However, in both respects they are closer to the global
average and to their African peer group.
• The South African group operates from a much lower asset base
than all other categories, except their African peer group.
• The South African group carries a staff complement on par
with the global average, but nearly double that of their African
peer group.
• The South African group carries a much lower absolute loan
portfolio on average than all categories of MFIs, except their
African peer group, which is a little over half the size of the
South African group.
Table 3 shows that:
• The average loan balance per client for the South African MFI
group is on the low end of the scale, even in African terms, except
for their direct peer group of small African MFIs targeting the
very poor.
• As noted above, there is enormous disparity in terms of average
balance per client as a percentage of per capita GNI. The South
African MFIs are the lowest of any category—the only group in
single figures—and only one quarter of the level of their African
peer group.
• The South African group has the highest percentage of women
clients.
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120

$867,348

$3,168,759

$5,147,848

90

$1,259,494

18,640

91

3.7

Average balance as a percentage
of GNI per capita

$105

SA

Percentage of women clients

Average outstanding
balance per client

Item

82

7

Africa all

10,096

8.5

6

SA

55.3

77

$181

Africa all

Table 3: Outreach of South African MFIs

Outstanding
principal balance

Total assets

Staff

Active clients

Offices

Age in years
(average)

Item

Table 2: Scale of South African MFIs

15.3

86

$54

Africa
small/low

$488,053

$804,756

47

11,678

11

6

Africa
small/low

45.3

61

$453

World all

$3,859,273

$5,735,499

101

11,698

15

8

World all

46.0

73

$371

World
solidarity

$9,131,991

$12,267,063

278

47,884

41

8

World
solidarity

16.0

86

$135

World
low end

$3,725,355

$5,369,487

222

42,520

110
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Table 4: Expense
Item
Total expense/
total assets
Operating expense/
total assets
Financial expense/
total assets

SA

Africa
all

Africa
small/low

World
all

World
solidarity

World
low end

101%

39%

50%

30%

31%

39%

84%

31%

37%

19%

22%

28%

11.7%

2.6%

2.5%

4.5%

3.0%

4.9%

Loan loss provision/
total assets

4.8%

2.5%

3.6%

2.2%

2.3%

2.8%

Personnel expense/
total assets

52%

15%

19%

11%

13%

15%

Nonstaff admin.
expense/total
assets

32%

16%

19%

9%

9%

14%

In Table 4 we see the following:
• In every expense category, the South African MFI group is significantly out of line with other categories of MFI. Total expenses,
operating expenses, and nonstaff administrative expenses as a percentage of total assets are roughly double those of the African
small/low peer group.
• Financial expense as a percentage of total assets is also significantly higher than other MFI groupings, reflecting South Africa’s
high real interest rates.
• Personnel expense as a percentage of total assets is the most
seriously inflated ratio in the case of South Africa, being 5
times the world average, 3.4 times the African average, and
nearly 3 times that of the African peer group.
From Table 5 the following can be seen:
• Unsurprisingly, given their relatively small scale, their inflated
staffing and expense ratios, and the low average loan balances in
proportion to per capita GNI, operating expense ratios in the
South African MFI group are radically out of line with all other
categories of MFI.
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Table 5: Financial Efficiency
Item

SA

Operating expense/
loan portfolio

Africa
all

142%

Operating expense
per client

$161

56%
$58

Personnel expense/
loan portfolio

91%

Average personnel
expense as a multiple
of per capita GNI

2.3

World
all

World
solidarity

World
low end

72%

27%

37%

50%

$35

27%

11.6

Africa
small/low

$89

$93

$56

35%

15%

22%

26%

7.4

5.5

7.0

5.1

• The category most divergent from global and African norms is
personnel expense as a percentage of the loan portfolio. The
South African figure is 6 times the global average, 3.5 times the
African figure, and 2.5 times the norm of their African peer
group.
• What is striking, however, given its personnel expense ratios, is
that the South African group performs better than any other
category of MFI in terms of average personnel expense as a
multiple of per capita GNI. The South African group is less
than half the global average, 20% of the African average, and
one third of the African peer group average. Compared with
other MFIs, South African MFIs pay relatively low salaries in
terms of the local economy. Again, this is due largely to the
country’s high average GNI per capita.

Table 6: Productivity
Item

SA

Africa
all

Africa
small/low

World
all

World
solidarity

Borrowers per
staff member

101

198

247

128

155

227

Borrowers per
loan officer

150

413

462

308

356

682

Loan officers as
a percentage of
personnel

69

42

41

45

49

49
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Table 6 illustrates the following points:
• The South African MFI group performs poorly against other
groups in terms of borrowers per staff member and performs
particularly poorly against its African peer group. This is driven
by especially poor performance in terms of borrowers per loan
officer—half the global average and only one third of the level
of the African peer group.
• Offsetting this somewhat, the South African MFIs are less top
heavy than most other MFIs when considering the ratio of loan
officers to total personnel.

The “Salary Burden”
One of the challenges of performing a benchmarking analysis using
performance ratios is to disentangle the relationships between various
numerators and denominators. For example, the relationship
between South African MFIs’ expenses and their loan portfolios is
poor compared with other MFI groups. Is this situation due to inefficiency, a high-cost environment, a high degree of societal income
inequality, or all three?
In the South African case, three things stand out:
• The extremely low average loan balance relative to per capita GNI
• A low average personnel expense as a multiple of per capita GNI
• The poor productivity of loan officers, which leads to inferior
overall physical productivity per staff member
Christen (2000) employs a useful measure that encapsulates all
three factors. This is the “salary burden,” computed as follows:
Average staff salary as a multiple of GNI per capita
Average number of
clients/staff member

X

Average outstanding balance
per client/GNI per capita

This measure exposes the proportion of the MFI’s portfolio that
each employee “represents” in terms of the national economy. The
higher the figure, the higher the proportion of an MFI’s portfolio
and operating revenue that is consumed by its personnel costs. The
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qualification “in terms of the local economy” is critical. While it is
useful to know the absolute level of average salaries and loan balances,
what is really important is the relationship between the two in any
given context. By comparing the two controlled for per capita
GNI, “salary burden” is a way to see the effects of societal income
inequality and poor productivity.
Compared with salaries at other MFIs, average South African
MFI salaries in terms of per capita GNI (i.e., the local economy) are
low (Table 7). Yet, average South African loan balances per client in
terms of per capita GNI are exceptionally low. Combined with poor
physical productivity, this produces a situation in which, even though
South African MFI staff are paid relatively poorly in local income
terms, a low relative portfolio income base still makes it difficult to
cover personnel costs.

Table 7: The Salary Burden
Item

SA

Average salary
as a multiple of
GNI per capita
2.3
Average loan
balance per client/
GNI per capita
3.7%
Average clients/
staff member
101
Salary burden

61%

Africa
all

Africa
small/low

World
all

11.6

7.4

5.5

7.0

5.1

55.3%

15.3%

45.3%

46.0%

16.0%

198

247

128

155

227

11%

20%

9%

World
solidarity

10%

World
low end

14%

Table 8: Salary Burden Scenarios
Item

SA
Actual

SA with
SA with
Africa
adjusted
adjusted small/low
loan size productivity

Average salary as a multiple
of GNI per capita

2.3

2.3

Average balance per client/
GNI per capita

3.7%

15.3%

Average clients/
staff member

101

Salary burden
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61%

101
15%

2.3
3.7%
247
25%

World
low end

7.4

5.1

15.3%

16.0%

247

227

20%

14%
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In considering the salary burden, which is more important in the
South African MFI context—a low average loan balance or poor
physical productivity? Table 8 considers two hypothetical scenarios.
In one, the average loan balance per client in relation to per capita
GNI is adjusted upwards to the Africa small/low peer group level. This
produces a salary burden of 15%. The second holds loan balances
constant while varying productivity upwards to match the African
small/low peer group. This produces a salary burden of 25%. This
suggests that the contribution of South Africa’s small average loan
balance per client contributes more to the salary burden, but only
marginally; and the two are more or less equally problematic.
An average South African MFI salary burden of 15 to 25% cent
would still be high in global terms, but much closer to the African peer
group and to the global low-end microcredit sector than at present.

Obstacles to Productivity in the
South African Context
The MFIs surveyed are all committed to reaching the very poor in the
South African context. Therefore, we can assume they would resist
increasing their average per client loan balances and would rather
concentrate on improving productivity. What are the obstacles to
improved productivity in the South African context?
• Distances and mobility: Most South African pro-poor MFIs
operate in rural areas, with client groups separated by large
tracts of commercial farmland and game reserves. This is very
different from the situation in densely populated parts of Asia,
particularly Bangladesh, whose MFI sector skews global benchmarks through sheer size. The South African scenario is not so
different from other African countries, but many African MFIs
are urban-based and this means the African benchmark figures
show higher physical productivity than South Africa. One
important factor is the lack of independent transportation for
many South African MFI loan officers, who generally rely on an
inadequate public transportation system, taxis, and their feet to
reach their clients.
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• Penetration levels: In a situation of relative remoteness, it would
be logical for South African MFIs to try to develop as many
clients in each village as possible. However, this is difficult
because of both the dearth of opportunities for microenterprise in
South Africa, as explained in the first section, and the similarity
of opportunities that do exist. One MFI that has considered this
issue carefully concludes that it can sustainably reach no more
than one in five households in very poor communities. Thus, in
a (large) village of a thousand households, even if a single loan
officer reached every possible household (200), he or she would
still be below relevant global and African measures of loan officer
productivity (350 to 450 households).
• Need for greater client training input: A factor rooted in South
Africa’s apartheid past is the low level of literacy, business skills,
and general self-confidence in the rural communities. Women
are particularly disempowered, given traditional patriarchal
social structures, and small enterprise is not as much a tradition for them as in other parts of Africa. This means that MFI
loan officers spend a significant amount of their time assisting
very poor women to develop the basic self-confidence and
skills to run their businesses—not necessarily through training
but through general encouragement and social empowerment.
• Skill levels and attitudes to work: South African MFI loan officers
are typically right out of high school or have a few years of postsecondary education. Many are drawn from the ranks of
unemployed teachers. They tend to be young, and many lack
life skills and a mature work ethic; they consider their MFI
jobs neither as a career nor as particularly “developmental.”
The hard work involved in rural microcredit and the attractions of city life lead many to jump at the first opportunity for
alternative employment.
• Labor relations: South Africa has a generally combative labor relations environment. Trade unions helped overthrow the apartheid
regime and some MFIs are unionized. Even those that are not
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must comply with restrictive employment legislation that
makes it difficult to fire underperforming staff. There have been
a number of strikes at South African MFIs.
• Management inexperience: South African MFI loan officers share
responsibility for their productivity with management, who
decide operational, human resource, and strategic planning
issues. Given the country’s small MFI sector, there is a very
small pool of experienced top-level MFI managers and many
mid-level managers are still learning the ropes. Management
turnover is particularly damaging in such a context, because
most replacements must learn by doing rather than bring propoor microcredit skills with them to the post.
• Undermanagement: While South African MFIs have a significantly higher ratio of loan officers to management and administration staff than do other MFIs, this may contribute to low
productivity because of insufficient supervision of loan officers.
Low productivity might tempt MFI managers to employ more
loan officers to increase their portfolios, thus reinforcing the
undermanagement problem.
• Relative salary levels: Are South African MFIs compensating for
poor productivity and relatively high non–loan officer salaries by
keeping loan officer salaries low in comparison to the salaries of
management and administration staff? There is some evidence
that this is so—but this is ultimately self-defeating, as income
inequality within an MFI would tend to undermine loan officer
morale.
• Lack of appropriate support: At present, South Africa lacks a
coordinated source of capacity-building resources for the
NGO microcredit sector. The state has yet to grasp the nettle
of capacity development as a precondition for the emergence of
a successful pro-poor microcredit sector, and microcredit
NGOs are left largely to their own devices.
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Analysis and Implications
What Is the Significance of Income Inequality?
Some might question whether loan size as a percentage of per capita
GNI is a meaningful measure in the South African context. It is selfevident that this figure will be low compared with that of most
developing countries. Because South African MFIs are not lending
to the middle class, it might seem more useful to compare loan balances to average incomes in the communities where their clients live
rather than an average for the entire society.
This objection is only relevant, however, if we are interested in
assessing poverty outreach, by comparing clients of South African
MFIs with clients of MFIs elsewhere, which is not the purpose of
this study. Here, we wish to understand how income differentials
between South African MFI staff and clients affect MFIs’ ability to
attain sustainability.
All other things being equal (including average salaries and
interest rates), the smaller the average loan, the more clients are
required per MFI employee to cover personnel costs. As other things
are almost never equal, per capita GNI is useful to compare such
relationships across different economies. South African MFI salary
levels are contextually low compared with the selected benchmarks,
but average client loans are, again contextually speaking, extraordinarily small. This leads to a very high salary burden. To be very poor
in South Africa means to have an absolute income similar to—even
below—that of very poor people in other developing countries,
while South African MFI staff members are drawn or pushed
towards relatively higher income requirements than their foreign
colleagues. The average South African MFI loan size as a percentage
of per capita GNI is indispensable to assess the client side of this
equation.
Salaries and Productivity
South African MFI managers, wanting to reach the very poor but
under pressure to achieve break-even, are in an unhappy situation.
They could compensate for the salary burden by offering compara-
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tively low salaries (as some do), but this would tend to reinforce
poor productivity, poor labor relations, and high turnover. They
could try to increase productivity—specifically the number of clients
per staff member—to exceptional levels, with salaries to match.
However, it is unlikely that this can be accomplished in South Africa’s
young microfinance sector, with inexperienced staff, a limited market
for replacements, and strong competition for suitable staff from other
MFIs, the government, NGOs, and the private sector. In such a situation, highly productive staff would tend to have their salaries bid
up beyond what the client end of the market could afford to support
through interest payments. Put a different way, MFI salary levels are
an exogenous variable, beyond the control of MFI managers.
In the private sector, the options in such a situation are quite
straightforward: innovate new production techniques, find new
products to produce and sell, or close down. South Africa is an
unlikely source of methodological microcredit innovation for the
very poor. Indeed, aside from a few trailblazers (most notably the SEF
of Limpopo Province), it has demonstrated remarkable slowness in
experimenting with existing methodologies. Even fairly obvious
adjustments (e.g., independent transport for loan officers) are
adopted slowly and cautiously. Far more common than methodological innovation has been “mission drift” towards better-off
clients.

Is Microcredit Appropriate for
Poverty Eradication in South Africa?
What about new products—ones that rearrange the cost-revenue
relationship? If salary levels are exogenous and the South African
pro-poor microcredit NGO sector is unlikely to innovate new
microlending techniques, this is the only other option besides closure.
There are three broad forms of microfinance intervention
available to South African NGOs with a poverty-alleviation focus:
individual microcredit, group microcredit, and supported Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCAs). By contrast,
deposit taking is illegal for non-bank institutions in South Africa.
Individual microcredit is demonstrably too expensive for very poor
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households, and there are no examples of successful South African
MFIs reaching the very poor this way.
South Africa has thousands of ASCAs and several initiatives
that link them into larger networks, but to date there has been little
serious work on their microfinance potential. The NGOs active in
this area concentrate on savings and credit as a vehicle for social
mobilization rather than access to savings and credit services per se.
As a result, their performance in providing access to small-scale
credit for business, emergencies, and consumption, based on intermediated group savings, is poor. Their main effectiveness as poverty
alleviation strategies lies in the development of social capital in savings
and credit groups and in their larger networks. In this respect, some
South African savings and credit networks have been remarkably
successful.
Nevertheless, it is notable that elsewhere in the southern
African region, some NGOs have been successful in encouraging the
formation and functioning of ASCA networks providing meaningful
local-level financial services that directly improve the poverty situations of their members. The cost of supporting these groups is a tiny
fraction of the cost of microcredit programs, with comparative perclient cost ratios of 1:100 common. In other parts of the world
(notably South and Southeast Asia), NGOs and parastatals have
successfully provided external credit lines to functioning ASCA
networks, enabling them to have a significant impact on poverty
without using NGO-to-client microcredit.
There is another reason to consider ASCAs in the South African
context. The opening section outlined the challenges facing
microenterprise in South Africa due to the presence of a highly
efficient formal sector alongside extreme poverty. This prevents
microenterprises from adding value sustainably in productive enterprise as well as many retail activities. In this context, the best use
of microfinance may be to assist households to reduce their vulnerability by smoothing incomes through locally-based savings and
credit, rather than microcredit for microenterprise.
As ASCAs have the potential to not only deliver microfinance
services, but also create social capital amongst target communities—
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thus creating the possibility of a more radical approach to poverty
that goes beyond reliance on market solutions—it may be time for
South African NGOs to consider this approach more seriously.

Summary and Conclusions
Because of the country’s extreme income inequality, to be very
poor in the South African context means to have a real income,
and thus capacity for borrowing, more or less on par with MFI
clients elsewhere on the African continent. But to be a South African
MFI staff member means to have socially determined expenses and
thus income expectations on par with the developed world, or at
least much higher than elsewhere in Africa and Asia.
The income and social inequality thus makes operating a
microcredit business in South Africa unusually expensive relative to
other developing countries, and there is little that South African
MFIs can do about it. This is so even though MFIs are paying their
loan officers much less, relative to the local economy, than most MFIs
globally and in Africa. However, it is clear that South African
MFIs could go much further to improve their physical productivity.
Until this is attempted, it is impossible for them to say with certainty what special consideration they might need or deserve.
This problem raises the question of whether microcredit is an
appropriate solution to poverty in South Africa. Substituting the
voluntary input of savings and credit group members for the paid
exertions of professional fieldworkers has the potential not only to
improve microfinance performance, but also to create social capital
that can be used to address poverty in a variety of ways.

Notes
1. At current prices, in mid-2003. Following MicroBanking Bulletin practice, this
and other figures in this document have not been adjusted for purchasing power parity.
For full details of the MicroBanking Bulletin approach to benchmarking, see
http://www.mixmbb.org. (US$1 = R8 in 2002, when this study was undertaken.)
2. Because they are based on the number of employees rather than turnover, official South African microenterprise figures include small but high-value first economy
firms as well as second economy microenterprises.
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Microcredit, Social Capital,
and Politics
The Case of a Small Rural Town—
Gossas, Senegal
Jainaba M. L. Kah, Dana L. Olds,
and Muhammadou M. O. Kah
Through an exploratory approach, we studied the evolution, sustainability, and
management of ten microcredit institutions located in Gossas, a small town in
Senegal, Sub-Saharan Africa. Prevailing ideas about social capital, in the form of
social relationships within and between microcredit institutions and financing
NGOs, donors, and governments, are examined using both rational choice and
Marxist social capital theories to highlight the social struggles in social capital.
This study goes beyond a microcredit impact analysis by including an exploratory
institutional study to examine broader social and economic changes, including
the new institutional changes brought about by neoliberal reforms, the emerging
roles of women in rural and urban Senegal, and their increased political savoir
faire. This study concludes with recommendations on how to better leverage
microcredit and social capital to fill the vacuum left by restructuring of the welfare state through structural adjustment programs and neoliberal reforms.

T

he impact of microfinance on women’s decision-making
and empowerment has been the subject of several
studies in the last two decades. Many of these quantitative studies have focused on the impact of microfinance—with
a majority proving that microcredit increased the standard of
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living—raised awareness, aided decision making, and reduced
poverty among rural beneficiaries.1 Putnam (1993) forwards the
argument that dense associational networks within civil society
correlate positively with indicators of political democracy and economic growth. In fact, Putnam (1995) asserts that political malaise
and economic stagnation can be traced to declining stocks of social
capital in neighborhoods and communities. Thus, what we have
been seeing dominating development discourse in the last decade or
two is a shift from “basic needs” or welfare approaches to poverty
alleviation to an alternative approach using social capital manifested
in social networks and associational life as resources that could fuel
development from the bottom up (Rankin, 2002). When people
engage in networks and forms of associations such as microcredit
organizations, they develop a framework of common values and
beliefs that can become a “moral resource” (Putnam, 1993, p. 172).
Thus, as Rankin (2002) argues, social capital has been adopted as
the “magic bullet” with the power to correct state market failures
(Edwards, n.d.). This view has led to a worldwide consensus where
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) rooted in civil society and
mobilizing social capital are considered to be the most appropriate
institutions to carry out development work (Rankin, 2001).
However, NGOs are not a panacea and cannot solve the problems
facing developing nations alone. The role of states, albeit weak or corrupt, cannot be ignored. The case study of Gossas will be analyzed
using social capital theory, including the strength of ties between
poor communities and resource-giving (donor) communities and
between NGOs and political development in the third world.
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Neoliberal and Marxist Theories,
Social Capital, and Development
Social capital has been defined as “bonds of trust and mutual concern
that arise through volunteering, socializing, and taking part in organizations such as church and civic groups, bowling leagues, PTAs,
and professional association” (Koretz, 2001, p. 30). Social capital is
expected to pay off in many ways by promoting the transmission
of new ideas, improving children’s education, and enhancing the
efficiency of labor and capital markets. The previous examples of
social capital were given in the context of the USA. In the context
of Senegal, a developing country, social capital is manifested in
memberships in solidarity groups (which frequently help each other
to pull water, process grain, and access cooking ingredients and
cash), Women in Development projects, tontines,2 and diaras.3 In the
study area, social capital has been translated to contacts with northern
NGOs, government funding, and political affiliation. In the study
area it was found that women’s groups received “rewards and spoils” as
a result of the support accorded to the political regime. The important question we will try to answer is whether women who organize
themselves within microcredit organizations are able to build their
social capital and leverage themselves politically to receive “rewards
and spoils” for the socioeconomic development of their community.
Recent sociological research has attempted to address the weaknesses in the deterministic relationship between social capital and
development portrayed by Putnam. In 1998 Michael Woolcock, a
World Bank economist, developed a typology of different types of
social capital and their likely outcomes. Intracommunity ties (“bonding” social capital, or “integration”) are manifested at the macro level
with social opportunity requiring high levels of both integration and
linkage. The macropolitical framework can facilitate or impede the
capacity of communities to mobilize social networks. Woolcock goes
on to say that state institutions can have more or less institutional
capacity (“organizational integrity”) and be more or less responsive
to civil society (“synergy”). High levels of both are needed for states
to achieve the cooperation, accountability, and flexibility character-
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istic of successful developmental states such as Japan, South Korea,
and Singapore (Rankin, 2001, p. 5).
Rankin, building on the work of Marxist anthropologist Pierre
Bourdieu (1977), cautions that there is a struggle inherent in social
capital. She asserts that social capital has an ideological function
where the gestures of giving and kindness can function as a form of
domination, a “symbolic violence” with the harmful effect of binding
the oppressed to their oppressors through feelings of trust and obligation. This code of honor (credit, confidence, obligation, personal
loyalty, hospitality, gratitude, piety) is the most economical mode of
domination. Rankin therefore cautions that to the extent that development programs, such as the microcredit frenzy we are witnessing,
nourish local forms of association underpinned by common moral
frameworks, they risk exacerbating already existing lines of hierarchy,
coercion, and exclusion (2002, p. 8).
The World Bank, bilateral agencies, and NGOs have largely
adopted social capital within the liberal tradition as cultural properties, such as trust, norms, and networks that enhance efficiency by
facilitating cooperation finance. Rankin argues that mainstream
development agencies, who two decades ago used modernization
approaches to development and would have attacked such smallscale forms of petty capitalism as anachronistic “vestiges of traditional
society” that had no place in a modern society, now promote microfinance as a programmatic strategy that mobilizes social capital. This
change of strategy and targeting of poor women, when previously
credit inputs were extended to the male head of household in small
farming communities, is happening for several reasons.
The recent “career” of social capital to borrow an expression
from Margit Mayer (2001) coincides with the conclusion of the
Cold War, dubbed sympathetically by another social theorist,
Francis Fukuyama, as the “end of history” itself (Kanishka
Goonewardena 2000). Or that these events also paved the way
for other, somewhat lesser endings, including state-centered
planning and the comprehensive welfare state. Unmoored from
state institutions, development planners with the best of inten-
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tions must now turn to civil society to do their good work—
buttressed by policies and programs intended to devolve capacity to the local level. Much has been said about the
opportunities this political economic conjuncture presents for
grassroots mobilization, local self-reliance, participatory
processes, and development informed by local knowledge (e.g.
Mayer 1994). Without disputing the potential for such progressive outcomes, I wish to emphasize the extraordinary omission
in most of the social capital literature of the implications of this
conjuncture for the cherished local capacities, on the one hand,
or for the emergence of social capital as a politically expedient
concept for those setting the terms of the new world order, on the
other. (2001, p. 10, emphasis added.)
The social capital framework therefore enables the architects of
neoliberal economic policy to cast the reconfiguration of state-society
relations in progressive terms, such as local capacity building, local
self-reliance, net social benefits from reduced transaction costs, and
increased return to human capital. “As such, social capital can be
expected to fill the vacuum left by restructuring of the welfare state
in countries around the world” (Rankin, 2002, p. 10). These two
prevailing theories of social capital will be discussed further in the
context of our study area. Kabeer (1994) makes the argument that
the “feminization of development” we have been witnessing manifested as microfinance projects is justified on the basis of efficiency
and empowerment arguments drawing on the principles of social
capital theory. The social costs of neoliberal reforms and structural
adjustment, as discussed in our case study of Gossas, is disproportionately borne by women whose unpaid domestic labor absorbs
much of the shock suffered by poor households as a result of cuts in
health care, agricultural inputs, and educational subsidies. Women’s
labor therefore underwrites the transition in macroeconomic policy
from the Keynesian welfare state to the neoliberal “workfare” state
(Rankin, 2001; Jessop, 1994).
Rural women in agrarian economies similar to our case study in
Gossas typically lack the collateral, literacy, numeracy, and freedom
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of mobility necessary to access conventional credit from banks and
other lending agencies. Women tend to spend disproportionately
more of their incomes on the welfare of the household and exhibit
higher repayment and lower default rates (Rankin, 2002; Jessop,
1994). The argument being made is that extending credit to women
for microenterprise development will lead to beneficial outcomes for
all household members, poor communities, and lenders themselves
(Morduch, 2000), through social capital garnered due to membership in borrower groups, which helps to correct for imperfect
information, borrowers’ lack of access to formal credit, employment
histories, and substitutes for collateral by ensuring against default
through social sanction and peer enforcement (Rankin, 2002,
p. 12). Therefore, by participating in a network of borrower groups,
poor women are empowered through new forms of bridging and
linking social capital.
Microfinance advocates drawing on liberal theories of social
capital in their approach to poverty alleviation, according to Rankin
(2002) are able to evoke feminist and union traditions by coining
expressions such as “solidarity groups” to describe women’s borrower
groups. By making such expressions, the implication is that
women’s associations through microfinance generate not just social
and economic capital but also collective consciousness and resistance
to oppression. In practice, however, microfinance models propounded by multilaterals and bilaterals focus more on lenders’ concerns about financial sustainability and profits rather than on getting
involved in the more difficult task of building radical collective
action. In other words, solidarity groups allow lenders to slash
administrative costs, motivating repayment by using peer pressure to
introduce financial discipline. Staff and founders of microcredit
institutions are more concerned about outreach and repayment rates
and are not engaged in building collective consciousness (Rankin,
2001, 2002; Ackerly, 1997; Goertz, 1997).
The assertions above will be tested in the case of Gossas. The
intent is to investigate whether some level of consciousness or
savoir faire is evoked as women become part of microcredit groups.
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This point will be discussed further later when we look at microcredit in Gossas.

The Strengths of Ties
Apart from managing the social struggles inherent in social capital,
another major challenge for NGOs is that they must perform two
different functions in order to be effective: (1) generate financial
resources with which to (2) give microcredits to their membership.
These two functions require them to bridge two very different
constituencies: other NGOs, especially those located in the north,
government-owned nonprofits operating in the domain of microfinance, or donors and the relatively resource-poor world of marginalized farmers, urban squatters, and women who can use these loans
and other resources to improve their own lives. Ashman, Brown, and
Zwick (1998) argue that this challenge of bridging these divergent
organizational environments of resource mobilization and grant
making can be managed by building and maintaining relationships
with people and organizations in both the environments through
which Civil Society Resource Organizations (CSROs) gain the
resources, information, and social legitimacy necessary for accomplishing their missions. The same kind of challenge is faced by
microcredit organizations.
NGOs in the small rural town of Gossas are deeply involved
in building social capital across diverse environments (donor/governmental grant-making institutions and rural women). In social
network theory, strong ties in social networks are used to explain
relationships among people with similar social identities, who are
relatively equal, and who share common bonds, such as profession,
ethnicity, family, status, and even recreational interest. Emotional
bonds of friendship, intimacy, and reciprocity often characterize such
relationships, and they tend to endure over time (Ashman et al.,
1998; Granovetter, 1973). Most microcredit NGOs in Sub-Saharan
Africa, however, have to manage relationships that are characterized
as weak ties, which are less frequent, more instrumental, and less
intimate; they are most common among those who are unequal and
heterogeneous in their social identities (Ashman et al., 1998;
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Putnam, 1993; Blau, 1994; Ibarra, 1993). According to Ashman et
al. (1998), people with different values, interests, degrees of power,
and ways of interacting often find it difficult to identify common
bonds that build trust. Their relationships are more likely than
strong-tie relationships to be threatened by conflicts or domination,
unless the parties can learn ways of overcoming their differences
through mechanisms such as friendship (Uphoff, 1992), intermediaries who perform bridging roles (Brown, 1993), or participatory
decision making (Brown & Ashman, 1996). However, weak ties that
connect otherwise socially isolated groups have been noted for their
capacity to bring new information and resources that would otherwise
not be accessible (Granovetter, 1973).
If microcredit institutions are too homogeneous and overassociated with either the resource-generating or grant-making environment, they can fail to bridge the two environments effectively and
risk becoming irrelevant to their own missions. Overalignment with
the perspectives of poor and marginalized constituencies can lead
to alienation from the priorities of financial resource donors and
managers, which in turn leads to the declining availability of funds
for microcredit. But overcompliance with the demands of donors
and financial managers for certain kinds of projects, strict financial
accountability, and quantifiable results of social development projects
can lead to grant-making relationships that are perceived by recipients
to be controlling rather than supportive of their own developmental
priorities and processes.

The Politicization of Microcredit Organizations
The relationships between NGOs and governments in Africa are
difficult to characterize. NGOs can either choose to isolate themselves completely from the state, engage the state through advocacy
(confrontational or nonconfrontational), or cooperate with the state
through parallel or collaborative field projects (Fisher, 1998).
According to Fisher (2003), in a world increasingly beset by
famines, wars, genocide, AIDS, environmental deterioration, and
continuing population momentum in poor countries, the failed
state has become the Achilles heel of the emerging international
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community. For every failed state there are many more “weakly
institutionalized” governments. To be both accountable and strong,
government at the national level must intersect, at least indirectly,
with the efforts ordinary people make in their communities. Weak
states, pushed by international forces advocating structural adjustment and privatization, are now partnering with NGOs, who are
now acquiring growing capacity, in order to avoid social unrest.
Fisher (2003) also asserts that in Senegal, during the early
1980s, the government began using grassroots support organizations
(GRSOs) to increase its access to rural areas and reduce the power of
the marabouts, or Islamic brotherhoods. Ironically, because this
threatened NGO autonomy, a GRSO network was developed and
led a long and complicated legal fight to forestall government intervention, thereby creating an NGO-marabout alliance.
In the context of the theories of social capital, the strength of
ties, and the politicization of NGOs (including microcredit institutions), this article compares 10 microcredit organizations in a small
rural town in Senegal to see how they managed their relationships
with northern NGOs and governments; to consider the challenge of
building social capital across the different environments of northern
NGOs, donors, and governments; and to examine their constituency
of poor rural women. The article also explores the role played by the
founders or heads of these organizations, investigating how the social
capital they managed to accumulate has influenced the effectiveness
and resources of their microcredit institutions and whether this has
translated into socioeconomic development for the community.

Methodology
The objective of this research is to examine microcredit activity in
the community and the impact of that activity on the building of
social capital. Research included socioeconomic surveys and semistructured interviews on social capital and microcredit institutions
in Gossas. The authors decided to focus on the more established
groupements in order to better understand how they operate and
their impact on social capital.
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Ethnographic research was conducted over a period of three
years, with one of the authors living in the community as a Peace
Corps volunteer in the town of Gossas, Senegal, for two years. The
other authors have traveled to Senegal and the Gambia to conduct
research on this topic three times in the last two years, their time there
totaling three months. Research included socioeconomic surveys
and semistructured interviews on social capital and microcredit
institutions in Gossas.
An ethnographic study was chosen as the most appropriate
methodology, as the results of microcredit programs can be better
understood using in-depth analysis of the social processes and economic histories of the communities impacted.

Economic Activities in
the Peanut Basin of Senegal
The Study Area
Senegal, the country where this research was conducted, is located in
West Africa. The capital of Senegal, Dakar, is the westernmost point
in Africa. The country, which is slightly smaller than South Dakota,

Figure 1. Map of Senegal

Source: http://www.mapquest.com
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surrounds the Gambia on three sides; it is bordered on the north by
Mauritania, on the east by Mali, and on the south by Guinea and
Guinea-Bissau. Senegal is mainly a low-lying country, with a semidesert area in the north and northeast and forests in the southwest.
With a population of about 10.85 million, a literacy rate of 40%, and
a GDP per capita of US$446, Senegal was ranked 156th in 2002
by the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human
Development Report. Senegal has been subjected to IMF and
World Bank Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and in 1994 had
a devaluation of its currency (Franc CFA). In 2005, 54% of the
population lives below the poverty line. Senegal also has a high
unemployment rate, with almost half of its population unemployed. This unemployment is most acute among the youths (CIA
World Factbook, 2003).4

Economic Activities
Senegal’s primary rural economic activity is agriculture. Approximately 70% of the country’s workforce is involved in agriculture, and
in 2000 agriculture accounted for 18% of the GDP. The two main
agricultural activities in Senegal are peanut (groundnut) production
and fishing. Peanut production takes place on 40% of cultivated
land and employs over 1 million people, although it now accounts
for a smaller portion of foreign exchange earnings when compared
to fishing and mining (US$79.4 million in 2000). Most farms are
smallholdings where family supplies all of the labor. Over 70% of
agricultural production in Senegal comes from small and mediumsized enterprises.5
Fishing employs over 200,000 people full-time; in addition, it
provides considerable temporary employment in the informal sector
through small-scale traditional fishing. In 2000, fishing earned
US$239 million. In addition to providing income, fish is also the
dominant animal protein in the Senegalese diet.
Ethnographic research was conducted in Gossas, one of the three
departmental capitals in the region of Fatick. Foundiougne and
Fatick are the other departmental capitals. The primary ethnic groups
are Wolof, Sereer, and Pulaar. The population is approximately
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10,000. Gossas is on the national road between Kaolack and
Diourbel. Because of its location (between two regional capitals—
albeit not its own), Gossas is often marginalized with regards to
resources available in the region, and there is very little NGO activity
in Gossas. In order to get to the regional capital of Fatick, it is necessary to take a car 39 km to Kaolack and then take another car to
Fatick. The essential economic activities in Gossas are agriculture and
animal husbandry. Located in the “peanut basin,” the area produces
principally peanuts, millet, sorghum, and corn.
During the colonial era, peanut production was high and
Gossas was a thriving town. There are several old French colonial
buildings in the town, many of which are now deteriorated and
crumbling. Due to both the increased salinity of the water supply
and the depletion of minerals in the soil, peanut production and
overall economic health of the town have declined over the years.

Gender Relations and Financial Resources
of Sene-Gambian Women
Gender relations in Senegalese families are generally very patriarchal.
Senegalese women may appear to have a lot of power because of
their animated nature and dynamism. Women do have some power,
but just within their spheres of influence—namely, the raising of
children; and even with regard to this, their authority can be questioned by the borom kerr (male head of household). Typically, women
who contribute financially to the family enjoy greater freedom and
influence. And the first wife is more influential than the others.
However, ultimately the male makes the final decisions concerning
the affairs of the family.
In Gossas, wives must ask for permission to travel. If a wife does
not have her own income, she is not at liberty to make decisions
about the schooling and health care of the children. Family law in
Senegal is also very patriarchal. Husbands are automatically given tax
breaks for their dependent children, even if the wife works and even
if the husband and wife are divorced and she provides financially for
the children. The children are believed to always belong to their
fathers. However, as Perry (2002) notes, neoliberal reforms have
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diminished men’s power in domestic spheres. In rural areas, male
household heads were the official members of cooperatives and therefore lost a major source of patronage when cooperatives were abolished
in the 1980s under the auspices of structural adjustment programs
administered by the World Bank and IMF. Men’s inability to provide
their wives with peanut seed or to pay for much needed household
essentials forces them to concede to women’s wants and demands.
Although most of the inhabitants in the study area (Gossas) are
Muslims, Wolof farmers do not practice purdah (the seclusion of
women), and Wolof women have traditionally enjoyed some freedom
to pursue such income-generating activities as cash-crop farming
and livestock rearing. Wolof women do not generally pool their
finances with their husbands’. This is evident not only in rural
Senegal but even in the USA, where great numbers have emigrated
to in the last three decades. The authors note that even in western
settings, many Senegalese women do not own joint accounts with
their husbands. Babou supported this point (2002) when he studied
Senegalese Murid 6 Muslims in New York. Babou found that women
refused to participate in household expenses, citing Wolof and Islamic
traditions that exclusively assigned the financing of household
responsibilities to men.
Peddling among rural Wolof women is a common practice, and
weekly rural markets open up new avenues to spawn small businesses.
Perry (2002) contends that, as opposed to largely held assumptions
about West African women, who are commonly depicted as “market
mammies” and avid traders, Wolof women joined their more marketsavvy counterparts from Nigeria, Benin, and Sierra Leone, in recent
years. Even though this observation is true, the authors are of the
opinion that women in the Sene-Gambia region have increased their
numbers in trading not only locally but internationally. Women from
the Sene-Gambia region are now traveling to the Middle East and
North Africa (Dubai, Tunis, Morocco, Turkey, etc.) and to the Far
East (Shanghai, India, China, etc.), and they are radically changing
their communities.
The authors wish to emphasize that economic migrants from
Sub-Saharan Africa (estimated at 35% of the highly trained and
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skilled workforce) to developed countries are also responsible for
meeting the void left by failed states and neoliberal reforms pushed
forward through the “Washington consensus.” Communities would
have collapsed and died of hunger without the joint efforts of women
at the home front and economic migrants (both men and women) in
developed countries sending remittances to meet school, housing,
food, and health expenditures. Remittances to Senegal through
formal channels were estimated by the World Bank at CFA 127 billion in 2001. This amount should be trebled in order to capture the
informal remittances, making a total of CFA 381 billion (US$0.762
billion). The authors’ observation is substantiated by Jettinger
(2005), who states that
remittances are not only sent out of a moral obligation towards
the family in Senegal, but are essential in guaranteeing a family’s
livelihood. These regular remittances developed as a result of
the increasing social and economic problems in Senegal (such as
drought, structural adjustment programs, and devaluation of
the Franc CFA), and the changing immigration policies in the
countries of residence. (p. 14)
In urban Sene-Gambia, women are building social capital by
joining associations or microcredit organizations and jointly sponsoring one or two members to go overseas and buy goods (clothing,
expensive lace and sequin materials, insulated food containers, gold
jewelry, scarves, incense, perfumes, stainless steel and porcelain
cookware and bowls, etc.) on behalf of each individual group member.
Goods are put in freight containers and distributed to the individual
members of the group. These people in turn distribute to their own
intermediaries to sell for cash and on credit. The middle women and
men are then responsible for collecting monthly payments. The
intermediaries put a margin on top of their “patron’s” asking price to
serve as their commission for the distribution of goods and the collection of debts. In rural areas we see less elaborate activities and
goods, but women still trade in incense, palm oil, fish, locally sewn
clothes, etc. In the Gambia, which is only three hours away from
Gossas by car, most goods are substantially cheaper than in Senegal,
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due to lower import taxes. Women in Gossas are taking advantage of
this difference in price by regularly sending women to the Gambia to
buy fabric, clothes, shoes, sugar, flour, chicken, etc., to be distributed
to other groupement members and sold in the community.

Microcredit Alliances in Gossas, Rural Senegal
The first formal groupement (association or group) in Gossas was
created 20 years ago. In 2005, there are more than 50 groupements in
Gossas, a town of 10,000 people. The average membership is 30
women. Microcredit has become particularly important to women in
the agrarian-based rural economy of Senegal due to major institutional changes. Senegal, like many developing countries, entered into
structural adjustment programs in the early 1980s with the Bretton
Woods Institutions, bringing about neoliberal reforms such as the
abolition of state-led agricultural cooperatives throughout rural
Senegal. This means that farmers can no longer get the plows, seed
drills, fertilizer, or high quality seed they used to receive on credit
(Perry, 2002).
In recent years, NGOs from developing countries have been providing financing to microcredit institutions in developing countries.
In Gossas, Alliance de Credit et D’Epargne pour la Production
(ACEP [Credit and Savings Alliance for Production]), an American
NGO, has identified 15 groupements to receive financing. The 15
most dynamic member organizations of the Consortium (Gossas’s
most powerful federation of women’s groups) were chosen. Loans to
the groupements vary widely but range from CFA 250,000 to CFA
950,000 (US$500 to US$1,900). (Most groupements hold tontines in
addition to their lending activities.)
Notably, many groupements were formed between 2000 and the
present, with several being formed in the year that Mr. Abdoulaye
Wade, the current president of Senegal, was elected. Furthermore, it
is no coincidence that the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) headquarters (Wade’s party) is also where the Consortium holds meetings.
Through federations, associations, and alliances, participants
synchronize their efforts and resources. NGOs are now forming
more alliances by reducing their insularity, largely because of the
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realization that they cannot do (or be) everything, and they now
accept a holistic view calling for complementary action with others.
Yet other more strategically oriented alliances occur to achieve
micro-macro complementarities (Fowler, 1997). At the grassroots
level, women’s economic groups are creating alliances that allow
them to reach greater economies of scale, heighten their political
clout, and realize greater opportunities and profits.
In Gossas, microcredit institutions formed alliances to reduce
redundancy, to maximize their impact, and to have a stronger political voice. There are three federations or alliances of associations
(groupement federation) in Gossas. Gossas has approximately 50
groupements, which fall under 3 different umbrella organizations.
With 49 member groupements, the Consortium of Gossas is the most
dynamic of these umbrella organizations. The Consortium was
started in 2001 and became a recognized organization in 2002.
Presidents of Consortium-member groupements meet monthly to
repay loans and to discuss opportunities, policies, and politics.
When the Consortium was started, each member of each
groupement was required to pay CFA 650 (US$1.30), of which CFA
150 (US$0.30) went to administrative fees (copying identity cards
and notarizing documents). The consortium initially started with 20
groupements and approximately 500 members (often women are
involved in more than one groupement). At its inception, the organization had CFA 270,000 (US$540) in operating funds. In November
2004, the Consortium had CFA 2 million (US$4,000) in its bank
account. Their account was strengthened by CFA 207,000
(US$414) from the government, which groupements in Gossas were
given following the visit of Prime Minister Macky Sall’s wife to
Gossas in 2003.

Gossas Groupement Structure and Governance
Generally every groupement has a president, vice president, treasurer,
and secretary. Money is collected only during meetings of the entire
group. Generally, money is collected in a pot, and each transaction
is verbally accounted for and then recorded in a book by the secretary. For example, one will take the money of a member and loudly
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say for all to hear, “Fatou Ndiaye 1,000 CFA,” after which the transaction will be recorded in a book. After money is collected, it is then
disbursed to members who will get loans during that meeting.
Money saved by the groupement may be deposited in the community
savings bank. Many groups have accounts at the savings bank. The
treasurer and the president usually have access to these funds.
As indicated by the interviews, all groups have a protocol for the
enforcement of rules regarding repayment. Fines, social pressure, and
the threat of being kicked out of the group are all means employed to
ensure that women repay their loans. One groupement indicated that
they would not hesitate to take nonpaying members to the police.

Lending Structure of the Consortium
Every month, each groupement president is given CFA 40,000
(US$80.00) to lend out to members of their groupement. The interest
rate is 10% over a two-month period. In the first month, groupement
presidents must come to the Consortium meeting with the interest
payment of CFA 4,000 (US$4), and the second month they must
pay back the complete CFA 40,000 (US$80). With the continuing
growth of the organization, it is difficult to continue giving 40,000
per member out of Consortium funds. Therefore, new member
groupements are limited to monthly loans of CFA 20,000 (US$40).
The Consortium also has a tontine each month for whoever wants to
participate. Each participant contributes CFA 2,500 (US$5) into the
pot, and two people are selected to win the money. If members do
not pay their loans back on time, there is a CFA 1,000 (US$2) late
fee. The groupement structure in Gossas is shown in Figure 2.
As a result of the political acumen of the groupements, in
November 1994, in a townwide meeting at the mayor’s office of
Gossas, the government of Senegal committed to providing CFA
40,000,000 (US$80,000) for loans to women’s groupements in the
department of Gossas. These loans can be individual loans or group
loans. The disbursement of loans began in early 2005. The largest
individual loan is CFA 250,000 (US$500) and the largest group loan
is CFA 2,500,000 (US$5,000). The loans are being given at 5%
interest, payable over a 12-month period, with a 3-month grace
Volume 7 Number 1

137

Journal of Microfinance

Figure 2. Structure of Associations in Gossas

Regional
Federation
Departmental
Federation

Communal Group

Individual Group
period before beginning payment. Women are required to fill out
applications detailing their plans for the money and a strategy for
repayment. Based on this information, the best projects are being
chosen to receive loans. Table 1 shows the most active microcredit
institutions in Gossas. Membership varies from 30 to 300 members;
longevity also varies, from 1 year to 18 years. Two of the groups are
receiving ACEP microcredit loans. The loan amounts, interest rates,
and penalties vary from one group to another.

Anatomy of Social Capital
Amongst Gossas Groupements
This section seeks to identify patterns in the formation and overall
standing of microcredit organizations in Gossas, as well as their access
to resources. Even though we cannot draw firm conclusions about the
patterns identified in this research, such an exercise is very insightful
to researchers and practitioners by pinpointing the “necessary” factors
propelling microcredit organizations to have greater impact. This
section assesses the development of social capital by the founders and
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Table 1. The Most Active Microcredit Institutions in Gossas
Bokk Ndeye ak Baye‡
(Sharing same mother and father—portraying closeness of group)
• Year of Commencement: 1984
• Number of members: 300
• Initial start-up financing: Started with member funds. Each person contributed
CFA 100 (US$0.20).
• Loan terms: Max.: CFA 50,000 (US$100) is both the maximum loan and the
average loan.
• Interest rate & penalties: The interest rate is 10%, and the duration of the loan
is four to five months. There is a late fee of CFA 100 per day.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members have businesses doing
tie dying and tailoring and selling vegetables, fabric, household goods, etc.
Diakhao*
• Year of Commencement: 1987
• Number of members: 30
• Initial start-up financing: Tontine to defray the costs of the baptism and CFA
5,000 (US$10) for themselves.
• Loan terms: Dues: CFA 50/wk; Max.: CFA 3,000 (US$6); Min.: CFA 2,000
(US$4); Ave.: CFA 2,500 (US$5)
• Interest rate & penalties: 10%, payable over two months. First month: interest
due, second month: principal due
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members sell vegetables,
churaye (incense), cloth, shoes, and household items.
Takku Liggeey Diakhao
(Stand steadfast and build Diakhao)
• Year of Commencement: 1996
• Number of members: 65
• Initial start-up financing: Started with member funds of CFA 1,000 (US$2) each.
• Loan terms: Max.: CFA 5,000 (US$10) Min.: CFA 2,500 (US$5)
• Interest rate & penalties: The interest rate is 5%, and the loans are paid back
the next month.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Most members sell food items
in the market. They sell vegetables, dried fish, millet, etc.
Bokk Jomm
(Together in pride)
• Year of Commencement: 2001
• Number of members: 30
• Initial start-up financing: Started with the funds of group members. They put
in CFA 500 each to get things started and each donate CFA 100 every month.
• Loan terms: Max.†: CFA 100,000 (US$200) Min.: CFA 50,000 (US$100)
• Interest rate & penalties: 25%, payable over five months. Members are given a
three to four month grace period. After the grace period is over, they must
make a payment equal to 20% of the loan and 25% of the total interest
payment. For example, on a loan of CFA 50,000, member will pay 12,500 per
month for a total of 62,500 repaid over the life of the loan.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members own boutiques, sell
vegetables in the market, and generally engage in all types of petty commerce,
i.e., buying fabric, jewelry, perfume, etc. to resell. Members also farm and sell
their produce—mostly millet.

Dangou Lebou
• Year of Commencement: 2001
• Number of members: 60
• Initial start-up financing: Started with member funds. Each member gave an
initial contribution of CFA 100 (US$0.20).
• Loan terms: Max.: CFA 10,000 (US$20) Min.: CFA 5,000 (US$10.00) 80%
repayment rate.
• Interest rate & penalties: The interest rate is 5%, and the duration of the loan
is two months.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members have businesses doing
tie dying and tailoring and selling vegetables, fabric, household goods, etc.
Doleel Jaboot
• Year of Commencement: 2001
• Number of members: 33
• Initial start-up financing: Started with member funds. Each member gave an
initial contribution of CFA 500 (US$1.00).
• Loan terms: Max.: CFA 15,000 (US$30.00) Min.: CFA 2,500 (US$5.00)
• Interest rate & penalties: The interest rate is 5%, and the duration of the loan
is 1 month for every CFA 5,000 borrowed. For example, if a member borrows
CFA 10,000, the duration of the loan is two months. 100% repayment rate.
Fine of CFA 150 (US$0.30) per day for late payment.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members have businesses doing
tie dying and tailoring and selling vegetables, fabric, household goods, etc.
Kai Fii**
(Come here)
• Year of Commencement: 2001
• Number of members: 45
• Initial start-up financing: Groupement was started with member funds. Each
member contributed CFA 500. Every three months, every member must
contribute CFA 500. In November they received funds from ACEP.
• Loan terms: With the funds contributed by groupement members: Max.: CFA
15,000 (US$30) Min.: CFA 10,000 (US$10). With the funds the groupement
received from ACEP: Max.: CFA 50,000 (US$100), Min.: CFA 25,000
(US$50)
• Interest rate & penalties: The duration of these loans is one month at 5%
interest. 13%, payable over 12 months. Two-month grace period.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members own boutiques, sell
vegetables in the market, and generally engage in all types of petty commerce,
i.e., buying fabric, jewelry, perfume, etc. to resell.
Takku Liggeey Dangou
(Stand steadfast and work for Dangou*)
• Year of Commencement: 2001
• Number of members: 48
• Initial start-up financing: Started with member funds.
• Loan terms: Max.: CFA 40,000 is both the maximum and average loan.
• Interest rate & penalties: 10%, and the duration of the loan is three months.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members have businesses doing
tie-dying, raising chickens, selling vegetables, and all types of petty commerce,
i.e., buying fabric, jewelry, perfume, etc. to resell. The groupement also owns a
millet machine.

Bunkard
• Year of Commencement: 2002
• Number of members: 32
• Initial start-up financing: Started with member funds. Each member
contributed CFA 650 to start.
• Loan terms: Max.: CFA 25,000 (US$50), which is also the average loan.
• Interest rate & penalties: 5%, and the duration is 2 months.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Most members are involved in
some form of petty commerce, i.e., buying items for resale in Gossas.
Funkal Sa Cherie
(Revere your husband)
• Year of Commencement: 2003
• Number of members: 70
• Initial start-up financing: Started with member funds.
• Loan terms: Max.: CFA 15,000 (US$30) Min.: CFA 10,000 (US$20). When
the groupement started, the maximum loan was CFA 2,000. When they had
enough money for each member to be able to borrow 2,000, they moved the
maximum loan to 5,000. They will continue this upward progression
indefinitely. Currently, every member has a loan out of at least CFA 10,000,
and two members have a loan of CFA 15,000.
• Interest rate & penalties: 10%, and the duration of the loan is one month.
There is a penalty of CFA 500 per day for late payment.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members have businesses tiedying fabric, working in hair salons, and all types of petty commerce, i.e.,
buying fabric, jewelry, perfume, etc. to resell.
Sopp Sokna Mame Diarra Bousso
• Year of Commencement: November 2004
• Number of members: 33
• Initial start-up financing: ACEP
• Loan terms: Max.: CFA 100,000 (US$200); Min.: CFA 50,000 (US$100)
• Interest rate & penalties: 13%, payable over 12 months. 2 month grace period.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members own boutiques, sell
vegetables in the market, and generally engage in all types of petty commerce,
i.e., buying fabric, jewelry, perfume, etc. to resell.
* Name of a town
** The founder is a dynamic change agent in Gossas. She was largely responsible for
ACEP choosing to finance Gossas groupements and is the point person for the
project. She keeps track of all ACEP loans made in Gossas. She is also the
secretary general for the Consortium of groupements in the town and the
federation of groupements at the departmental level.
† A member receiving an initial loan of CFA 50,000 (US$100) must borrow and
successfully repay a loan of CFA 50,000 (US$100) five times in order to be
eligible for the next tier loan of CFA 65,000 (US$130). Then the member must
borrow and repay a loan of 65,000 successfully five times in order to be eligible
for a loan of CFA 100,000 (US$200).
‡ Bokk Ndeye ak Baye was the first groupement started in the commune of Gossas.
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leaders of Gossas groupements and evaluates its impact on women’s
political clout and their ability to garner financial and material
resources from the government of Senegal and the NGO community.
The founders of the microcredit organizations in this study are the
individuals and groups who played the most critical roles in the formation of the new organizations. They include the national, regional,
and local social leaders and groups who invested their ideas, time, and
resources in founding the organizations.
The authors observed that women, especially microcredit
founders and leaders, have built their social capital by allying with
the regime. They are thus using their political connections to get
access to northern NGOs, government financing, and grants. It is
therefore evident that these rural women have become more sophisticated in their dealings with government and are “banking” on the
political clout of their organization. This leverage is brought about
by these women arguing that “I carry X number of women who will
listen to my directives [voting and supporting the regime].”
Ties with government are assessed from the interviews performed
with microcredit organization presidents, founders, and members.
Gossas has a Social Development office, a regional office of the
Ministry of Family and Social Development. The director of the Social
Development Office is the point person for receiving government
financing; all proposals will go to the Minister of the Family and Social
Development from the director’s desk. It is this regional office that
supplies technical support to women’s economic groups in Gossas.
Regarding the awarding and distribution of the CFA 40,000,000
(US$8,000) government fund earmarked for groupements in the
department of Gossas, staff of this office were trained to provide support applicants and provide the winners of the funding with training
in accounting, record keeping, and the rules and regulations of the
financement. In 2004, the request for proposals for the new government financing was presented to the public at the mayor’s office. This
has been an arduous task for Social Development office staff. While
microcredit organizations have become very aggressive in their search
for more funding and have successfully wielded their social capital to
obtain greater funding opportunities, they often lack the vision and
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skills to work with greater sums of money. The following remark
made by a government official underscores this dilemma:
I am frustrated. When the women come to me for help, they not
only want me to help them type the proposals, they essentially
want me to write the proposals. They come with no clue of
what type of project they want to do and how they will manage the money. All they know is that they want more money.
(Interview Notes)
In the last year, vast changes have occurred on the politicaleconomic landscape for Gossas groupements. Before 2004, when
ACEP began to finance groupements, and 2003, when Prime Minister
Macky Sall’s wife introduced a fund, groupements in Gossas were
primarily self-financed. Women who have been accustomed to
receiving loans no larger than CFA 100,000 (US$200) are now able
to access loans that are over 10 times larger. Hence, these women are
experiencing growing pains as their dreams of greater financement
become a reality.
These realities notwithstanding, it is important to assess the
factors that have precipitated these new infusions of capital. How
were these women able to garner social capital and wield it to their
advantage in a town often overlooked in the distribution of resources,
also located in one of the poorest regions of Senegal?

Women’s Groupements in Sene-Gambia
and the Political Process
Women’s groupements form one of the most powerful voting blocs in
Senegal. Highly organized, these groups meet frequently and regularly, devise political strategy, and wield great power and influence
over politicians and government actors. In the town of Gossas alone,
which only has a population of ten thousand, there are close to 1,000
women who belong to a groupement. Women have been called on time
and time again to don their blue and gold boubous,7 the colors of the
Partie Democratique du Senegal (PDS), to go to rallies in support of
the PDS. For very significant rallies, women are often bussed in from
near and far. In 2004, women in the region of Fatick made their
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voices heard in vociferous support for the mayor of Fatick’s ascension
to prime minister of Senegal. Following Senegal’s independence celebration on April 4, 2004, amidst accusations of improper use of funds
designated for revitalization projects in the region of Thies, Prime
Minister Idrissa Seck was booted from the number two post. During
the controversy, President Abdoulaye Wade dissolved his cabinet and
changed several members. When the smoke cleared, it was Macky
Sall, the mayor of Fatick, who was standing in the country’s number
two political spot as prime minister of Senegal. The women of Fatick
and particularly the women of Gossas did not hesitate to use their
influence to realize economic benefits for groupements.
The leader of the Consortium, the most powerful groupement
federation in Gossas, is a charismatic woman well known and liked in
the community by both young and old. When the vice president of
the Consortium was asked about the role of politics in the activities
of groupements, she stated that “Groupements are more and more a
political thing. It is difficult to talk about development anymore
because everything is politicized.” When asked why the Consortium
is so strong, the vice president responded, “It’s the president, X; when
she walks down the street you hear children and old people chanting
her name. She worked very hard to have the prime minister’s wife
come here to Gossas.” The president of the Consortium is also very
active within the departmental and regional groupement federations
and was instrumental in persuading the wife of the newly appointed
prime minister, Macky Sall, to come to Gossas and commit funds to
Gossas groupements. At that meeting she committed CFA 207,000
(US$414) to the town of Gossas, and more was given to groupements
in the rural villages of the department of Gossas. The president’s success in persuading Sall’s wife to come to Gossas before going to the
other departments in the region further legitimized her status and
role as a powerful change agent capable of wielding the social capital
garnered by Gossas groupements to produce results.
Therefore, when assessing the relationship between microcredit
organizations or women’s groupements and government, the important question to ask is what social capital theory (Marxist or rational
choice) best captures the social capital exhibited by the people in our
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study site of Gossas. The authors are of the opinion that microcredit
organizations are using their political affiliations to get more support
from government and northern NGOs. As shown in Table 2, the
strength of ties and the politicization of the 10 microcredit organizations chosen is just developing. Out of the 10 organization studies,
3 have strong ties with northern NGOs (ACEP) and 1 has very strong
ties to the government. However, most of the microcredit organizations are tied to government since they are dipping or planning to
dip into microcredit funds administered by the Ministry of Family
and Social Development.

Impact of Microcredit in Gossas
In order to determine the impact of microcredit on the community,
we performed a process flow analysis of where the money goes—i.e.,
what is done with the loan money. Women in Gossas are primarily
engaged in economic activities such as selling foodstuff in the market
(fruit, vegetables, fish, etc.); selling clothes, shoes, and other consumer
items; hairdressing; and tailoring. When women receive loans, they use
the money to purchase inputs for their businesses and pay businessassociated fees. For example, the women who sell vegetables in the

Table 2. Microcredit Organizations and Scope of Ties
Microcredit
organization

Inception Year

Ties with
northern NGO

Bokk Ndeye ak Baye

1984

No

Diakhao

1987

Yes

Takku Liggeey Diakhao

1996

No

Bokk Jomm

2001

No

Dangou Lebou

2001

No

Doleel Jabot

2001

No

Kai Fii

2001

Yes*

Takku Liggeey Dangou

2001

No

Bunkard

2002

No

Funkal Sa Cherie

2003

No

Sopp Sokna Mame
Diarra Bousso

November 2004

Yes

* Kai Fii is also has strong ties to the government—it was founded by a political leader.
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market use their money to pay those that deliver vegetables, which
come from Cassamance and Guinea, and also to pay rent for their
stalls in the market. They use the money they earn to pay debts,
make business related purchases, and take care of familial obligations
(school fees, clothes, baptisms, marriages, etc.). While in Senegal the
finances of women are generally kept separate from those of their
husbands, women are often the ones who pay their children’s school
fees. In polygamous families, a husband may have four wives and
more than a dozen children. The expense of educating children is too
great for fathers to pay alone, and often the only way children are
educated is through the earnings of women. Women also spend a
substantial amount of money on the required gifts for baptisms and
marriages. Finally, Sene-Gambian women take particular pride in
their appearance and often spend substantial amounts of disposable
income on clothing. There are very little personal savings amongst
the women.
When the founders and some members of microcredit organizations were questioned on whether their lives have been significantly
changed by microcredit, the answers were not very convincing. Most
women accept that microcredit has impacted their lives, but not considerably. Figure 3 includes some of the statements given by the
women interviewed in November 2004.
As shown by these statements, microcredit institutions have
brought positive changes to this poor rural town of 10,000 inhabitants. However, the expectations portrayed in neoliberal development
discourse that microcredit and social capital will help lift communities out of poverty are a bit too optimistic. The abject poverty, lack of
social amenities, and deprivation suffered by rural communities as a
result of structural adjustment programs and failed states that we are
currently seeing all over the Sub-Saharan African landscape will take
more than microcredit to correct.

Conclusions
The general expectation of the impact of microcredit is largely due
to the interpretation of social norms and networks that underlies the
Grameen model of microfinance that is now widely promoted by
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mainstream development agencies. Drawing on liberal theories of
social capital, these interpretations expect that opportunities for
association afforded women through “solidarity groups” will foster
the social networks and common moral frameworks necessary for
cooperation and collective action (Rankin, 2002).
However, the authors are of the opinion that since its inception,
there has been much debate as to the merits of microcredit as a tool
of empowerment and poverty alleviation. High interest rates, low
rates of personal savings, and inaccessibility of higher levels of credit
and formal lending institutions are all factors that have been highlighted in this debate. The women of Gossas, Senegal, face all of these
obstacles. There was a common thread of empowerment vis-à-vis
husbands and communities, which was highlighted during interviews.

Figure 3. Statements from November 2004 Interviews
“We only just started. But [and she waves her hands towards her pots, where she
is preparing the night’s meal of millet couscous and dried fish] we are just trying to add
a little to our pots, dress a little better, and contribute more to our households.”
“I’ve seen especially how groupements have helped single women, women with no
husbands. Many of these women didn’t have enough even to eat for the day. It’s tough.
Gossas is a poor town. Now they have money to buy food and the things they need.”
“Yes and no. We now have a source of money when we need a loan. But the loans
are too small and we need more money. I would like to really expand my boutique, but
to do that I need a lot more money.”
“When we started this groupement, we had nothing—not one single CFA. Now we
have 350,000 CFA in our account, and it only keeps growing. Each member is up to
having a loan of at least 10,000 CFA. We are making great progress.”
“I initially started this groupement to bring greater unity and cohesion in our neighborhood. Through the activities of our groupement, we have learned unity in economics. Everyone is struggling to make it here. We are now struggling and working
together.”
“I definitely see the changes. If you can help your husband, this lifts your voice in
the household. He listens to you more.”
“It took a while for the women to understand how the groupement works and to
believe that they’d see real benefits. But now, things are running smoothly and everyone
sees the benefits.”
“Yes. Before, there was no one to borrow money from. Often, you just need a little money to get you through until the end of the month, a little money to buy your
merchandise and fill up your table. Before, when we fell short of money, there was no
one to turn to.”
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Women who contribute to the family financially enjoy greater freedom and influence. When asked if her standing within the family has
changed as a result of her earning income, one groupement president
stated, “I definitely see the changes. If you can help your husband,
this lifts your voice in the household. He listens to you more.” Within
the author’s host family, in the town of Gossas, this was quite apparent. Of the three wives, the wife who is a groupement president and
has had her own stand in the vegetable market enjoys the greatest
freedom and mobility. While, like the other wives, she must ask permission to travel before going anywhere, she is given permission to
travel more frequently. This wife is very involved politically and often
travels to rallies and meetings. The other wives, who are completely
financially dependant on the husband of the family, are not granted
permission as often, and it is evident that their voices do not carry as
much weight in the household. Furthermore, they are not at liberty
to make certain decisions regarding the schooling and welfare of their
children. The income-earning wife pays school fees for her children
and in some cases purchases their medicine when they are sick.
Whether the increased flow of microcredit to Gossas will have
significant socioeconomic impact is unclear. From the interviews
conducted, when asked to describe lessons learned, while some gave
concrete examples, most interviewees stated that their groupement
has operated essentially in the same manner since the beginning.
Members were also asked what they needed in order to advance or
improve their organization, and all answered, more financement.
None answered that they needed more training in any area. When
members were asked what would they do if they had more money,
only two people gave very detailed responses: to build a vegetable and
fruit processing business and to open stores; but the majority answered
that they would continue to buy more products to resell in Gossas.
It is evident from this case study that women are using microcredit organizations to organize and have more voice in politics.
Indeed, women in this small town of Gossas have played a role in
getting the mayor of their region elected as prime minister in Senegal
(Macky Sall) and in return have received some spoils from visits of
the prime minister’s wife, the establishment of a northern NGO
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offering microcredit loans, and microcredit loans from the Ministry of
Family and Social Development. The crucial question to investigate
in the very near future (2–3 years) is whether these benefits have
gelled together to propel the socioeconomic development of the
community or whether microcredit and social capital merely act as
“symbolic violence” binding the oppressed to their oppressors—the
state, multilaterals, bilaterals, and northern NGOs.

Notes
1. See Gladwin (1991), Buckley (1997), Abdulai and Delgado (1999), Mordoch
(2000), and Martin and Holme (2003).
2. A joint financial arrangement in which members contribute monthly or weekly a
set amount, and the entire amount collected is awarded to one participant at a time. Each
participant gets a chance to be awarded the entire amount collected per week or month.
3. Weekly or monthly meetings that fulfill religious as well as secular purposes.
Diaras are used for educational purposes (recitation of the Quran and sermons) but also
for socialization purposes.
4. See http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri.nsf/en/gr110237e.html
5. These estimates are from 2001.
6. An Islamic sect or brotherhood in Senegal founded by Amadu Bamba Mbakke
around the 1890s. Scholars of the Muridiyya interpret the brotherhood as a response of
the Wolof to the structural changes brought about by colonization and the introduction
of a market economy (Babou, 2002, p. 152).
7. Boubous are long flowing garments consisting of a wrap skirt and shirt with a
head scarf traditionally worn by Sene-Gambian women.
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